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The dissertation explores shame and how shame shapes identities in the nineteenth century. 
While many scholars examine Darwin in terms of narrativity, how he attempts to counter the 
theological language in Victorian evolutionary discourses, and the influences he has on his 
contemporary writers, I argue that his writing on shame, which is part of his long argument on 
evolution, secularizes the concept of shame, opposing the notions of many Victorians that 
shame is God-given. Both God-given shame and secular shame are rooted in sexuality, as this 
dissertation will show, and thus shame, sexuality, and identity are interconnected. Using 
Darwin as a springboard, I examine other aspects of shame such as nationalist shame, bodily 
shame, shame in an industrialized city, shame of minorities, and sexual shame via the books of 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Elizabeth Gaskell, John Addington Symonds and Havelock Ellis. They 
were prolific in the beginning, middle, and end of the century respectively, giving account of 
how shame evolved through the long Victorian period and how Darwin’s concept of secular 
shame influenced their narratives. The writers, including Darwin, express their identities in 
relation to shame differently through their different writing styles, and those who embraced 
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Introduction: The Origin of Shame, Identity, and Darwin 
 
In Plato’s Protagoras, the eponymous narrator relates a myth about the origin of shame during 
the creation of human beings. Epimethus, the twin of Prometheus, was given the responsibility 
to distribute traits to newly created animals. When it came to humans, he, lacking in foresight 
(his name means “afterthought”), had nothing left to give. Prometheus presented humanity the 
gifts of civilizing arts and fire, stolen from Zeus. However, these gifts only enabled humans to 
stay alive, without the wisdom of staying together; political knowledge (politikē technē) was 
kept with Zeus. Humans lived in isolation and could make fire, but they could not band together 
to protect themselves from wild beasts.  Although humans did try to live as a community, they 
would eventually disperse and be destroyed, lacking in politikē technē. Afraid that the entire 
of humanity would be annihilated, Zeus sent Hermes to bestow justice and shame on all humans 
so that there would be order and bonds of friendship to create cities. Justice metes out fair 
punishments to offenders while shame prevents people from committing crimes. Against 
conventional thinking that shame is negative, the parable informs us that shame has its uses to 
keep a society functioning, and maintain bonds of relationships. Putting it in another way, 
studying the shame of a society illustrates the machinery behind it.  
Victorian society is one that involved much shame. “For shame!” is a familiar refrain 
that runs through the gamut of different genres in Victorian literature from Bleak House to 
Vanity Fair to Jane Eyre to Mary Barton to Wuthering Heights. Shame itself is a recurring and 
significant theme in many major nineteenth-century novels, often in the guise of secrets: Pip’s 
benefactor is revealed to be a fugitive from the law he has helped when he was a boy; Maggie 
Tulliver lives as a pariah after her disgraceful near-elopement; Lady Audley’s shameful 
bigamous secret is uncovered at great cost. Following Eve Sedgwick’s exposition of Silvan 
Tomkins on shame, critics such as Joseph Adamson, Katherine Hallemeier, and Andrew Miller 




Ashly Bennett’s article, “Shameful Signification: Narrative and Feeling in Jane Eyre,” is 
particularly interesting because she is developing a new way of reading Victorian novels as 
performative scenes of shame and readers as spectators.  
In this dissertation, however, I am invested in shame at a specific cultural and historical 
moment.  In 1859, Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species which, if it did not change 
the minds of Victorians regarding the creation of humans, affected the path of Victorian 
literature, as Gillian Beer and George Levine have argued convincingly. Much of the 
discussion on Darwin is centered on his influence on the narratology of Victorian literature, 
but not on the emotive change in Victorian characters. Many people saw The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, as a continuation of Darwin’s argument for 
evolution in Origin and The Descent of Man which was published only a year earlier. But in 
Emotions, while Darwin points out many similarities between humans and animals, a major 
phenomenal difference, one of which Darwin devotes the penultimate chapter, is that humans 
can blush and blushing is a sign of shame. While Beer and Levine explore how Darwin 
influenced the narrativity of Victorian novels, I propose to view the influence of Darwin in 
terms of shame.  
 
The Origin of Shame 
There are two contradictory theories on the origin of shame, one religious and one 
psychological, and both are helpful in the analysis of shame in the nineteenth century. In St. 
Augustine’s The City of God, he argues that the origin of shame coincides with the fall of man: 
It is right, therefore, to be ashamed of this lust, and it is right that the members 
which it moves or fails to move by its own right, so to speak, and not in complete 
conformity to our decision, should be called pudenda (“parts of shame”), which 




and yet they felt no embarrassment.” This was not because they had not yet noticed 
their nakedness, but because nakedness was not yet disgraceful, because lust did 
not yet arouse those members independently of their decision. The flesh did not 
yet, in a fashion, give proof of man’s disobedience by a disobedience of its own… 
their obedience was chastized by a corresponding punishment, there appeared in 
the movements of their body a certain indecent novelty, which made nakedness 
shameful. It made them self-conscious and ashamed. (130-2) 
Although, as Robert Metcalf rightly concludes, St Augustine’s inductive reasoning to 
substantiate his hobbyhorse of the conflict between the will and the insubordinate body is 
merely a “wish-fulfilment” that harkens to his wish to return to a prelapsarian world and may 
hold no water,1 it is worth examining St Augustine’s notion of shame in relation to a Victorian 
society that was largely religious.  For St Augustine, shame is the punishment of the bodily 
transgression and a reminder of the original sin. Thus the shame in Victorian novels is often 
sexual in nature. Jane Austen’s heroines are often shamed before finally choosing the right 
husband. Pip’s downfall is his desire to be compatible for Estella who is brought up to be cruel 
and heartless by the jilted Miss Havisham. Some novels, such as Wilkie Collins’s Woman in 
White and many Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s works, involve the kidnapping of a young woman 
who is forced to marry the villain. Victorian novels that revolve around shame are often 
informed by the theology of St Augustine. 
 St Augustine also suggests that the tumescent or flaccid genitals are beyond one’s 
control, signifying that shame in humanity’s fallen nature is involuntary; delinquent behavior 
does not lead to shame—one can commit a crime without being ashamed—but shame is innate, 
always present as an appendage aroused at random, making us vulnerable. This aspect of shame 
                                                
1 Among myriad interpretations of the Biblical scene, Augustine picked the one that suits his 




can be applied to a range of behaviors in Victorian novels from maidens blushing suddenly in 
front of their suitors to hiding a painting in the attic while shamelessly committing (often sexual) 
atrocities.  
 St Augustine’s understanding of shame can only take us so far and does not aid in 
understanding the raison d'être behind the writing of the novels. What drives the shame in 
Victorian characters? Robert Metcalf in “Unrequited Narcissism” argues via Freud that shame 
originates as a form of self-preservation to mitigate humans’ experience of trauma. To avoid 
losing the love of the parents when one outgrows the primary narcissism of early childhood, 
one strives to the ego-ideal which is approximately “the common ideal of a family, class or 
nation” (Freud 562). When the fear of a castrating father during the Oedipal stage is introjected 
into the child and the superego is formed, it (or the conscience) keeps the ego-ideal in check, 
and hence the initial anxiety of losing the love of parents is transmuted into an anxiety of the 
conscience. Although as one grows older, the ego strengthens, and one loses the “old 
determinants of anxiety… as the situations of danger corresponding to them have lost their 
importance… [,] anxiety with respect to the superego should normally never cease, since, as 
the anxiety of conscience, it is indispensable in social relations, and only in the rarest cases can 
someone become independent of human society” (Freud 779). The myth of Protagoras—that 
shame is necessary for bonds between people—seems to be incorporated into Freud’s 
explanation as the ego adopts shame to protect itself against anxiety. While it is easy to see 
how a Freudian reading of shame fits into many Victorian novels—Charles Dickens, for one, 
creates humor from his characters’ social faux pas, and readers laugh at their shame of not 
knowing social etiquette—and while shame is a universal affect, it is important not to assume 







While St Augustine argues that shame comes with the will, and Freud contends that shame 
comes before the will, what is common between the two thinkers is that both readings involve 
sexuality. Is shame necessarily always sexual? Sally Munt claims that shame “in the nineteenth 
century, became a code word for homosexuality and queerness” (86). Michael Warner argues, 
“Shame is an experience of exposure, in which I become suddenly an object through the eyes 
of another; it thus resonates powerfully in situations of erotic objectification, visuality, and 
display” (290). Consider John Locke’s use of shame for children, for example: “If by these 
means you can come once to shame [children] out of their faults (for besides that, I would 
willingly have no punishment) and make them in love with the pleasure of being well thought 
on, you may turn them as you please, and they will be in love with all the ways of virtue” (58). 
Shame to Locke is associated with “pleasure” and “love,” which is mentioned twice in a 
sentence. It seems that shame, to many theorists, involves sexuality. 
 The shaming of a child is Locke’s ambiguous way of mentioning corporeal punishment 
and it is worth looking at two scenes in popular Victorian novels that link shame and 
corporeality. Tom Brown receives many floggings in school but one particular flogging stands 
out because it is one of the few long and humorous descriptions of his scrape before a flogging. 
He borrows a fishing rod from his good friend, East, and trespasses on an estate. When he is 
hiding in a tree from the underkeeper, he shifts the rod to “get the rod hidden” but unfortunately 
the underkeeper catches “sight of the rod” (203, 205). Still he is “working away at the rod, 
which he takes to pieces” and remains in the tree “with lifted rod” (205). As he is afraid that 
the underkeeper may climb the tree, he “shorten[s] the rod in his hand…preparing for battle” 
(205). When eventually the underkeeper brings Tom to the headmaster, the underkeeper wants 
to confiscate the rod but Tom pleads for it. The phallic symbol of hiding, working, lifting, and 




Copperfield, Mr Murdstone, young David’s step-father, applies the cane when David stumbles 
on his lesson: 
“David,” [Murdstone] said, making his lips thin, by pressing them together, “if I 
have an obstinate horse or dog to deal with, what do you think I do?” 
“I don’t know.” 
“I beat him.”  
I had answered in a kind of breathless whisper, but I felt, in my silence, that my 
breath was shorter now. 
“I make him wince, and smart. I say to myself, ‘I’ll conquer that fellow’” (57) 
To mention these two scenes is not to trivialize the trauma of corporeal punishment the 
characters undergo, but rather the scenes exemplify how in the Victorian literary imagination 
shame is required to ward off the anxiety of trauma (Freud’s point) and shame is sexualized 
and embodied. Throughout this dissertation using varied examples such as the innocuous 
Cranford reputed to be charming and inoffensive to Victorians and the nationalist novels of 
Bulwer-Lytton’s, I argue that shame is closely related with sexuality and in particular a queer 
sexuality, in which queer is defined as ““the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of 
anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” 
(Sedgwick, Tendencies 8).  
 
Shame and Identity 
The following three illustrations, though separated by time and space, bolster the theoretical 
arguments underlying this dissertation. The first is an eighteen-century treatise on sympathy; 




an early twentieth-first-century thought experiment. Together, the three passages present a 
repeated narrative about shame and identity.2  
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea 
of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in the like situation. Through our brother is upon the rack, as long as 
we ourselves are at our ease, our sense will never inform us of what he suffers. 
They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations… By 
the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring 
all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him. (Smith 11-12) 
Several times a week I must negotiate my way past the crowds of homeless people 
on Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley. Every time I do so, I am overcome with 
irrational panic… Then, one day, I realized that I always studiously avoided 
looking at the homeless people, whom, with ruthless arbitrariness, I either help or 
don’t help. And I began to understand that my panic on these occasions is not just 
economic but specular. What I feel myself being asked to do, and what I resist with 
every fiber of my being, is to locate myself within bodies which would, quite 
simply, be ruinous of my middle-class self—within bodies that are calloused from 
sleeping on the pavement, chapped from their exposure to sun and rain, and grimy 
from weeks without access to a shower, and which can consequently make no claim 
to what, within our culture, passes for “ideality.” (Silverman 26)  
                                                
2 It should be noted that Ashly Bennett uses the same Smith and Sedgwick examples in her 
article although I have presented the examples in my drafts prior to reading Bennett’s article. 
Smith’s and Sedgwick’s anecdotes are commonly cited. Furthermore, while her point is to 




I used to ask listeners to join in a thought experiment, visualizing an unwashed, 
half-insane man who would wander into the lecture hall mumbling loudly, his 
speech increasingly accusatory and disjointed, and publicly urinate in front of the 
room, then wander out again. I pictured the excruciation of everyone else in the 
room: each looking down, wishing to be anywhere else yet conscious of the 
inexorable fate of being exactly there, inside the individual skin of which each was 
burningly aware; at the same time, though, unable to staunch the haemorrhage of 
painful identification with the misbehaving man. (Sedgwick, Touching 37) 
The three passages from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Kaja Silverman’s 
The Threshold of the Visible World, and Eve Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling are similar in that 
they link shame and identification. They show communication between an abject person and a 
subject, and shame, as a way of transmission, instils in the subject an image of the abject, 
introjecting the abject into the self, essentially changing the identity of the self. Smith’s account 
of shame differs from Silverman’s and Sedgwick’s in that the homeless in California and the 
half-insane man may not feel shame, although witnesses to the scene feel shame. In Smith’s 
exposition, the audience’s shame corresponds to the shame of the man on the rack, presuming 
that the felon feels ashamed. The spectators identify “with his shame, not with his sorrow. 
Those who pity him, blush and hang down their heads for him. He droops in the same manner, 
and feels himself irrecoverably degraded by the punishment, though not by the crime” (Smith 
71). The Victorian reader, when faced with scenes of shame in novels, are forced into the 
position of introspection; the reader is taught what is shameful, and their identities are 
transformed by what they read. 
 Be it blushing or caning, not unlike the Victorian experience of Augustine’s somatic 
shame, all three passages above deal with the corporeality of shame; subjects are invited to 




As a result, it is also a contemplation of the self; as Adam Smith put it, “As [subjects] are 
constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so 
he is constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the 
spectators of his own situation” (22). The subject has taken the place of the object viewing the 
subject. Shame breaks down and blurs lines across identities and it is this disintegration caused 
by shame, creating a change, that I discuss in this book.  
 While Smith’s subject may feel sympathy for the abject, Silverman’s and Sedgwick’s 
illustrations cause panic and anxiety in the subject’s identity. Silverman is overcome with an 
“irrational panic” when she imagines taking the place of the homeless; Sedgwick’s audience’s 
skin “was burningly aware… unable to staunch the hemorrhage of painful identification with 
the misbehaving man.” The sight of the object is imagined to encroach on the self and a threat 
to the subject’s identity as Silverman claims she cannot be herself were she to occupy the 
abject’s position3 (26). Diana Fuss would have said that the violent identification would cause 
“killing off the other in fantasy in order to usurp the other’s place, the place where the subject 
desires to be” (9); however, shame protects the self from the anxiety of trauma, as Freud has 
argued previously, and shame destroys boundaries between the self and other; there can be no 
“killing off the other” without destabilizing the subject.   
 It should be pointed out that the three accounts come from a position of power; a 
position of power of the innocent, the “middle-class self,” and the educated respectively. In 
Rhetoric, Aristotle encapsulates this aspect of shame when he writes that individuals feel shame 
because they are above the other in station (1385a). However, we know from Freud and 
Victorian novels that shame can emanate from any object. Shame is, for Freud, a way of losing 
the love of one’s parents who is in a position of power; by having shame, children can anticipate 
                                                
3 The object should not be confused with the abject. However, in the three examples, the 




parents’ judgment of them and avoid parents’ dislikes. Victorian novels also demonstrate that 
the object can come from a powerless position. Readers of Great Expectations, regardless if 
one is an aristocrat or a worker, can surely be ashamed of and with Pip’s dissolute squandering 
of his fortune. A blushing Victorian maiden, as Richard Kaye demonstrates, holds the power 
even as she is ashamed for her sexuality. Therefore, this dissertation will not pursue this 
pointless line of dichotomous thinking; instead I seek to break down barriers, showing a 
continuum and an intersection in identities.  
 Shame is so powerful in breaking down identities that all three accounts show that there 
is no difference if you gaze at the disgraced spectacle or not. Smith’s audience “hang down 
their heads for him”; Silverman “studiously avoided looking at the homeless people”; and 
Sedgwick’s listeners are “each looking down.” Yet the interrupted visual contact makes no 
difference to the imagination of the subject where they feel shame. Laura Mulvey’s influential 
essay argues that the gaze interpellates the observed as the object because it occupies a passive 
and feminine position. But here, in shame, since there is no prolonged gaze past the initial 
cursory glance, boundaries between the subject and object are dissolved.4 Even if one feels 
shame for the other, the other may not be ashamed for themselves. Unlike other emotions like 
pity or anger, shame does not produce subject and object.  
 Regarding the blurring of subject and object, Sedgwick writes about “the double 
movement shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality” 
(Touching 37). Shame is individualizing because each person feels shame differently; although 
shame is embodied, the introjection of the abject figure in the imagination differs and the shame 
may reflect on the subject more than the objective situation. Shame is relational not only 
because the subject requires an object but also because, as Smith’s and Sedgwick’s accounts 
                                                
4 For the purpose of clarity and lack of lexicon, I shall use “subject” and “object” although in 




illustrate, spectators share the same experience of shame, which bonds the group together. This 
aspect of shame, both individualizing and bonding, raises questions about the framework and 
interdependence of identities in the Victorian society; and the circulation of shame within 
Victorian literature may provide the answer.    
 
Darwin, Shame, and Identity 
It would be helpful to understand Darwin’s work on emotions, which influenced the Victorians, 
by using what we have discussed thus far, that shame intersects with sexuality, corporeality, 
and identity. While Darwin might not have anticipated Silvan Tomkins’s work on shame, 
Darwin and Tomkins appear to coincide on many points, and so, using Tomkins as a theoretical 
framework would give us a deeper understanding of Darwin’s work. Although there were 
theories of evolution before Origin, no one had caused an impact as monumental as Darwin. 
And with the paradigm shift from the divine creation of humans to evolution of people from 
animals, the Victorians’ identities were called into question. While Darwin did not directly 
tackle the question of identity, he compared the differences between animals and humans in 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, and the only difference is humans’ ability 
to blush: “Under a keen sense of shame there is a strong desire for concealment. We turn away 
the whole body, more especially the face, which we endeavor in some manner to hide. An 
ashamed person can hardly endure to meet the gaze of those present, so that he almost 
invariably casts down his eyes or looks askant” (295-6).  Darwin’s secular description of shame 
is uncannily apt for the much celebrated and much plagiarized fresco, Italian Renaissance artist 
Masaccio’s The Expulsion from the Garden of Eden, in which Adam and Eve display shame in 
their hunched poses, bowed heads, and avoidance of gaze. Eve covers her genitals, associating 
her shame with sexuality. Ewan Fernie argues convincingly that Christianity is predicated on 




crowds, degraded, spat upon, mocked with a crown of thorns and crucified between two thieves. 
Fernie reads the fall of Adam and Eve as the “passage from innocence to guilty knowledge,” 
and because they gain the knowledge that they are not one, they become ashamed and self-
conscious of their bodies “as things,” and their bodily desires as “gross and foreign” (emphasis 
original, 32). Hence it can be said that the moment Adam and Eve acquire shame from God, 
they become separate entities and form their identities.  
Fernie’s argument is thus similar to St Augustine’s reading of shame in that it is in the 
moment of expulsion from Eden, of gaining the knowledge of sexuality and the ability to feel 
shame, that Adam’s and Eve’s identities are formed. Although Darwin in his scientific study 
of emotions secularized shame, I shall argue that his work on secular shame similarly forms 
identities. Darwin is infamous for deconsecrating biblical concepts in oblique ways. In 
Darwin’s Plots, Gillian Beer suggests that one of the difficulties that Darwin faced when 
writing his theory is that the language of natural history was still entangled with theological 
language. Philip Adams in Darwin’s Worms takes Beer’s idea a step further by claiming that 
Darwin, like an earthworm, which is the subject of his last book, chipped away the influence 
of the Church. In a letter Darwin wrote to his son who wanted to inveigh against Christianity, 
he advised, “direct attacks on Christianity… produce little permanent effect” and “good seems 
only to follow from slow and silent side attacks” (qtd. in Adams 53). Darwin’s sentiments were 
reiterated in a letter he wrote to E. B. Aveling: “Though I am a strong advocate for free thought 
on all subjects, yet it appears to me (rightly or wrongly) that direct arguments against 
Christianity and theism produce hardly any effect on the public; and freedom of thought is best 
promoted from the advance of science” (Letter 12757). It seems that what Darwin was trying 
to achieve is to replace a theological language with a scientific and laicized one. Indeed, Adams 
examines Darwin’s writing on worms and claims that “It is as though the earth is reborn again 




secular maintenance myth” (58). Similarly, George Levine argues in Darwin Loves You that 
the scientist disenchants the world of its biblical myths only to re-enchant us with narratives of 
nature. Darwin’s oblique attack is then one that substitutes a religious version for a secular one, 
or in our case, a religious shame for a secular shame. 
Origin, “a very long argument,” is but an “extract” as Darwin tells us (459). As readers, 
we are to read Origin, The Descent of Men and Emotions as a trilogy. Darwin avoided talking 
about humans in Origin, which states the law of natural selection, to make ideas of evolution 
more palatable to the public. In an oblique attack, Darwin thought it was best not to deal with 
human beings in his first book on evolutionary theory.  He explained his strategic and deliberate 
avoidance in a private letter to Alfred Russel Wallace, “I think I shall avoid the whole subject… 
so surrounded with prejudices; though I fully admit it is the highest and most interesting 
problem for the naturalist” (Letter 2192). The purpose of Origin is to state natural laws and set 
the parameters for his very long argument based on the concrete empiricism he had gathered 
over the years. Between the twelve years of publications of Origin and Descent, Adrian 
Desmond and James Moore, biographers of Darwin, write, “Everyone had spoken on the rise 
or fall of man but [Darwin]” (572); sermons were preached, lectures were read and books such 
as Karl Vogt’s continental work, Lectures on Man (1864), Ernst Haeckel’s Generelle 
Morphologie (1866), Thomas Huxley’s Man’s Place in Nature (1863), and the Duke of 
Argyll’s Primeval Man (1869) were published. This abeyance is deliberate on Darwin’s part: 
to allow the dust to settle before applying the evolutionary theory stated in Origin to examples 
in Descent and Emotions. What Darwin did not say in his long argument in Origin, he 
continued in Descent by including sexual selection. Emotions was meant to be a chapter in 
Descent but Darwin’s notes were far too extensive and required a separate book. If the three 
books form a long argument, then they are Darwin’s meditation on not only what a human is 




In general, the clear structure in each chapter of Darwin’s books is to state the natural 
laws, provide examples, deal with counterarguments and end with concluding paragraphs. This 
micro-structure is replicated in the larger structure of the book: the first few chapters usually 
state the laws, the following chapters apply the laws, and last few chapters look at 
counterarguments with a concluding chapter. If the books form a long argument and we follow 
closely Darwin’s structuring of an argument, then it seems that emotions appear to be the 
counterargument to evolution: why would animals evolve to have emotions? And specifically, 
why would shame evolve in animals? It could be argued that some emotions aid in survival: 
altruism, love and sympathy help the continuation of a species, and fear pumps the adrenalin 
in a fight or flight situation but what use is shame?  
If emotions are the counterargument to evolution, then explaining what shame, found 
in the penultimate chapter of Emotions, is would be tantamount to explaining what being 
human means. For most parts of Emotions, Darwin insists that there is no difference between 
human and animal emotions. Dogs (a favorite subject of Darwin’s), for instance, show signs 
of happiness, fear and contrition. The only difference between humans and animals, stated in 
the penultimate chapter of the book, is blushing: “Blushing is the most peculiar and the most 
human of all expressions… it would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to make us 
believe that any animal could blush” (286). Blushing for Darwin is an empirical manifestation 
of what one feels within. He associates blushing with what he calls “self-attention” or calling 
attention to the self and splits self-attention into three categories, shame, shyness and modesty. 
But in actual fact, shyness and modesty are forms of shame. Janet Browne echoes my view that 
blushing is synonymous with shame for Darwin in her authoritative biography of him: 
“Blushing—and shame generally—was almost always understood as a specifically human 
quality” (383). Furthermore, Darwin defines shyness as “shamefacedness” and “false shame” 




is also another form of shame and presented as being ashamed of one’s gauche self: “He who 
is modest, and blushes easily at acts of [indelicacy], does so because they are breaches of a 
firmly and wisely established etiquette” (Emotions 307). “Why is modesty, mixed with 
triumphant feeling so similar to shame,” he ruminated in Notebook N (25). Furthermore, 
Darwin’s overarching description of blushing is, after all, when “the small vessels of the face 
become filled with blood, from the emotion of shame” (Emotions 291). As early as 1838, in 
his Notebook M on “metaphysics on morals and speculations on expression,” he asked himself, 
“What is the Philosophy of Shame & Blushing?” (Notebook M, 144). By the time Emotions 
was published more than three decades later, Darwin would have thought through his own 
question. “Shame,” he wrote, “is accompanied by blushing” (Old & useless notes 55v). When 
Darwin equates blushing to shame, this is not to say that experiences of shyness, modesty, and 
shame are the same. Clearly they are not; they differ in intensity, in objects of cathexis and in 
consequences, which in turn, shape one’s response and identity. But as Tomkins argues, “The 
failure to grasp the underlying biological identity of the various phenotypes of shame has 
retarded our understanding of these consequences as well as of the magnitude and nature of the 
general role of shame in human functioning” (134). To paraphrase Tomkins, the basic affect 
underlying shyness and modesty is shame and we need to make sense of the simplest building 
block “in human functioning” first before understanding other composite emotions that shame 
can educe. Thus, in Darwin’s usual roundabout way, while on the surface he wrote on blushing, 
the empirical expression is a metonym of the shame it conveys. 
Although Darwin is not explicit on what blushing represents, he notes that the blind, 
the “insane” (Darwin’s word), men, women, blacks, whites, Asians all blush except for children 
of a very young age. Common sense would prescribe blushing to a development of emotions 
but Darwin counter-intuitively argues that one must acquire mental facilities for “self-




self-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s own existence and being. During moments of 
blushing and shame, one is most aware of the self and comes the closest to knowing the self 
objectively and in these moments, the knowledge of self may influence one’s development of 
identity. As Tomkins states, “Shame is an experience of the self by the self” (136). Like no 
other emotions, shame forces us to examine our own selves.  
But these formative moments are not solitary. Whichever forms of shame that cause 
blushing, Darwin concludes that the principle is the same: “a sensitive regard for the opinion” 
of others, what we might today identify as a Hegelian notion of identity (Emotions 309). To 
Darwin, identity is formed when someone stands as a witness to recognize, misrecognize, or 
unrecognize one’s self, and blushing is a physical indicator of shame of bringing the self to 
being. The self-consciousness that causes blushing requires shame, a distressing feeling, when 
one is being watched. Quoting Maria and R. L. Edgeworth, Darwin wrote in the chapter on 
blushing: 
Nothing hurts young people more than to be watched continually about their feelings, 
to have their countenances scrutinized, and the degrees of their sensibility measured by 
the surveying eye of the unmerciful spectator. Under the constraint of such 
examinations they can think of nothing but that they are looked at, and feel nothing but 
shame or apprehension. (305)  
Much has been said of the observer in contemporary theories. For instance, the male gaze puts 
the spectator in a masculine position (Laura Mulvey) or the spectator watches because s/he 
knows an open secret, waiting for a scandal to be exposed (D. A. Miller). But what Darwin 
proposes is to examine from the position of the person who blushes, the one being policed and 
shamed. Only when one realizes he or she is being watched can s/he blush and have self-
consciousness of an identity. In other words, there is nothing inherently negative about shame; 




one is ashamed by another, shame breaks down one’s certainty about one’s self but, at the same 
time, forms an identity under surveillance. 
 But this notion of identity built by shame gets complicated in several ways. Firstly, 
Darwin cites an example: “A physician told me that a young man, a wealthy duke, with whom 
he had travelled as medical attendant, blushed like a girl, when he paid him his fee; yet this 
young man probably would not have blushed and been shy, had he been paying a bill to a 
tradesman” (303). Why did the wealthy duke blush at paying the physician and not a tradesman? 
Darwin proposes that “we are much more apt to be shy in the presence of acquaintances, whose 
judgment we in some degree value, than in that of strangers” (303). Darwin suggests that to be 
shameful, one has to be interested in or at least care for the opinions of the observer. In being 
ashamed to one who has initiated one’s interest, one is defamiliarized to the self (therefore 
treating the self as objectively as possible) and to the observer: the physician couldn’t 
understand why the duke blushed. The observer also becomes defamiliarized and estranged to 
the shamed: after traveling with the physician, the duke ought to be well acquainted with him 
yet at this moment of a mundane task, the physician was seen in a new light with new eyes. In 
this way, identity is complicated and constantly in flux because one behaves and is ashamed in 
different degrees to different people at different times under different circumstances. 
Identity gets more complicated as illustrated in one of Darwin’s examples. A Maori 
requested a four-year rent from a missionary, Mr. Stack, to buy himself a gig. The Maori “was 
old, clumsy, poor and ragged, and the idea of his driving himself about in his carriage for 
display amused Mr. Stack so much that he could not help bursting out into a laugh: and then 
‘the man blushed up to the roots of his hair’” (292). Darwin believed the example “is worth 
giving” when we consider from the point of view of the observed. Since the Maori could not 
have known the reason of Stack’s laughter—was Stack mocking, snickering or laughing out of 




his shame or to put it more generally, one’s sense of shame is not real because it is one’s own 
imagination of putting oneself in the shoes of the observer. During moments of shame when 
one is most “objective” and introspective, one stands in the imagined position of the other and 
constructs one’s identity.  
But more than just isolation in one’s imagination, one’s shame is individualizing and 
at the same time affecting as Darwin notes, “So strong… is the power of sympathy that a 
sensitive person, as a lady has assured me, will sometimes blush at a flagrant breach of etiquette 
by a perfect stranger, though the act may in no way concern her” (306-7). Shame can be 
experienced vicariously, as Smith, Silverman, and Sedgwick have previously admitted. The 
shamed is then not the only one experiencing the affect. Put in a position of shame, the observer 
shares a similar experience with the shamed, looking at the self through the eyes of what she 
imagines the partner to think of her, becoming aware of the self, getting closest to being 
objective at looking at one’s own identity and, at this point, the observer is capable of forming 
a new identity. Not only are the boundaries between the subject and object broken down, their 
identities form a mise en abyme, each reflecting the other, changing at any one time, infinitely 
regressing to the point that there is no real identity.  
But Darwin also mentions that the observer doesn’t have to be physically present to 
excite a blush: “one or two of my informants believe that they have blushed from shame at acts 
in no way relating to others” (308). Since blushing is performative and identity is inherently 
Hegelian, there must be someone who recalls the blush. And if Darwin believed his informants, 
then that someone must either be the self or God. Dr Burgess, as Darwin quoted him 
dismissively, suggests that perhaps God created blushing in “order that the soul might have 
sovereign power of displaying in the cheeks the various internal emotions of the moral feeling” 
(309). Of course, to Darwin, it was bosh and he could hardly be stirred to argue against the 




general theory of evolution, which is now so largely accepted,” is the one-liner that rejects Dr 
Burgess’s assertion. Just a few pages before explaining how blushing evolves, Darwin 
illustrates that “A man may be convinced that God witnesses all his actions, and he may feel 
deeply conscious of some fault and pray for forgiveness; but this will not, as a lady who is a 
great blusher believes, ever excite a blush” (305-6). In Darwin’s usual careful phrasing, there 
is no mention of shame in relation to religion: he prays because he is “deeply conscious” of his 
fault but not because he is shamed. Since blushing is not a God-given mark, being shameful is 
not being ashamed at sinning in the scriptural sense. This is not to say that one doesn’t feel 
shame in religion, but Darwin was careful to associate shame with secularity and not 
Christianity. In Darwin’s universe, shame is exaugurated and has become merely a fluid 
emotion without any moral judgment. Since it cannot be God in the absence of an observer 
when one blushes, it is the unconscious self that causes the shame: it is self-shaming and self-
loathing. But since we establish that the observer-shamed relationship changes each other and 
forms a mise en abyme, and the observer and shamed are within the same person, then shame 
is a powerful affect that effects changes within the identity of the self. No one needs to shame 
you for you to be ashamed, so there is nothing shameful about shame except in one’s self-
consciousness.  
An example that Darwin implies of the unconscious shame in the self—he was familiar 
with the concept of the unconscious via Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poems5—is blushing can 
be seen as a parapraxis: unlike other expressions, blushing cannot be induced by any physical 
“action on the body. It is the mind which must be affected. Blushing is not only involuntary; 
but the wish to restrain it… actually increases the tendency” (286). According to Darwin, 
blushing is a performance that cannot be performed on volition. Consider the actions 
accompanying the performance as Darwin describes them: “As there generally exists at the 
                                                




same time a strong wish to avoid the appearance of shame, a vain attempt is made to look direct 
at the person who causes this feeling” (296). Since blushing, an indicator of shame, reveals 
what one is thinking, the performance is a revelation and a concealment of one’s identity. The 
more one wishes to conceal, the more obvious the disclosure of one’s self.  
But the identity that one shows through blushing and shame is one that is fluid and 
unstable, not as direct as one might imagine, because shame discombobulates one’s mental 
powers. Despite parapraxes like stammering, tics and grimaces that accompany shame, the 
mind may be so disturbed that one constructs another reality. The example that Darwin 
provides: 
A small dinner-party was given in honour of an extremely shy man, who, when he rose 
to return thanks, rehearsed the speech, which he had evidently learnt by heart, in 
absolute silence, and did not utter a single word; but he acted as if he were speaking 
with much emphasis. His friends, perceiving how the case stood, loudly applauded the 
imaginary bursts of eloquence, whenever his gestures indicated a pause, and the man 
never discovered that he had remained the whole time completely silent. On the 
contrary, he afterwards remarked to my friend, with much satisfaction, that he thought 
he had succeeded uncommonly well (297).  
For fear that he might humiliate and shame himself in front of people who wanted to honor 
him, his imagined shame clouded his mind and conjured a reality where he wouldn’t be shamed. 
Under extreme distress, a shamed person is one who may present a “false” sense of identity 
but, in a way, this “false” sense of identity is also a “true” one. The man rehearsed the scene in 
his imagination and believed he had presented himself well. His friends collaborated with, 
supported, and understood his actions. Reflecting the man’s “false” identity, the friends 
presented a “false” reality, but in the man’s mind, his friends’ reactions were genuine and to 




imagination of failure of his speech surfaced, causing him to falter, the scenario became reality 
in that he had both failed and succeeded in his oration. And his friends had both recognized his 
identity as a failed speaker and supported him as if he were a successful one. Hence, not only 
does shame reveal one’s identity the more one tries to veil it, the identity that one divulges/hides 
is one that has degrees of truth and mendacity. 
One other interesting observation that Darwin made about shame is that shame precedes 
the development of morality. According to Darwin, the movements accompanying blushing, 
caused by shame—the desire to avert eye contact yet defiantly maintaining it, to bow the head 
yet awkwardly holding it up high, and to turn the body away yet facing the observer—are 
developed merely because the shamed is being observed and judged. Before the “primeval 
man… had acquired much moral sensitiveness [he] would have been highly sensitive about 
this personal appearance, at least in reference to the other sex, and he would consequently have 
felt distress at any depreciatory remarks about his appearance; and this is one form of shame” 
(302). He reiterates his point a few pages later: “It is not the conscience which raises a blush” 
although “many a person has blushed intensely when accused of some crime, though 
completely innocent of it” (305; 306). It may seem preposterous that a primeval man blushed 
because of his appearance but the more important point to note here is, to Darwin, shame 
develops before morality and blushing out of shame is not indicative of one’s guilt, that is, 
shame is independent of morality. Darwin believes that, unlike morality which is relative and 
learnt evident from the way some tribes shocked the European value system, shame is innate.6 
                                                
6  The notion that shame is developed before an infant has any concept of prohibition is 
supported by psychologist Tomkins who found expressions of shame in a child as young as 
seven months. In reading Tomkins, Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank explicate, “Many 
developmental psychologists, responding to this finding [of shame developing before 
superego], now consider shame the affect that most defines the space wherein a sense of self 





Here, Darwin uses shame to chisel away at religious guilt and provides an alternative idea of a 
self that involves secular shame to replace morality.  
For Tomkins, shame is one of the few basic building blocks of affects, closely 
connected to drives. Affects switch drives on and off but while drives are digital—after I eat, I 
am no longer hungry—affects are analog and can never be fully extinguished or satiated. That 
is how shame is interlinked with desire: one must first be interested and ignite sparks of interest 
in the other, in order to be shamed. Though not knowing Tomkins’s psychological terms, 
Darwin seemed to grapple with an understanding of the affiliation of shame and desire. The 
opening pages of the chapter on blushing contain many scandalous examples that join shame 
with desire, in the guise of scientific terms. Take a random one: “The moment [Dr Browne] 
approached [her bed], she blushed deeply over her cheeks and temples; and the blush spread 
quickly to her ear. She was much agitated and tremulous. He unfastened the collar of her 
chemise in order to examine the state of her lungs; and then a brilliant blush rushed over her 
chest, in an arched line over the upper third of each breast, and extended downwards between 
the breasts nearly to the ensiform cartilage of the sternum” (314). Put in a novel, this passage 
would have been pornographic. One recalls Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh subpoenaing 
Darwin to be a witness in favor for their defence in the (in)famous obscenity trial for publishing 
Charles Knowlton’s book on birth-control. They withdrew the subpoena when the appalled 
Darwin informed them that he would denounce them. Dr Browne’s patient blushed because 
she was aware of the sexual impropriety of his examination. Therefore, it is difficult to separate 
sexuality and shame: shame can be titillating (such as sadomasochistic role-playing) and so 
can shamelessness, a challenge to authority (exhibitionism or pole-dancing for instances). That 
is why, as Darwin notes, when ashamed, one wishes to look away but attempts to look at the 
other because in the first place, there is interest in the other and at any moment, shame may 




In fact, Darwin was well-aware of the connection between shame and desire. The 
description Darwin wrote on blushing can be used to describe a tumescence: blushing and 
erection are both “due to the relaxation of the muscular coats of the small arteries, by which 
the capillaries become filled with blood; and this depends on the proper vaso-motor centre 
being affected. No doubt if there be at the same time much mental agitation, the general 
circulation will be affected; but it is not due to the action of the heart that the network of minute 
vessels covering the face becomes under a sense of shame gorged with blood…It is the mind 
which must be affected [to cause blushing]. Blushing is not only involuntary; but the wish to 
restrain it, by leading to self-attention, actually increases the tendency” (my emphasis, 286).  
This is Darwin’s double entendre: As someone who had studied medicine, the similarities 
between blushing and the phallus must be striking to him. They both involve a complex play 
of psychological, neural and vascular elements. Blushing “must be sexual, because it intensifies 
when men and women interact,” write Desmond and Moore, commenting on Darwin’s 
memorandum on blushing. Indeed, Darwin wrote in his notebook that blushing occurs because 
thinking about one’s appearance drives “blood to surface exposed, face of man… bosom in 
woman: like erection” (Notebook N, 51-2). Darwin encodes sexual desire in the expression of 
blushing.  
Blushing’s sexual connotations have been in the Western literary tradition for some 
time.  In Redefining Elizabethan Literature, Georgia Brown, reading Francis Bacon whom 
Darwin had read, informs us: 
The redness of blushing implies that the head is hot, and suggests a potential association 
between shame and creativity, given that mental activity is supposed to produce heat in 
sixteenth-century physiology. The richly allusive somatic language of blushing also 
points to sexual transgression, not only because sexual misdemeanors provoke blushes, 




burning sensation in the head, and burning produces redness. Furthermore, the blush’s 
instability as a sign is exacerbated by the fact that excessive activity of blood was 
thought to stimulate passion, so redness becomes both the sign, and in a sense the cause, 
of sexual arousal. Consequently, not only is the blush, as a sign of modesty, easily 
confused with the flush, as a sign of activated sexuality, but modesty itself, the 
propensity to blush, may actually cause lechery, as it activates the blood which arouses 
passions. (167) 
Darwin, great devourer of books, who read Shakespeare and John Milton’s Paradise Lost 
incessantly, one of the few books he could bring on-board the Beagle due to space constraints, 
might (or might not) have inherited notions of blushing from his literary predecessors although 
there are some strong similarities in the Renaissance’s and his ideas on blushing. For instance, 
“The young blush much more freely than the old” is something the Elizabethans believed 
(Emotions 286). Or following the Renaissance idea that blushing signals both desire and 
modesty, Darwin writes, “A pretty girl blushes when a man gazes intently at her, though she 
may know perfectly well that he is not depreciating her (300). When a “pretty” girl blushes, is 
it because she is showing her desire, understanding the passion she arouses in the other, or is it 
out of modesty? This obfuscation may likely be deliberate as Tim Birkhead’s “Promiscuity” 
argues that Darwin was aware of his female readers and did not want to offend them while 
Gowan Dawson claims that Darwin wished to avoid charges of obscenity and make his 
evolution theory more palatable to both conservative and liberal Victorian publics. Whichever 
the case, Darwin is clearly associating shame and desire in his writings.  
For Darwin, the shamed party is always feminized because he uncritically associates 
blushing with femininity. “Women blush much more than men,” claims Darwin (Emotions 
287). It is easy to infer that if men blush in front of women, then the men are feminized, under 




Darwin opines, “a slight blush adds to the beauty of a maiden’s face; and the Circassian woman 
who are capable of blushing, invariably fetch a higher price in the seraglio of the Sultan than 
less susceptible women” (309-10). In Descent, Darwin introduces a second element to 
evolution, other than natural selection. Sexual selection is dependent on female choice as 
Levine states: “In discussing sexual selection, Darwin expresses precisely the same 
consternation and disbelief that anyone could deny the intention at work in the participating 
animals. The difference is that Darwin’s designer is not God but female animals” (198). 
Although Darwin eventually claims that female choice occurs among animals but not 
humans—men are still the selectors—he confesses in his autobiography of his weakness for 
happy endings and pretty heroines in novels. Levine argues that a “higher culture and a higher 
level of evolutionary development shifted the power of choice to men, but in the Autobiography 
Darwin sadly concedes his own fall from that higher culture” (Darwin Loves You 193). To 
Darwin, when a man blushes, he loses power and is feminized but when a woman blushes, she 
becomes doubly feminine and more beautiful and radiant; she gains power over men through 
expressing her femininity by her modesty. Not merely does she defeat men by simply blushing, 
she defeats men by her superior knowledge. Shame is a form of anagnorsis, blushing marks the 
transition from innocence to cognition. When a woman blushes, she knows something, yet men 
tend to overlook her knowledge and attribute the blushing uncritically to her beauty.  
Although Darwin only considered blushing in terms of heterosexual or male 
homosocial unions (women blushing in front of men or men blushing in front of other men), 
every human being is capable of blushing and this show of shame is subversive. Shame breaks 
down our ideas of our own identities, makes us strange to ourselves and others, and makes 
others strange to us. Since shame can confuse us and befuddles our sense of reality, it reveals 
our selves and not-selves and both selves are equally true and false and make us vulnerable to 




thinking of us; they may in fact not be shaming us. When one is shamed, the other in an act of 
empathy feels shame too. Hence, shame exists in a mise en abyme: the identities of two parties 
are ever-changing until shame gradually subsides but is never completely annihilated. As 
shame emanates from our own imagination, shame comes from the self, as psychoanalysts 
discover that we know shame before we know prohibitions. Shame, thus, as Darwin sees it, is 
amoral and nothing shameful, that is, one can commit a crime and not feel ashamed and 
conversely, one can feel ashamed without committing any peccadillo.   
Thus Darwin forms the basis of this dissertation on understanding shame in the 
nineteenth century. The second, third, and fourth chapters revolve around the early, mid-, and 
late Victorian works represented by Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Elizabeth Gaskell, and John 
Addington Symonds and Havelock Ellis respectively, showing how Darwin’s notions of shame 
have affected their writings.  
The chapter on Bulwer-Lytton demonstrates the usage of nationalistic shame in the 
nineteenth century before Darwinian evolutionary theory. Even though Bulwer-Lytton and 
Darwin share many common notions about shame, Bulwer-Lytton’s inflexible religious 
structures of shame contrast greatly with Darwin’s secular shame and, as a result, Darwin’s 
narratives proliferate and vary whereas Bulwer-Lytton’s early novels are similar to one another. 
In his novels, homosocial bonds between men are valued over heterosexual relationships but 
since homosociality is sterile, hindering the heterosexual procreation required for England to 
maintain its supremacy over the colonies, the author uses shame to manipulate the workings of 
nationalism. Therefore, unlike Darwin’s concept of shame which creates a fluidity in identities, 
in Bulwer-Lytton’s notion of shame, honor, and pride exists in a fixed stasis in order to create 
the English identity and its dominance over the colonies.  
The chapter on Gaskell, Darwin’s contemporary, focuses on the shame of women’s 




writing in terms of shame. Gaskell’s life and works demonstrate a complicated entanglement 
with private shame. When the production of her body for a child has failed her—her infant son 
died—her husband persuaded her to write, or in other words, Gaskell directed the shame of 
non-productivity of her body to produce literary works. Compounded to her bodily shame is 
the shame of publishing. Her books are exposed to be shamed and spoken about. In order to 
face the shame of being seen, the minister’s wife imagined herself to be a man, St Sebastian, 
whose suffering has a godly purpose. This transgendering of sexes is often depicted in her 
novels where men behave like women and women like men. Hence, Gaskell utilizes the affect 
of shame to interrogate and destabilize the self and identity. 
  The second chapter talks about nationalistic shame prior to the publication of Origins; 
the third chapter revolves around women’s’ bodies in an industrial age of mechanical 
production, which coincided with the fierce debates regarding the veracity and duplicity of 
Darwin’s theory; and the last chapter discusses the shame of sexuality following the influence 
of Darwin, exemplified by the autobiographies by sexologists Symonds and Ellis. The men led 
rather different lives. The homosexual Symonds came from a well-to-do family, excelled 
academically, and was on the way to a brilliant academic career until scandals ruined it, 
inducing him to live an itinerant life, paying for boys on the Continent. Although his 
Renaissance in Italy, which came out in seven volumes, made him a leading man of letters, his 
reputation suffered greatly later in his life as he had come to be known to be insane among the 
English literati. The heterosexual Ellis, on the hand, came from a poor family and achieved 
mediocre results in school. He was not a good doctor and had almost flunked medical school. 
However, his inaugural work on human sexuality put him as the forerunner of the British 
sexologists. Clearly, they suffered shame differently in life and this difference is, I argue, 
reflected in their writing in their autobiographies. Symonds’s writing is meandering, almost 




using a Foucauldian lens to analyze the autobiographies demonstrates that Ellis remains 
trapped in the superstructure of panopticon whereas Symonds’s shame, implied through his 
indirect style and his treatment of his memoirs, places him outside of the Foucauldian power, 
effects changes for the study of sexuality, and perhaps gives progress to the equality of 
homosexuals. 
 Although each chapter in the dissertation is fairly independent, they are linked by 
Darwin, identity, shame, and how shame affects their narrative styles. While one usually hides 
in shame, these Victorian writers and thinkers studied here demonstrate different ways of 
circumnavigating through shame via their public writings in such a way that they used shame 
to manipulate social expectations and/or to anticipate the repercussions of their writings. 
Darwin explored secular shame as a meditation on what is it to be human; Bulwer-Lytton for 
a nationalist propaganda to build an English identity; Gaskell to ruminate on gender identity in 
an industrial state where humans are replaceable easily by machines; and Symonds and Ellis 
wrote on sexuality, which they suggest is a building block for their identities. All were 
traumatized by shame, most avoided it, and those who embraced it could channel it into their 
writing as a form of cathexis. Their struggles with shame manifested in their narrative styles 
as will be apparent in the chapters. By investigating popular Victorian writers in respect to 
shame and identity, this dissertation hopes to illustrate that while shame is a universal affect, it 
is also historical and cultural and can change with time: shame had changed from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century to the end, from a stiff notion of morality and gender to a resistance 






Chapter One: Darwin Ashamed and Why He Wrote 
The introduction of the dissertation has explicated Darwin’s concept of shame to Tomkins’s 
theory and how the concept would influence contemporary writers such as Gaskell and the 
sexologists in the late nineteenth century. Following the introductory chapter, this chapter 
illustrates the ways Darwin had been through shame and how the affect seeped into his writings. 
Shame begins, Darwin argues, when one is “highly sensitive about this personal appearance” 
(Emotions 302). Darwin himself had always been embarrassed by his nose. Someone had 
cruelly said it was “like a farmer,” and he bore the smart for the rest of his life (qtd. in Voyaging 
10). His later jokes reveal “a shaky self-image and a lack of confidence”: his nose, Darwin 
joked, was “as big as [a] fist” (qtd. in Voyaging 10). It was because of this nose that Captain 
Robert Fitzroy of HMS Beagle almost rejected Darwin for the voyage. He felt himself so ugly 
that he almost did not propose to his wife, Emma. Even at an old age, when his bust was 
sculptured and portrait painted, he would put the bust inconspicuously at a corner of a room 
and “scorn” it and describe his portrait as one of an “old dog” (Power of Place 423; 424). The 
association and myth1 of nose and penis could not escape readers and according to Sexuality in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain, the myth has its roots in Aristotle’s Masterpiece and is often the 
source of double entendres in Tristram Shandy, which Darwin had read. Darwin’s nose 
symbolizes the intersections of sexuality, shame, identity, and the corporeality that this chapter 
focuses on. After showing the ways Darwin was ashamed, I argue that Darwin’s struggle with 
shame seeped into his writings and the affect is transferred to the reader. Reading shame as the 
basis of Darwin’s work and reading his work as stemming from shame open up new ways of 
understanding his work in its formation, motivation, and reception. 
 In addition to his appearance, Darwin was also ashamed of his background. His 
infamous grandfather, Erasmus, was a philandering libertine who had too much of “wine, 
                                                




women, [and] warmth” (Desmond and Moore 7).    Erasmus’s wife was an alcoholic and died 
inebriate, leaving him five children. He then married his rich patient, an illegitimate earl’s 
daughter, who had a child with her first husband. Together with his two bastards (with a 
governess), the ten of them lived in the earl’s daughter’s country mansion. The backlash of the 
riots of 1791 put an end to this modish libertinism: Erasmus’s “erotic botany was denounced 
as titillating trash; his ‘atheism’ lambasted as the sort of demoralizing philosophy” (Desmond 
and Moore 11). The backlash “ushered in a period of respectability and evangelical rectitude, 
which was to mark the younger generations of Darwin-Wedgwoods” (Desmond and Moore 
11). What was tolerated in Erasmus’s time was censured, denounced and chastised in Darwin’s 
years. Darwin’s grandfather’s behavior had to be kept hush-hush. At the time of writing 
Descent, another illegitimate offspring of Erasmus’s was discovered. Evolution was itself an 
affront to the Church and if Darwin’s family background was made known widely, it would 
make evolution harder to swallow. When Darwin wrote Erasmus’s biography and let his 
daughter, Henrietta, proof-read, she, armed with a bright red pencil, censored him. All the talk 
about sex, illegitimacy, and unorthodox Christianity was struck off. Although Browne argues 
that there is little evidence that Darwin used Henrietta as a “convenient feminine censor, or as 
a ready-made moral vigilante… to identify… any hint of nineteenth-century impropriety,” he 
did let her use her sensibility to censor and eradicate the passages that she thought were 
inappropriate and he let her corrections stand (Power of Place 347). His own daughter’s 
disapprobation of her father’s origin sent a clear signal to Darwin, and his readiness for his 
daughter to red pencil his writing demonstrates how he wished to avoid shaming himself and 
his family to the public eyes.  
 Another related shame is the shame of inferiority when compared to his brother, Eras, 
in the era of the right of primogeniture. While Michael Lewis does not agree with Tomkins and 




one is pitted against another. Indeed, the idea of a comparison is for one party to put the other 
party to shame. Seen as intellectually inferior to his brother, Darwin made a constant effort to 
match his brother (Voyaging 10). Many—Thomas Carlyle for example—who had met the 
siblings thought Eras the cleverer of the two. “A great deal of Charles Darwin’s later dogged 
persistence can be attributed to the struggle of a younger brother to match what he believed 
were the natural gifts of the older,” wrote Browne (11). In addition, his comparison with his 
brother also brought about comparisons with his dissipated uncles and there was a fear that 
Darwin might turn out to be like them (Desmond and Moore 20). 
Perhaps the reason why Darwin was shamed by his brother was because he did not do 
as well in school. In his education, “he was too ordinary for a Darwin, perhaps even deficient” 
(Desmond and Moore 20). Reverend Samuel Butler, grandfather of the novelist with same 
name, shamed him in front of his schoolmates by calling him “very unjustly a ‘poco curante,’ 
and as I did not understand what he meant it seemed to me a fearful reproach” (Autobiography 
40).  When Darwin left the school, “I was considered by all my masters and by my Father as a 
very ordinary boy, rather below the common standard in intellect” (Autobiography 27). It 
seemed as if the shame followed him through his schooling days: “During the three years which 
I spent at Cambridge my time was wasted, as far as the academical [sic] studies were concerned, 
as completely as at Edinburgh and at school… I attempted mathematics…but I got on very 
slowly” (Autobiography 50). Although eventually he did score well upon graduation, shame 
had long marred his education as he did not live up to the Darwin name but his brother did. 
In the same paragraph in which Darwin wrote that he was of below-average intellect, 
he commented, “To my deep mortification my father once said to me, “You care for nothing 
but shooting, dogs, and rat-catching, and you will be a disgrace to yourself and all your family” 
(Autobiography 27). Darwin’s father’s view was reiterated by Adam Sedgwick, his mentor and 




turning out an idle man,” a line which Susan, Darwin’s sister, came to know of and conveyed 
to Darwin (Letter 6418). Darwin’s own father, Sedgwick, and Rev’d Butler, all paternal figures, 
had at one time or another shamed him. 
The shame of failing or the fear of failing his paternal figures intensified at the 
University of Edinburgh, where he was sent to study to become a doctor. Darwin came from a 
family of doctors. His grandfather was one of the most celebrated doctors in the eighteenth 
century. His father was equally skilled and economically shrewd, running one of the largest 
medical practices out of London. His uncle, whom he was named after and who passed away, 
was an intelligent medical student at Edinburgh. His brother, whom Darwin had always looked 
on as a role model, studied medicine at Edinburgh and Cambridge. At Edinburgh, Darwin 
discovered he could not stomach the sight of blood and couldn’t fulfill the patrilineal legacy. 
When the school break came and he returned home, he did what most gentlemen his age did in 
an avoidance of shaming: he trekked and tried not to remain in the same house as his father, 
too ashamed to face him (Voyaging 64).  
Shame is the fear of loss of love. Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer argue that shame 
occurs when one fails to reach the ego-ideal: “Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear 
of hatred but the fear of contempt… of abandonment, the death of emotional starvation” 
(emphasis original, 28-9). Shame then is the failure of some kind which gives rise to the fear 
of being disowned. While Darwin feared the loss of paternal love, he had already lost a 
maternal one literally. Thus perhaps the most significant childhood and young adulthood event 
that caused him the most shame is the death of his mother.2 Many biographers, psychoanalysts, 
and critics have written on the subject of his mother’s death. Desmond and Moore remark that 
the death’s “impact on Charles, difficult to assess, was certainly profound” (14). Death is 
                                                
2 Gaskell too suffered from the shame of loss and death, as I will argue in the third chapter. 




shameful, as John Bowlby argues that premature separation of infant and mother brings about 
feelings of shame as the child fails to find the missing object and every loss that we suffer in 
adulthood returns us to the first loss, along with its feelings of shame. But Julia Kristeva notes 
that the separation of infant and mother is the moment of abjection where an identity is formed 
and the self and the (m)other are distinguished. The abject thus refers to the perceived threat of 
loss of meaning by the eradication of boundaries between the self and other. Kristeva associates 
the abject with the Real, particularly with Death: “The corpse, seen without God and outside 
of science, is the utmost of abjection” (4). Anything that is linked with death—such as blood,  
which Darwin was sickened by later in his adult life—recalls to mind the trauma of being 
mortal and our eventual death. Shame “is the greater part of the experience of abjection” 
(Pajaczkowska and Ward 3). Like Kristeva, Tomkins agrees that boundaries are eradicated 
when shamed and elegantly puts it in one short sentence: “Shame is the most reflexive of affects 
in that the phenomenological distinction between the subject and object of shame is lost” (136). 
Tomkins’s statement is similar to the mise en abyme example we have discussed in the 
introduction of the dissertation because reflections of self and other are infinite until the 
difference between them is disappeared. In short, separation between child and mother, 
regardless if it is premature, helps us maintain a stable identity, but when we come across a 
death, the death recalls us to a time before the separation and threatens the collapse of self and 
other, exposing us to the anxiety beneath, making us susceptible to abjection and shame. Shame 
washes over us when abjection sets in; when words fail us, our ability to differentiate the self 
and the other collapses, demolishing boundaries of masculine/feminine, good/bad, etc. To 
avoid dissolution of boundaries (and hence psychosis), Donald Campbell suggests that a 
“shame shield,” a barrier before the self and the shaming other, is erected for self-preservation. 
Darwin seemed to have constructed a shame shield with regards to his mother. He was 




death was shrouded in secrets and shame. “My mother died in July 1817, when I was a little 
over eight years old, and it is odd that I can remember hardly anything about her… I believe 
my forgetfulness is partly due to my sisters [and Darwin’s father], owing to their great grief, 
never being able to speak about her or mention her name” (Autobiography 21). Caroline, 
Darwin’s younger sister, could recollect details of the death but not Darwin. On the day of her 
death, the children were summoned into her room to view the corpse. When reminiscing about 
the scene at her deathbed, he could only recall “her black velvet gown, and her curiously 
constructed work-table,” without any mention of the deceased body (Autobiography 21). 
“More than once he wrote that ‘my memory here is an obscure picture” (Voyaging 20). The 
unspeakability of his mother’s death made the death shameful and apparently affected the 
shame-prone Darwin more than his sister. It seems that Kristeva’s theory of abjection applies 
in Darwin’s case: in order for the young Darwin to establish his own budding identity, he had 
to kill the Mother in him but as he was doing so, his real mother died and he could have 
associated the shame of two deaths—one psychological, one real—as one. The deathbed scene 
with his mother is a direct confrontation of his identity: the ejected abject, as a visual warning 
of his impending death, lay physically in front of him, recalling him traumatically and 
shamefully to the time before the separation of self and other as the binary of life and death 
was blurred. Shame of death thus works on two levels with Darwin: a guilt-shame (“I have 
done something wrong, I killed or could not protect my mother”) and the shame from the 
experience of the abject. To maintain his own identity, the shame shield that his family taught 
him was avoidance and silence. His mother’s death caused him so much trauma and shame that 
he shunned all funerals of significant importance to him. He did not attend his father’s, nor his 
most beloved child, Annie’s funeral. The funerals of his mentors and father figures, Charles 
Lyell and John Henslow, he avoided. On all occasions, he pleaded ill health, which, as we shall 




My analysis of the shame Darwin felt in face of his mother’s death is rather different 
from Carolyn Dever’s in Death and the Mother from Dickens to Freud. She uses a Freudian 
psychoanalytic lens, that is a “vexed desire for a mother who is dead, and [an] intense rivalry 
with a father who is all too present,” but reading Darwin in such light is to ignore many pieces 
of evidence that go against such a Freudian reading (179). Leaving aside the general flaws and 
problems of a Freudian reading, Darwin loved his father. Darwin wrote that his father was “a 
remarkable man” and had “powers of observation and his sympathy, neither of which have I 
ever seen exceeded or even equaled” (Autobiography 27). He trusted his father who was the 
“best judge of character” to the point that it “seemed almost supernatural” (41-2; 30). In a rare 
display of his affections, Darwin confided in a letter to Joseph Hooker, his closest friend, “I do 
not think any one could love a father much more than I did mine, and I do not believe three or 
four days ever pass without my still thinking of him” (qtd. in Power of Place 426). A Freudian 
reading thus is flawed because it brings about with it the problems of Freudian theory and 
focuses too narrowly on rivalry when Darwin lived in a homosocial society where the men 
supported one another’s theories. Shame, to me, seems to explain the death of Darwin’s mother 
in more complete and encompassing terms. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the repression of the memory of his mother’s death 
“manifested itself in peculiar ways” (Desmond and Moore 14). For one, both Browne and 
psychologist Bowlby in his biography of Darwin agree that Darwin learnt from the incident to 
push aside all unhappy and unpleasant things by sweeping them under the carpet and diverting 
attention to other things. For instance, at around the same time of his mother’s death, a funeral 
of a dragoon-soldier occurred near his school and he could remember it distinctly 
(Autobiography 24). Darwin was projecting his grief and shame of the death of his mother to 
an unknown stranger who was given a soldier’s funeral and presumably died an honorable 




displacing his grief to a complete stranger, and his shame of death was transformed to pride in 
the honorable soldier. The silence and shame revolving his mother’s death also signal to him 
how he should behave, that is to say, he should not talk about his feelings, he should ignore 
them and not be introspective (Power of Place 398). Although Pat Jalland is examining how 
Victorian agnostics dealt with mourning, what she mentions about Darwin is equally true due 
to his trauma and shame: “the Darwins did not talk about the meaning of death in theological, 
philosophical or any other terms, nor try to discern any purpose in Annie’s death” (347). The 
Darwins simply did not talk about deaths because of the shame involved.  
It was the desire to shy away from shame compounded from his appearance, family 
background, his inferiority to his brother, his below-average intellect unbefitting the Darwin 
name, fear of loss of paternal love, and death of his mother, that made Darwin a “stickler for 
etiquette” (Voyaging 282). Besides, shame is the need to avoid pain, a lesson learnt from his 
mother’s death, and by being respectable, Darwin could avoid the pain of being a social outcast. 
Since shame requires the other, Darwin’s need to avoid shame was so extreme that he placed 
a mirror outside his study window like Alfred Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott” so that he 
could see who was approaching his room. Shame occurs, Darwin noted, when one breaches a 
social rule. He was so aghast at his manservant for having long hair that he gave him a “public 
and sarcastic dressing down, and he was horrified when his maid forwent her bonnet” 
(Voyaging 282). Since Darwin wanted to avoid shame, an affect which calls attention to the 
self, a breach of the gentleman’s code, “a compelling need for quiet respectability dominated 
Darwin’s life” (Desmond and Moore 203). Indeed, right at the start of Darwin’s career in 1831, 
Henslow once observed to him in a letter: “One of your foibles is to take offence at rudeness 
of manners & any thing bordering upon ungentlemanlike behavior” (Letter 150). In Woman in 
White, Wilkie Collins noticed the Victorian gentleman’s protocol, “Never mind about his 




respectability” (13-4). It was not respectable to Darwin that he figured out the workings of 
evolution, a theory that would shake the Christian foundations of Victorian society, a lesson he 
learnt early when in 1829 radicals Richard Carlile and Revd Robert Taylor came to Cambridge 
to lampoon the Anglican liturgy. They had both been in prison for blasphemy and there in 
Cambridge, they were social outcasts. The proctors made sure they had no housing. In 
Darwin’s later years, he would remember them, “fearing that he himself might be similarly 
reviled, an outcast of respectable society, a terror to the innocent, an infidel in disguise” 
(Desmond and Moore 73). In 1844, he completed the manuscript on evolution but did not 
publish it. His fear of shame made him delay his publication because the theory “was still 
associated with riot and revolution” (Desmond and Moore 315). Instead, he wrote a strange 
letter to his wife, Emma, to publish “in case of my sudden death” (Letter 761). Similar to how 
E. M. Forster left instructions to publish Maurice only after his death, they were both ashamed 
of the secret lives they led. Brown asserts that Darwin “would prefer to be dead rather than 
suffer the controversy which he knew would break over his head. He would prefer to be dead 
rather than deliberately hurt Emma’s feelings, or even worse, be the cause of her social 
ostracism” (Voyaging 447). Fearing social outcast, the men Darwin chose to be his allies did 
not always agree with him but they must be respected in society (Voyaging 448). Behind the 
veil of respectability, Darwin had hidden his shame at all cost.  
 Right from the start, Darwin had associated science with shame. In Edinburgh, he, 
sixteen, joined the Plinian Society, an indictable, seditious group of “fiery, freethinking 
democrats who demanded that science be based on physical causes, not supernatural causes” 
(Desmond and Moore 31). The meetings were held at an underground room, signifying its 
secrecy and shame. Robert Grant, his surrogate brother for five months in Edinburgh and his 
first mentor who encouraged him to present a paper at the Plinian Society on polyps in 1827, 




blasphemy and sex with men could put them in prison, bringing shame, and hence in Darwin’s 
mind, the connection between science and illegality and shame was sealed. 
 If general science was shameful to a young Darwin, transmutation was downright 
ignominious. Not only was it easy to dismiss and scoff at evolutionists—John Ruskin, for 
instance, termed Darwin’s “deep & tender interest about the brightly coloured hinder half of 
certain monkey” as “pernicious nonsense” (qtd. in Power of Place 477)—transmutation was 
seen as a direct challenge to the Church because to claim that species can change over time is 
to gainsay that God created each being as perfect. When Darwin was unwittingly researching 
a transmutation problem for Grant, “he could see that it was far from respectable” (Desmond 
and Moore 40). At around the same time when Darwin was in Edinburgh, a timber merchant 
claimed that “inherited privilege ran counter to nature’s law of progress through competition. 
An aristocracy was debilitating, it bucked evolution. If society did not change, he warned, 
Nature would ‘avenge’ herself; she would plunge the British race into decrepitude, push it into 
a bywater of history” (Desmond and Moore 40-1). Science here was linked with politics. The 
merchant was arguing for the elimination of class system that England had depended on for 
hundreds of years. According to Desmond and Moore, this was Darwin’s first taste of the 
cataclysm that transmutation could do to shatter the foundations of Victorian society through 
social, political, economic, and religious repercussions. 
Darwin was not the only one who considered against publishing on transmutation for 
the shame and disrepute it brought. When a future son-in-law asked Robert Chambers why he 
did not admit to writing his “greatest work,” Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), 
a massive bestseller published anonymously, he pointed to his eleven children and replied, “I 
have eleven reasons” (qtd. in Desmond and Moore 323).  Everyone was guessing who wrote 
Vestiges, and some fingers pointed to Darwin. As a homophobic person in shame harbors same-




denounced the book to Lyell and distanced himself from it for fear the stain of shame would 
fall on him (Desmond and Moore 348).  
The shame connecting to transmutation deepened on his return to England after the 
voyage of the Beagle. He furtively worked on this theory of transmutation, ashamed of its 
disrespectability, telling no one except Eras, “for fear he be branded irresponsible, irreligious 
or worse” (Desmond and Moore 233). In 1838, he was secretary to the Geological Society of 
London: “his identity was split,” Desmond and Moore write, because he wrote in his 
transmutation notebooks at night and in the day was ashamed to face Lyell, Richard Owen, 
Sedgwick, William Whewell, all of whom except Owen were father figures to Darwin (236). 
If they knew, he would be dishonored as a “traitor. His respectability would be compromised. 
Not only would his science be impugned, he himself would be accused of reckless abandon” 
(Desmond and Moore 239). Darwin, still as secretary, witnessed the disgrace of his erstwhile 
mentor Grant’s summary justice regarding a fossil heresy. Another warning came in William 
Lawrence’s fall from grace. His “scientific rhetoric achieved a pyrotechnical brilliance” but 
“he had been forced to resign his post at the College of Surgeons and recant his [materialist 
views of man and mind] after a vicious attack in the Tory Quarterly Review… The Court of 
Chancery ruled his Lectures on Man blasphemous” (Desmond and Moore 253). Darwin had a 
copy of Lawrence’s book, a constant reminder of the shame and obloquy that would follow if 
he published the transmutation notebooks.  
Besides the shame of disappointing his paternal figures, destroying the Church and 
societal hierarchy and bringing social ostracism and infamy on himself and his family, 
transmutation also presents a very deep and personal shame for the Darwin-Wedgwoods. A 
pivotal aspect of transmutation is hereditary because, for change to occur, the children must be 
able to inherit traits of their parents. A peahen may choose a peacock with just a slight shimmer 




with more shimmer, the trait will be enlarged, passed down with every generation. But while 
positive traits are amplified, so are deleterious ones. Darwins and Wedgwoods had a history of 
intermarriages. Darwin’s maternal grandfather, Josiah Wedgwood, married his cousin, Sarah 
Wedgwood. Darwin’s father married their daughter, Susannah Wedgwood, Darwin’s mother. 
His mother’s early death and the severe spinal curvature of Elizabeth his sister made him 
suspicious of the ills of inbreeding. Darwin himself married Emma, his cousin. He blamed his 
and his children’s weak constitution on his ancestry: Annie, his daughter, “inherits, I fear with 
grief, my wretched digestion,” he wrote to his cousin, William Fox (Letter 1396). Out of ten 
children, two died in their infancy—one of whom was severely mentally challenged—Annie, 
Darwin’s favorite child, died at ten in 1851 and the rest were often ominously ill. “George was 
sick and home from school, Etty languished in bed every morning, [and] Lizzy still behaved 
strangely” (Desmond and Moore 447). The shame of transmutation is such that for a theory of 
the survival of the fittest, a theory that he worked on day and night, his own children could not 
be qualified as strong in the race of natural selection. 
Yet as Darwin was shamed, he was motivated by shame. Tomkins hints that shame is 
so basic an affect that it enables or disables a project: shame “operates only after interest or 
enjoyment has been activated, and inhibits one or the other or both. The innate activator of 
shame is the incomplete reduction of interest or joy” (134). What this means is science, 
considered to be shameful to Darwin, had sparked his interest and he refused to give up his 
interest because at any one point, the shame might turn to enjoyment. Gabriele Taylor takes 
Tomkins’s suggestion a step further by asserting that shame drives our actions because it 
reveals to us our real values and identities and inspires us to live up to those values, that is to 
say, shame shapes and unveils and forces us to fulfill our ever-shifting identities. Shame gives 
us our self-esteem and self-respect. Thus although transmutation presented a personal shame 




writings. In The Effects of Cross and Self Fertilisation, he calls cross- and self-fertilization of 
ordinary plants “legitimate” and “illegitimate” marriages. “Legitimate” marriages would, to a 
Victorian reader, be analogous to a heterosexual union, the norm. Self-fertilization or 
“illegitimate” marriages would conjure images of onanism, same-sex desire, and inbreeding. 
While by and large Darwin agreed that inbreeding would weaken the offspring, he used the 
terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” that are defined in legalese and not “natural” or 
“unnatural” because, to Darwin, all forms of sexuality that could happen in nature are “natural.” 
He wrote, “But as no instance was known with animals of any evil appearing in a single 
generation from the closest possible interbreeding, that is between brothers and sisters, I 
thought the same rule would hold good with plants” (8). He deflected his shame by distancing 
the experiment from his own consanguineous marriage, as if he was objectively conducting a 
scientific experiment, but in doing so, he made the experiment more scandalous, between 
“brothers and sisters.” In the sixth generation of the experiment, a self-fertilized plant, or a 
plant from an “illegitimate” union, for the first time grew taller and stronger than cross-
fertilized ones. Darwin proudly named the underdog “Hero.” If deviant sexuality is shameful, 
and if transmutation is shameful in the eyes of his father figures, then his writing, the daring 
act of pronouncing a monstrous object born between siblings as heroic, demonstrates that he 
turned the shame to pride. 
As he was scribbling in his notebooks on transmutation that led up to the publication 
of Origins in 1859, his health broke. For someone who had travelled throughout the world and 
“performed mental and manual feats” without any obvious ill effects, his shame about his work 
and “living a double life with double standards” must have been colossal to take a toll on him 
(Desmond and Moore 233). As Freud shows that criticism from parental figures is equivalent 
to the shame of loss of love, Darwin’s childhood and young adulthood experiences of shame 




of Auguste Comte’s Positive Philosophy which states that true knowledge comes from 
“positive” facts and not theology, a stance that Darwin adopted, “he developed a headache 
from the stress” (Desmond and Moore 260). Darwin felt shame through the empathy of feeling 
what Comte might have felt. Even as late as 1868, almost ten years after the runaway success 
of Origin, when he published Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, he 
claimed that “if I try to read a few pages I feel fairly nauseated” (qtd. in Desmond and Moore 
550). “The sight of book sickened him; his old insecurities resurfaced, his fear of rejection and 
loss of status” (Desmond and Moore 550). Shame had never left Darwin. He learnt from his 
mother’s death that the best way to deal with shame and criticism was to avoid them. When he 
escaped from London to Down, “he breathed an enormous sigh of relief. Here he was at a safe 
distance from society. No more worry about what people might say; the rustics would respect 
him for the gentleman he was, not judge him by what he thought or wrote. He would see 
everyone on his own terms, when and as he pleased” (Desmond and Moore 302). Darwin’s 
description of the motions accompanying blushing in Emotions states a strong desire to avoid 
being seen. Shame, to Darwin who prided his reputation, was so excruciating and private that 
he literally shunned being seen.   
 His escape to Down was one of his methods of evasion of the direct shaming and 
criticisms he had to face from his paternal figures, the other method, his illness. His illness is 
both an evasion and manifestation of shame. Most of Darwin’s critics agree that “he had a 
tendency to become psychically and/or psychophysiologically ill when confronted with 
unpleasant events” (Colp 5). In 1858, James Copeland stated that in A Dictionary of Practical 
Medicine stomach problems might be due to “nervous and hypochondrial temperaments” and 
this diagnosis appeared to fit Darwin’s illnesses (1044). Brown, in several instances in her 
biographies of Darwin, wrote: “Darwin’s illnesses were… something of an inconvenience in 




have sometimes used these illnesses as a way of restricting unwanted social commitments” 
(Power of Place 227); his illnesses were “escape mechanisms” (Power of Place 384). For 
instance, in the early years with Emma when he still went to church, the dampness of the church 
made him unwell but he miraculously recovered in time to dine and go for a play (Voyaging 
405).  In a book-length study, Colp tracks the history of Darwin’s illnesses, attempts to give a 
diagnosis and dismisses all of them including gout, dyspepsia, catarrhal dyspepsia, chronic 
indigestion, pyorrhoea, auto-poisoning, chronic neurasthenia, cardiac arrythemia, Chagas’ 
disease, appendicitis, duodenal ulcer, chronic cholecystitis, diaphragmatic hernia, diabetogenic 
hyperinsulinism, porphyria, arsenic poisoning, anorexia, pleurisy, and severe allergy. Colp also 
looks into psychiatric illnesses but finds them unsatisfactory too. Perhaps Colp could not find 
a single psychiatric illness because Darwin was pinned by shame. When Darwin took breaks 
from writing, from shaming, his health improved but when he faced shame, he was sickened. 
Even the slightest private “cautions on the species-question” from his confidants, Hooker and 
Gray “overwhelm me in confusion & shame; it does make me feel deuced uncomfortable” 
(Letter 1562). When Roman Catholic biologist St George Mivart, one-time protégé of Darwin’s, 
attacked his work, his illness exacerbated, his inexplicable symptoms aggravated.  
The paradox of Darwin’s illness is that, despite its chronicity, he was so prolific in his 
biological and literary offspring. This is not to say that Darwin was so disingenuous as to feign 
illness. His illnesses were very physical and real but feelings of shame often triggered them. 
Many critics argue that shame must be purged. Although Campbell is writing on sexual shame, 
it is apparent that the shame could still be applicable to Darwin: shame is expelled by changing 
from the position of helpless passivity to active agency. Similarly, as Friedrich Nietzsche 
suggests, one needs to get rid of shame so that one can reach one’s potential but shame is 
necessary for protection of the self in face of situations that are not wholly comprehensible. 




and to become the person he wanted to become but at the same time, the more he wrote, the 
oftener he was sick, the more he damaged a bodily part of him. He needed the shame, never 
fully extirpated, to drive him to write, to give him self-worth but, by writing, he was exposing 
himself to the ridicule of the world.  
Darwin at seventy years old confided in Francis Galton, “I have never tried looking into 
my own mind” (Life and Letters 3:238). If he had looked into his mind, he would find that it 
was shame that was enervating and, at the same time, rejuvenating. In 1838, when he was 
mulling over the problem of how blushing and shame could have evolved if transmutation was 
true—why should we develop shame? How does it aid in our survival?—he had a dream. He 
jocularly wrote, “Thought that a person was hung & came to life, & then made many jokes 
about not having run away &c., having faced death like a hero, & then I had some confused 
idea of showing scar behind (instead of in front, having changed hanging into his head cut off) 
as kind of witty, showing he had honourable wounds” (Notebook M 143-4). The person in the 
dream was obviously Darwin himself. When he came out of the closet and told Hooker about 
his theory of transmutation, Darwin remarked, “It was like confessing a murder” (Letter 729). 
He clearly saw himself as a criminal in a time when transmutation was associated with anarchy 
and social unrest. Hung for his “murder,” he was a person redivivus like a secular Jesus or 
Lazarus. Shame caused Darwin to hide and withdraw from society and to be someone he was 
not, but shame also forced him to be the ideal person that he wanted to be, to tell the truth, and 
to live again. Just as he projected the shame of his mother’s death onto the pride of a righteous 
soldier, his writing turned his shame into “honorable wounds.” 
One of the themes of Darwin’s writing that turns shame to pride is the slavery and 
treatment of “savages” he witnessed on his voyage. Those against transmutation were against 
the idea that an ape ancestry bestialized Europeans and ranked them the same as slaves and 




lower in order than the Europeans and there would be no excuse to subjugate and exploit them, 
a complete annihilation of social hierarchy. How shameful it would be to be on the same 
standing with them. Slaves and savages by the nature of their race and state of “civilization” 
were already in a shamed state. But as Darwin travelled the world, he witnessed the physical 
degradation of the slaves and savages. Slaves were whipped and abused, families were torn 
apart, sold to different estates. Soldiers killed savages in the name of God and to colonize lands. 
Indubitably in his mind, he could not bridge the gap of vast differences between a savage and 
an European, but still, he firmly believed that all humans were from the same stock. To lay 
hands on another being just because one is in a position of power is to shame and degrade 
oneself.3 Thus, Darwin’s shame is two-fold: his shame is the shame of betraying the European 
intelligentsia and his paternal figures due to his transmutation theory and it is also the emphatic 
shame of what Darwin saw was the subordinate other. Once, Darwin recounted an incident in 
which he waved his hand to signal where he wanted a slave to ferry him but the slave 
misinterpreted his intentions: “Instantly, with a frightened look and half-shut eyes, he dropped 
his hands. I shall never forget my feelings of surprise, disgust and shame, at seeing a great 
powerful man afraid even to ward off a blow, directed as he taught at his face. This man had 
been trained to a degradation lower than slavery of the most helpless animal” (qtd. in Voyaging 
214). The shame of the slave—because of his status, race, and actions—was transmitted and 
reproduced in Darwin. Darwin was both ashamed of and for the slave.  
But yet if slaves and savages are shameful to opponents of transmutation, then all 
humans are equally shamed, as Darwin noted, “It is absurd to talk of one animal being higher 
than another” (Notebook B 74). Or rather, since Darwin saw no shame in humans being animals, 
then all humans are equally shameless: in Descent wrote he, “He who has seen a savage in his 
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native land will not feel shame, if forced to acknowledge that blood of some more humble 
creature flows in his veins” (619). This interplay from shame to pride on slaves and savages is 
demonstrated early in Darwin’s writings in Voyage of the Beagle. Darwin came across a group 
of runaway slaves who were “seized with the exception of one old woman, who sooner than 
again be led into slavery, dashed herself to pieces from the summit of the mountain. In a Roman 
matron this would have been called the noble love of freedom: in a poor negress it is mere 
brutal obstinacy” (59). Not only exposing the double standards of the Victorians, Darwin 
rewrote suicide, a sin and a shame in Christian theology, into something regal and virtuous by 
harking back to a Western and respectable mythology. She was described simply as “old,” 
signifying experienced, long-suffering, venerable, worthy of respect. His almost-theatrical 
description—“dashed herself to pieces from the summit of the mountain”—elevates the status 
of the shamed slave to the numerous Roman women who committed suicide. What others saw 
as shameful in slaves, Darwin rewrote into pride.  
Shame forces us to renounce the object but Darwin’s unwillingness to renounce 
writing about transmutation heightened his self-consciousness, which is why writing, like 
blushing, is a proprioceptive activity. And like blushing as an expression of shame, Darwin’s 
writing is shame cathected. “We work ideas through our bodies; we write through our bodies, 
hoping to get into the bodies of our readers,” expounds Elspeth Probyn in “Writing Shame” 
(141). She narrates how writing has taken a toll on her body and, on reflection, discovers that 
it is the shame of her contents that causes her ailments. Although she begins the chapter with 
her sympathy for Darwin and how writing made him sick, she does not take a step further to 
uncover the reason behind his illnesses. Gilles Deleuze argues that the body is not unified and 
not bounded by its physicality; it is made up of many elements in constant movement and 
interaction with other bodies, forming multiple connections, or what Darwin would called “an 




with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth… these 
elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in 
so complex a manner” (Origin 489). A dip in the population of herbivores causes a dip of 
carnivores, but in a more metaphorical sense, bodies affect other bodies through affects. 
Supported by scientific ideas on propriocentrism, Brian Massumi explicates, “feelings have a 
way of folding into each other, resonating together, interfering with each other, mutually 
intensifying, all in unquantifiable ways apt to unfold in action, often unpredictably” (1). 
Deleuze’s and Massumi’s views are echoed in other studies. Building on Tomkins, clinical 
psychologist Gershen Kaufman explains that interminable shaming can accumulate to become 
a dominant trait in a person. This state of shame eventually is embedded in the body, 
relationships, or competence. In short, writing affects the body that writes and the bodies that 
read the writings.  
Unconsciously, Darwin’s writings demonstrate the two Deleuzian notions of the 
multiplicities of the selves, affecting one another. Firstly, Darwin saw his writings as 
extensions of himself. He often called his books his children, his published travel journal was 
“my first literary child” (Autobiography 96) and pangenesis, a theory of his, was his “beloved 
child” (qtd. in Desmond and Moore 551). All his books were “offspring of his fertile 
imagination” (Desmond and Moore 551). Like his biological progenies whom he was proud of 
for their achievements and slightly ashamed of their inbreeding ancestry, his literary babies 
gave him both pride and shame. Pride stemmed from the praise he received especially from his 
father figures and the book sales. All 1, 250 copies of Origin were sold out on the first day. 
Emotions sold 7, 000 copies quickly and his “small book of little moment” on worms sold the 
best (Desmond and Moore 650). But his books also humiliated him. He often associated his 
work with shame: “Talking of shame!, I have sent a copy of my Journal with [a] very humble 




200 reviews of Origin, tracking the compliments and insults. His book was “shamefully 
imposed” on the public (emphasis original, letter 2814). If his geological theory on the 
mechanical origin of cleavage and foliation should “ever be proved, I shall not look back with 
utter shame at my work” (letter 1633). His books then worried and excited him as extensions 
of his selves, like his children. His books were part of him but had lives beyond him. 
 As Deleuze states that bodies affect bodies through emotions, even as Darwin’s books 
were part of his selves, his affects transmit through them to the readers. Beer evinces in her 
eminent book, Darwin’s Plots, that he was a master storyteller. But a good narration isn’t 
merely about techniques, it is about the ability to affect and influence the reader. Style is 
important to Darwin, as his son Francis notes in Life and Letters. Levine hints that in 
disenchanting the world of its Biblical myths and reenchanting it with nature, part of the credit 
goes to Darwin’s affective prose. His children often teased him on his effusive enthusiasm in 
describing nature. A larval barnacle isn’t a larval barnacle but has “six pairs of beautifully 
constructed natatory legs, a pair of magnificent compound eyes, and extremely complex 
antennae” (Charles Darwin 99). The descriptions, “beautiful,” “magnificent,” and “complex,” 
are vague but their purpose is to stir in the reader’s imagination a sense of awe and wonder, 
corresponding to Darwin’s. In the same way, shame could seep into his writings, consciously 
or unconsciously, and be transmitted to readers through his body of works. 
It was not only that transmutation is a theory of shame, or Darwin was shamed for his 
entire life, or shame drove him to write, to turn shame into a badge of honor, but also that the 
affect seeps into his writing unconsciously. His style of writing is a style of shame. Stemming 
from shame and other feelings, two of Darwin’s symptoms had to do with hands and lips (Colp 
6). “My lips,” Darwin wrote to his cousin Fox, “have lately taken to be bad, which will prevent 




be unable to travel because of one’s lips.4 But as we have shown that Darwin’s illnesses were 
often psychosomatic in nature, his lips and hands are symptomatic and tell a tale of their own. 
Lips and hands are essential to storytelling: you narrate a story and gesticulate or you pen it 
down. In both oral and written traditions, Darwin had some difficulties. Darwin, like his father 
and grandfather, was a stammerer, having difficulty with the consonant “w.” His elders would 
reward him if he could pronounce “white wine” clearly. Emma or his daughters read novels to 
him in the afternoons, he was never the narrator. But perhaps he had spun all the yarns he 
wanted as a child:  
I was in those days a very great story-teller [sic] for the pure pleasure of exciting 
attention and surprise. I stole fruit and hid it for these same motives, and injured trees 
by barking them for similar ends. I scarcely ever went out walking without saying I had 
seen a pheasant or some strange bird (natural history taste); these lies, when not detected, 
I presume, excited my attention, as I recollect them vividly, not connected with shame, 
though some I do, but as something which by having produced a great effect on my 
mind, gave pleasure like a tragedy. I recollect at Mr. Case’s [school] inventing a whole 
fabric to show how fond I was of speaking the truth! My invention is still so vivid in 
my mind, that I could almost fancy it was true, did not memory of former shame tell 
me it was false.” (emphasis original, More Letters 3-4) 
Both Browne and Beer read the passage as a triumph of the imagination: analogous to Darwin’s 
paradox of “pleasure like a tragedy,” of lying about speaking the truth, they see that his 
speculations, grounded in reality, were merely an exaggeration and magnification of 
experiences and in a sense, “an imaginative rethinking of daily life” (Browne 14). In lying lies 
“a form of truth discovery” (Beer 25).  
                                                
4 In Gaskell’s Cranford, Matty’s father writes to her because her mother has broken her leg, 




But besides truth, lies, storytelling, pleasure, and memories, the keywords are shame 
and attention, both words mentioned twice in the above short excerpt. As Darwin states in 
Emotions that blushing of shame is drawing attention to the self, Darwin wanted to draw 
attention to himself in telling these lies. He wished to be looked at and looked upon and to be 
discovered. Shame requires the self and other to form identities. Darwin represented himself 
as a confused body of a complex matrix of shame: the lies, Darwin claimed, were not connected 
to shame but in some cases, they were. When were lies connected to shame and when not? It 
was difficult for Darwin to pinpoint a moment because shame means that the identity is in flux. 
But whatever the case, his lies were so convincing even in his own mind that he almost believed 
them to be true if not for the shame of lying. Even though the lies he told to draw attention to 
himself were shameful, it was also through shame that he could disbelieve the reality he created 
or, put in another way, shame made him honest. It is easy to see why he kept his evolutionary 
theory quiet for so long because he turned the shameful theory in his mind to see if he could 
shame himself to disbelieve it and he could not. 
Darwin’s style of shameful narration is dependent on honesty. But it has been noted 
that Darwin found writing as onerous as speaking. His son Francis comments that Darwin 
“often laughed or grumbled at himself for the difficulty which he found in writing English, 
saying, for instance, that if a bad arrangement of a sentence was possible, he should be sure to 
adopt it” (Life and Letters 154). Similarly, his daughter Henrietta mentions that “He did not 
write with ease, and was apt to invert his sentences both in writing and speaking, putting the 
qualifying clause before it was clear what it was to qualify” (Life and Letters 154). Beer 
attributes the burden of his writing to a theologically laden language of the nineteenth century. 
To counterpoise the ecclesiasticism in language, Beer proposes that Darwin uses several 
narrative strategies, such as anthropomorphizing nature—so that the creator is Nature, not 




of Tree of Life. But Beer doesn’t point out that Darwin had to resort to narrative strategies, 
metaphors and anthropomorphizing, precisely because language is not precise enough. 
Because this linguistic imprecision is not accurate, as if it is a form of prevarication, it is a 
cause for shame. The disconnection of the signifier and the signified is shameful because 
language does not represent the honesty and precision Darwin wanted, as he would have learnt 
from his contact with different languages in his travels. Writing lacks honesty and that is 
shameful, causing Darwin an impediment and to toil under language’s strain. Even at an old 
age, Darwin still had “as much difficulty as ever in expressing myself clearly and concisely; 
and this difficulty has caused me a very great loss of time; but it has had the compensating 
disadvantage of forcing me to think long and intently about every sentence” (Autobiography 
111-2). As mentioned earlier, Kristeva sees the arduousness of writing, or more precisely the 
lack of words, as a sign of abjection and shame, and this abjection and shame of Darwin’s came 
from the nebulous nature of language.  
The Darwinian linguistic paradox is thus this: narration requires honesty to get rid of 
the shame in transmutation but language itself is shameful because it is inexact and 
approximate. What Darwin might have (unwittingly?) done could be a precursor for feminist 
and queer writings. To undercut the phallogocentrism and heterosexism inherent in language, 
feminists and queers often use language in unpredictable ways, stretching the linguistic limits, 
using forbidden proscriptive grammar, such as run-on sentences. One’s writing may be queer 
without being explicitly queer: Henry James, Marcel Proust and Joseph Conrad for examples. 
One’s writing could be queer without being homosexual; and being homosexual doesn’t 
necessarily mean the writing is queer. Darwin himself was a fan of run-on sentences or 
grammatically incorrect sentences: he “frequently put too much matter into one sentence, so 
that it had to be cut into two” (Francis Darwin, qtd. in Life and Letters 154). He was “sure to 




way. He was committed, Henrietta informed us in 1903, to “invert his sentences,” especially 
with regards to qualifying clauses. Surely, Darwin was capable of learning a grammatical rule 
and correcting himself since he made the same mistake over and over again? The term 
“inversion” that Henrietta chose is used to refer to same-sex desire in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Henrietta, the editor of many of Darwin’s scientific books, might 
probably have heard of the term but also probably did not mean to apply same-sex desire to 
Darwin’s writing. But what she meant was that his writing was strange and defamiliarizing. In 
a paradoxical move, Darwin made the imprecise language vaguer, more dishonest by 
incorporating bad grammar that causes one to read a few times before comprehension. In short, 
Darwin linked shame, honesty, and queerness in his writing. 
Darwin’s writing is so queer that it reflects differently on different people. On the one 
hand, Darwin and “at least one good judge” knew that Darwin’s writing “is not a good style” 
(Life and Letters 155). A reviewer remarked Darwin wrote in a “conceited & cock-sure style, 
which shame [Darwin] a little” (Letter 2537). On the other hand, “His style has been much 
praised… His courteous and conciliatory tone towards his reader is remarkable, and it must be 
partly this quality which revealed his personal sweetness of character to so many who had 
never seen him” (Francis Darwin, qtd. in Life and Letters 155). Here, Francis has cast his father 
in a “feminine” role (in the nineteenth century sense). Darwin sought to please and was sweet; 
he did not want to be “conceited & cock-sure.” Henrietta too feminizes her father as she 
comments on her editing: “He was always so ready to be convinced that any suggested 
alteration was an improvement, and so full of gratitude for the trouble taken. I do not think that 
he ever used to forget to tell me what improvement he thought I had made, and he used almost 
to excuse himself if he did not agree with any correction. I think I felt the singular modesty and 
graciousness of his nature through thus working for him” (qtd. in Life and Letters 154). In 




in expressing his emotions, he was always first to submit and defer to her, he was gracious and 
modest, a form of shame Darwin has pointed out in Emotions. As we have discussed in the 
previous section that shame is queer because it feminizes men, Darwin himself is the exemplar 
of a feminized man, queered by shame, shown through his writing. Perhaps so accustomed was 
he by the lifelong shame of his writing that, towards the end of his life, he called himself an 
“old woman” (Charles Darwin 76). Darwin’s shame, experienced through his illnesses and 
expressed in his writings, pushed the limits of the body and language: his body broke down 
and changed its sex, the understanding of language was tested with bad grammar. In other 
words, the mind and body were in conflict and yet shame connected them both—the mind 
caused Darwin to be sick, the body wrote his thoughts. Hence, shame produces, in this clash, 
new subjectivities of the body and language. Out of shame came the theory of evolution. In 
this sense, shame is generative.  
In writing about shame, Darwin was not trying to associate emotions with women nor 
was he demonstrating men’s superiority of triumph of reason over emotions, as suggested by 
Sara Ahmed in The Cultural Study of Emotion. The point of Darwin’s Emotions is that 
everyone, men and women across all races and ages, has emotions. He was also not claiming 
that emotions have no place in a dog-eat-dog world, as argued by Patricia Jalland. On the 
contrary, he wished to justify the role of emotions in the competitive world. Darwin’s life was 
consumed by emotions and, as I emphasize, by shame. His appearance, family scandals, 
inferiority to his elder brother, mediocrity in school, disappointing his parental figures, 
dereliction of his family occupation, and especially the death of his mother, caused him great 
humiliation and shame. With great shame, he wanted all his life to avoid the pain of shame by 
being respectable and maneuvered with great expertise to achieve credibility and reputation. 
But even his writing is shameful. Writing on transmutation is shameful because it equates 




shameful because the writing is based on a reading of ancestors’ inchoate forms as texts of 
failure.  
Like Frankenstein seeking the secret of life because of the death of his mother, the 
shame of Darwin’s mother death drove him to research the origin of life to the point that writing 
made him sick. Anyone who has written before knows that writing is dependent on the body 
and Darwin’s body was ridden with shame. The shame in his bodies of work was transmitted 
to readers by his queer and shameful style of writing, which is at once honest and dishonest, 
rambling and clear. To produce such shameful, queer writing, his body is a combat zone where 
ideas and experience shaped by shame threaten to tear it apart but in the end, his body is a 
productive one, generating new theories about mediating our identities in relation to time and 












Chapter Two: “We Must Inculcate the Sentiment of Shame”: Shame and Nation-
Building in Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s The Caxtons Trilogy 
To desire to do something, not only as well as it can be done, but better than we can do 
it—to feel to exaggeration all our own natural deficiencies towards the doing of it—to 
resolve by redoubled energy and perseverance to extract from art whatever may supply 
those deficiencies in nature—this is the surest way to become great—this is the 
character of the English race—this should be the character of an English genius. 
 But he who thus feels, thus desires, and thus resolves, will keep free from rust those 
mainsprings of action—the sensibility to shame, and the yearning towards perfection.  
-Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s “On Shyness”  
In the epigraph, Edward Bulwer-Lytton elucidates the defining characteristic of the English. 
To have a sense of honor and shame is not only patriotic, it is the source for the English to 
excel, a “yearning for perfection”; shame drives the English, whatever their “deficiencies in 
nature” are, and “redoubled [their] energy and perseverance” to achieve something great, as 
Bulwer-Lytton writes in a chapter called “Shyness” in Caxtoniana (59). Like Darwin, Bulwer-
Lytton views shyness as a gradation of shame and defines shyness as “shamefacedness” (49). 
To them, shame encompasses shyness: shyness “has its root in the generous sensitiveness to 
shame,” as Bulwer-Lytton quotes Plutarch (53). “Shyness… is a certain nervous susceptibility, 
a perpetual comparison between one’s own powers and some ideal standard of excellence 
which one can never wholly attain, but towards which one is always striving” (53). In other 
words, shyness is the shame of never being able to match up to one’s ideal self and identity, 
but it is this shame, a desire to perfection, that motivates the English. 
Darwin and Bulwer-Lytton think of shyness-shame in a few similar ways: shyness-
shame is dissimulating, and contagious (51-2). It is more common in the young than the elderly 




excel and fears to fail” (58). Both thinkers also agree that shame requires a second party to 
reflect on one’s action: “You could still blush or turn pale at the thought of a stain on your 
honour” because you imagine what others would think of you (59). Shame, to them, is not a 
negative affect: the avoidance of shame drives people to reflect on their actions, to possess a 
sense of morality, to “set before his imagination some ideal perfection to which he desires to 
attain, and of which he fears to fall short,” to inspire “courage when it feels like fear” (56; 54). 
 In other ways regarding shame, they disagree, as Darwin argues that all human 
beings—from the insane to aboriginals, from the mightiest to the lowest—feel shame but 
Bulwer-Lytton states that shyness-shame is a “national character,” and “The British race are 
shy to a proverb,” but not “Turk and Red Indian [who] do not improve” (58). Although, to 
Bulwer-Lytton, the English are susceptible to shame and the fear of failures, there are variations 
within the English race as shyness-shame is “more prevalent with the high-born than the 
plebeian” (52). The “eldest sons of good family are generally more shy than the younger” 
because, in a primogenitary society, eldest sons are more ashamed of failures. But “vigorous 
competition” cures the shyness-shame in “the high-born” as “high rank in England [is] so 
generally associated with the discharge of public duties, that if these elder sons be born to pre-
eminent stations, their shyness will often wear away when their faculties are called into 
exercise by the very inheritance which deprives them of the stimulus of gain, but, bringing 
them at once before the criticism of public opinion, supplies a motive of coveting public esteem” 
(52-3). While Darwin and Bulwer-Lytton agree that shame is humanizing, the latter opines that 
there are races and classes of humans more susceptible to shame and thus more equal than 
others. To Bulwer-Lytton, a sense of honor and shame is not only necessary to prevent a 
complete revolution of government and class system, they are traits essential to Englishness 




“aristocratic spirit.” But while they could be found in every English citizen, only “true” male 
aristocrats who possess the spirit could become natural, talented, brilliant leaders.  
To understand how Bulwer-Lytton uses the notion of shame in a nationalist context, 
this chapter examines The Caxtons trilogy (The Caxtons, My Novel, and What Will He Do with 
It?) alongside his non-fictional essays on class, gender, and sexuality. Although The Coming 
Race, a novel on a dystopia brought about by the fruition of evolution, may appear suited for a 
comparison between Bulwer-Lytton and Darwin, I deliberately chose early nineteenth-century 
novels published before Origin to demonstrate the shift in thinking about shame between 
Bulwer-Lytton and Darwin, and the influence of Darwin regarding shame on later writers such 
as Gaskell (Chapter 3) during the mid-nineteenth century, and J.A. Symonds and Havelock 
Ellis (Chapter 4) at the fin de siècle. As a contrast to Darwin’s understanding of shame in which 
he utilizes it to interrogate the subjectivity of the self in light of his agnostic beliefs, Bulwer-
Lytton’s shame, underlined by his Protestant upbringing, defines his sense of selfhood in 
relation to England and masculinity, and because Darwin’s understanding is individualistic, 
that is, shame operates differently for different people under different circumstances, and 
Bulwer-Lytton’s notion is predetermined and prescriptive, Darwin’s narratives are multifarious 
whereas Bulwer-Lytton’s novels have similar trajectories. This chapter begins with an 
examination of Bulwer-Lytton’s intention in writing novels and essays, and of how shame 
affected and seeped into his writing. A combination of his intention and the shame he suffered 
engender the production of his brand of nationalism to be transmitted through his writings, as 
shown later in the chapter, before finally analyzing shame in The Caxtons trilogy.   
 
Bulwer-Lytton’s Intention in Writing 
In the common imagination, Bulwer-Lytton is now reputed as the man who persuaded Charles 




mightier than the sword,” and “It was a dark and stormy night,” the oft used opening in high 
school students’ stories. But at the height of his popularity, Bulwer-Lytton’s novels outsold 
even Dickens’: his were the most extensively published in Britain between 1830 and 1870 
(Edward Bulwer-Lytton 136).  Not only were his novels immensely popular, his political 
treatises were highly influential as exemplified by the pamphlet A Letter to a Late Cabinet 
Minister on the Present Crisis, published in the aftermath of King William IV dismissing Lord 
Melbourne’s ministry in 1834, which ran for twenty-one editions in six weeks and sold thirty 
thousand copies. The pamphlet was credited with the return of Lord Melbourne’s victory in the 
ensuing elections (Schor 129). Bulwer-Lytton, a lifelong friend of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli, wrote on England and the English, and was elected a Minister of Parliament for St. 
Ives in Huntingdonshire in 1831, and for Lincoln in 1832, and sat for that city for nine years. 
He returned as a conservative for Hertfordshire from 1852 till 1866 when he was raised to the 
peerage of Baron Lytton of Knebworth. In 1858, he held the post of Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Bulwer-Lytton’s novels then not only captivate and encapsulate the Victorian 
imagination, they are infused with his political thoughts. A writer imparts his way of seeing 
the world through his work and because Bulwer-Lytton’s politics entwined tightly with his 
personal life, an analysis of his novels demand an understanding of his politics. 
 One could make a case that his novels, like many early Victorian novels, are 
nationalistic, propagandistic, and didactic. In contradistinction to Thomas Carlyle’s materialist 
ethic, expressed succinctly in his memorable phrase “virtue by Profit and Loss” (76), Bulwer-
Lytton argues that the novel should cultivate good values. In his non-fiction work, England 
and the English, the novel, as a mode of popular and powerful communication, should 
“inculcate a venerating enthusiasm for the true and ethereal springs of Greatness and Virtue… 
the noble aspirations that belong… to the diviner excitation of the soul” (379). In another non-




Moral Effect of Writers,” that art “is essentially ethical; because every true work of Art must 
have beauty or grandeur of some kind, and beauty and grandeur can not [sic] be comprehended 
by the beholder except through the moral sentiment” (115). An excellent novel, to Bulwer-
Lytton, should inspire readers to “Greatness and Virtue” by moving, touching, affecting them. 
To lead by example, Bulwer-Lytton’s characters are often edified by books. Pisistratus Caxton, 
the protagonist, and his uncle Roland de Caxton in the first of The Caxtons Trilogy, The 
Caxtons, are humbled by the Life of the Reverend Robert Hall, which depicts a life of fullness 
that incites them to action and out of their heartaches from the impossibility of their one-sided 
infatuation. In the second of the trilogy, My Novel, or Varieties in English Life, Leonard 
Fairfield writes a novel so instructive that villains weep and repent after reading it. Bulwer-
Lytton’s hook-and-bait writing style seduces readers with sensational and moving storylines, 
but, in the end, leaves readers with moral lessons by tugging at their heartstrings.  
 His didactic intentions did not escape attentive Victorian readers. In 1880, American 
diplomat Henry Wikoff writes in his autobiography that in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels, there is a 
“vein of philosophy that pervaded that attracted me, and aroused a habit of reflection vastly 
beneficial. I believe I derived more instruction in this way from Bulwer than any author I ever 
read” (25). John Ruskin echoes Wikoff’s sentiments: Bulwer-Lytton’s works “must always 
refine the mind to a great degree, and improve us in the science of metaphysics” (“Essay” 371). 
But the foible of didactic novels is that they run the risk of being sententious and sanctimonious, 
of placing oneself in the position of a teacher above the readers. Perhaps William Makepeace 
Thackeray had spotted Bulwer-Lytton’s sense of superiority and did not hold back on his 
vituperation, calling Bulwer-Lytton “Bulwig,” who was “bloated with vanity, meanness, and 





 Even as Bulwer-Lytton’s writings reflect his propagandistic and moralistic agenda for 
the public, they are also meditations on what it means to be human in light of the scientific 
theories of evolution—What is human if humans are animals?—and these meditations are 
clearest in his essays. In “On the Spirit in Which New Theories Should Be Received,” he mocks 
Darwin: “out-Lamarcking Lamarck, appears Darwin!” (150). He, as a staunch Christian, goes 
on to discuss other scientific discoveries, such as Bichat’s, and repudiates them. “All that we 
think, feel, and imagine,” he writes, “[is consolidated] into one absolute unity—LIFE. Notable 
discovery! which, in plain words, simply means this, Life is life!” (151, emphasis original). 
Bulwer-Lytton would go on to write The Coming Race, a “solemn quiz on Darwin,” as he calls 
it in a letter to John Forster (qtd. in Darton v-xv).  In the novella, he out-Darwins Darwin by 
creating a satire of a dystopia, which concludes with the triumph of God, and the exalted 
position of the human race. Bulwer-Lytton’s meditations on being human culminate in 
Caxtoniana which contains essays on the nation (“On the Spirit of Conservatism”), morality 
(“On Intellectual Conduct as Distinct from Moral,” “On Moral Effect of Writers,” etc), writing 
(“On Style and Diction,” “Of Essay-Writing,” etc), and emotions (“On Shyness,” “The 
Sanguine Temperament,” “On Self-Control,” etc). On the surface, Caxtoniana, named after the 
The Caxtons trilogy, appears to collect essays of disparate themes, yet a closer inspection can 
connect the themes to explain Bulwer-Lytton’s concerns of being human, especially an 
Englishman, guided by morals and emotions. In essence, to examine Bulwer-Lytton’s works, 
one must look at the intersections of nationhood, morality and the human condition; all these 
issues are enmeshed together and any analysis missing one component is an incomplete one. 
Although Darwin and Bulwer-Lytton set out from different paths—one was a skeptic, the other 






Bulwer-Lytton’s Shame and Honor: Nationhood, Gender, Sexuality 
“Despite the taunts of enemies who gloated over his publication failures,” Christopher Lane 
writes, “the collapse of his marriage to Rosina Wheeler was more damaging and humiliating” 
(608). In 1827, Bulwer-Lytton married Rosina Wheeler, an Irish beauty of no social standing 
or wealth, against his mother’s implacable opposition. His mother cut off his allowance but the 
parent and son reconciled three years later when his marriage was on the brink of collapse. His 
separation from Rosina would bring him a lifelong shame partly because of Rosina’s public 
altercations and partly because of his own abusive reactions. Their quarrels were made public 
with mutual accusations of infidelity.   He was “so violent towards his wife that a servant fled 
the scene in terror” (Mulvey-Roberts 160). After they were legally separated—he did not want 
a divorce as it would hurt his political career—Rosina wrote thinly veiled romans a clef to 
traduce, calumniate, and shame him publicly. In Cheveley (1839), he is lampooned as the 
villain, Lord de Clifford, taking after the name of Bulwer-Lytton’s eponymous hero in Paul 
Clifford (1830). She caricatures him as Sir Liar and Sir Coward in her The Budget of the Bubble 
Family (1840) and The Peer’s Daughter (1849) respectively. In Rosina’s Behind the Scenes 
(1854), Henry Ponsonby Ferrars, who is an author and M.P. like Bulwer-Lytton, tries 
unsuccessfully to commit bigamy with the heroine. Ferrars’s German mistress is a ghost-writer, 
a barbed reference to rumors of Bulwer-Lytton publishing his German translations under his 
name while secretly employing his daughter’s German governess to translate his books 
(Mulvey-Roberts 163).  
Not only did Rosina shame Bulwer-Lytton publicly in her novels, she did so in her 
private correspondence. In a letter to her friend, Dr Price, Rosina wrote, “If you can read novels 
do read ‘The Woman in White’ [sic] by Wilkie Collins. It will remind you slightly of my history. 
Sir Percival Glyde and Count Fosco are very pretty rascals as far as they go, but mere sucking 




Wilkie Collins, “The great failure of your book [The Woman in White] is the villain; Count 
Fosco is a very poor one, and when next you want a character of that sort I trust you will not 
disdain to come to me. The man is alive and constantly under my gaze. In fact he is my own 
husband” (qtd. in Escott 331-2). This is not to say that Bulwer-Lytton was the victim—he took 
their children away from her—but rather he was shamed by the airing of dirty laundry in public 
on what was supposed to be a private affair between two adults, and he retaliated in a public 
manner.  
In June 1858, after multiple caricatures of Bulwer-Lytton appeared in Rosina’s books, 
when he stood as a parliamentary candidate for Hertfordshire, she denounced him publicly at 
the hustings. As a result, she, like Laura in Woman in White, was forcibly committed to a 
lunatic asylum by Bulwer-Lytton, and was released after three weeks with the help of her 
husband’s political rivals. Not satisfied to immure her, Bulwer-Lytton was so incensed and 
ashamed that he threatened to bring an injunction to prevent the republication of Rosina’s Very 
Successful! (1859) in which he was satirized as Sir Janus Allpuff. His shame was so debilitating 
that he wrote to his mother, “My career is blighted; my temper soured; my nerves shattered; 
and if I am to go on for ever [sic] in this way because she insists on continuing to force herself 
upon me, god knows what I shall do at last” (qtd. in Sadleir 403). As Rosina’s biographer 
argues, she “evolved scheme upon scheme to malign and embarrass her husband. Bulwer, the 
man she had loved, whose every fear was at her mercy, was an easy quarry for her wiles, and 
she pursued him with relentless and savage fury until his death” (Flower 20; also see Blaine).  
Besides the attacks from his wife, Bulwer-Lytton had many literary detractors. One of 
them, Thackeray, condemned his poetry as “flimsy, mystical, namby-pamby” and called 
Lucretia (1846) “his most appalling and arsenical novel” (qtd. In Hollingsworth 199-200). A 
humiliated Bulwer-Lytton almost challenged Thackeray to a duel, which his two friends 




resulting in a mortifying quarrel made public in Punch (see “Alcibiades,” “After-thought,” and 
“The New Timon”). Unlike Darwin whose respectability in society stemmed from his personal 
conduct and shame from his studies, Bulwer-Lytton’s shame arose from his public brawls.  
But his shame was not debilitating; as he claims that “the sensibility to shame” fuels 
the “yearning towards perfection,” he as the Secretary of State for the Colonies was driven by 
shame to strive for political and literary honor. Honor and shame are words he frequently uses 
in his novels. In My Novel, “honor” and its derivatives occur no less than 327 times, “shame” 
and its derivatives, 120 times. But critics seldom discuss honor and shame in relation to 
Bulwer-Lytton’s works on nationhood. In not talking about shame, critics miss out on Bulwer-
Lytton’s idea of the defining characteristic of and the driving force behind the English.  
Joachim Mathieu’s “England and the English: Perceiving Self and Other” argues that 
Bulwer-Lytton sees the European Other not as an antagonist, but as someone to emulate. “It is 
important,” Mathieu concludes, “to see oneself through foreign eyes in order to understand 
oneself and to observe models from abroad in order to reform oneself” (97). But Mathieu 
cherry-picks his evidence and neglects to take into consideration Bulwer-Lytton’s pride for 
England. He ignores lines like “Courage is more universally spread through the raw material 
of England than it is among that of any other people” in England and the English (1: 90, 
emphasis original). In many of Bulwer-Lytton’s novels, Europe outside of England is often 
seen as a depraved den of sins. In The Caxtons, Francis Vivian, the villain, is inured to iniquity 
partly because of his Spanish mother’s upbringing. Effeminacy among Englishmen is often 
depicted as a French affliction. The threat in My Novel emanates from Italy. To enable a reading 
like Mathieu’s is to ignore evidence from Bulwer-Lytton’s oeuvre, and to ignore the pride he 
took in being an Englishman.  
Like Mathieu, Charles W. Snyder in “Bulwer Lytton and ‘The Cult of the Colonies’” 




the Colonial Secretary, Bulwer-Lytton attempts to counter the pessimistic opinion on the 
colonies, that they were too expensive to maintain, likened to “millstones around our necks” 
by Prime Minister and close friend, Disraeli. Bulwer-Lytton’s justification is that colonies 
provide a financial opportunity for the overcrowded and competitive England—many young, 
intelligent, hardworking, and moral men in his novels venture to the colonies and bring wealth 
back to the motherland—and that colonists should identify with England. But why would 
colonists not set up homes in colonies? Why should these young, strapping men return to 
England? What ties them to their home country? Snyder does not explain but, as we shall see 
later, it is shame that drives colonists to do their patriotic duty to return to their motherland.  
Peter W. Sinnema agrees with Snyder that Bulwer-Lytton emphasizes the rapport 
between the home country and the colonies. However, Sinnema presents a more nuanced 
interrogation of intersections of nationhood, gender, and sexuality in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels. 
Following Nancy Armstrong’s seminal Desire and Domestic Fiction, Sinnema evinces that 
Bulwer-Lytton creates a gendered division in his works: men versus women, self versus society, 
action versus emotion, private versus public, and home country versus colonies. In Sinnema’s 
reading, homosocial male-to-male tutelage must occur in The Caxtons trilogy for boys to 
mature into men useful for England. “This instruction,” Sinnema argues, “in turn, points 
invariably to the home as a locus of meaning in a fractious world: good, successfully tutored 
men always return home” (157). While it is generally true in The Caxtons trilogy, Sinnema, 
like Snyder, does not explain why men return to England and what hold England has over them.  
The analyses of Sinnema, Snyder, and Mathieu have missed out an important aspect 
that makes their articles on Bulwer-Lytton’s notion of nationhood flawed: a discussion of 
emotions. After all, Bulwer-Lytton insists that The Caxtons trilogy is to “apeal [sic] to domestic 
Emotions” (qtd. in Edward Bulwer-Lytton 155). Both Helen Groth and Christopher Lane 




nineteenth-century sense, i.e. “a fellow feeling,” not tinged with pity. Groth’s concern is that 
in a suddenly widening world which “inspires multiple affiliations and resistances across 
boundaries of nation and culture” (11), the sympathetic identification between Bulwer-Lytton’s 
characters and his readers would create a sense of Englishness and belonging. This 
identification, however, depends on the subjectivity of each individual reader, and not all 
English readers would have similar patriotic responses. Furthermore, as both Groth and Lane 
assert, there are limits to sympathy as it clashes with the inherent misanthropy existing in all 
humans according to Bulwer-Lytton. It is this tension between sympathy and misanthropy, as 
Lane argues, that would lead to progress in Bulwer-Lytton’s world. But “the characteristic of 
the English race” is to “desire to do something, not only as well as it can be done, but better 
than we can do it—to feel to exaggeration all our own natural deficiencies towards the doing 
of it—to resolve by redoubled energy and perseverance to extract from art whatever may 
supply those deficiencies in nature” (Caxtoniana 59). If one relies on the dialectics of 
sympathy-misanthropy, why would the English feel compelled to excel? Furthermore, as Lane 
himself notes, misanthropy cannot explain Bulwer-Lytton’s oeuvre as “the ironic misanthrope 
briefly vacates Bulwer’s 1840s novels” (619). What drives the English to honors, and to yearn 
for perfection? “The sensibility to shame,” Bulwer-Lytton replies (Caxtoniana 59).    
 
On Englishness, Honor, and Shame 
Before I move on to The Caxtons trilogy, I want to explicate Bulwer-Lytton’s notions of 
Englishness and tie them with shame and honor. In England and the English (1833), Bulwer-
Lytton talks about the decaying state of the country in which the “disease” is embedded in its 
fetid class system as his book “begin[s] by ascertaining its origin” (42). The issue is that 
“people have no exact and fixed position—that by acquaintance alone they may rise to look 




few, the rank that may be obtained by fashion seems delusively to be open to all” (29). (One 
can see how Darwinian evolution, in which there are no higher or lower beings, would irk 
Bulwer-Lytton who believes that a dissolving of ranks would lead to chaos.) Although, in 
theory, people could transcend their class, and although the “highest office have been open by 
law to any man, no matter what his pedigree or his quarterings,” Bulwer-Lytton points out that 
it is not true in practice; only those with the influence of the aristocracy obtain high offices 
(17). And thus, the responsibility of aristocracy in these revered positions should check both 
the king and the commons. By not creating a strict social sphere between members of differing 
classes in England, that is, classes are allowed to mix in social events and work, the English 
aristocracy could extend “their moral influence throughout the whole of society” (27).1 
 But the checking power and the moral influence may be diluted by the “intermixture of 
the highest aristocracy with the more subaltern ranks of society” (1: 28), that is, instead of the 
aristocrats influencing the lower classes, they themselves are corrupted. “It is from the poorer 
classes that the evils and the dangers of a state arise; their crimes are our punishments,” he 
writes (1:73, emphasis original). Bulwer-Lytton gives several reasons for this attrition of 
morals, among which include the rise of capitalists and parvenus, who marry titles, and fortune 
hunters, especially young men marrying rich women; he clearly condemns men who marry 
above their stations in his novels. In The Caxtons, Pisistratus the protagonist falls in love with 
a highborn heiress Fanny Trevanion, and the “manly” and correct etiquette is to leave the 
Trevanion household in which he works as an amanuensis; he gives up his political career, gets 
over his heartbreak, and seeks his fortune in Australia. Pisistratus’s foil, his cousin, Francis 
                                                
1 Seven years after the publication of England and the English (1833), Thomas Carlyle’s “The 
Hero as Man of Letters” (1840) argues similarly that a man of letters (or an “aristocrat” in 
Bulwer-Lytton’s case) could bridge factions in society. However, the differences in the two 
treatises mean that it is still worth exploring Bulwer-Lytton’s notion, less known than 
Carlyle’s, because Bulwer-Lytton involves the class system and advocates for aristocracy, 




Vivian, takes over his job, falls in love with Fanny, misconstrues her intentions, kidnaps her, 
almost coerces her into a Scotch wedding, and falls in shame and disgrace. Shame, for Bulwer-
Lytton, is used to keep individuals in their proper places within the class system, never over-
reaching.  
 But in Bulwer-Lytton’s real Victorian world, it was not always as neat as in his novels. 
He perceived the class system to be eroding, and he was afraid that England would follow the 
path of the French Revolution. Despite the flawed aristocracy blighted by its association with 
the lower classes, overthrowing the class system is, in Bulwer-Lytton’s view, not the solution. 
He warns his readers that “democracy had its illegal or corrupt form—in OCHLOCRACY or 
mob rule; for democracy did not signify the rule of the lower orders alone but of all the 
people—the highest as the lowest” (Athens 112, emphasis original). He argues that democracy 
by ochlocracy would never be operative and that there should be no social insurrection because 
aristocracy is much too entrenched in English society: “What is the influence which… proved 
to be the dominating influence of England; colouring the national character, pervading every 
grade of our social system, ruling our education, governing our religion, operating on our 
literature, our philosophy, our sciences, our arts? You answer at once, that it is the 
ARISTOCRATIC” (2:246-7, emphasis original). He reiterates the point that the aristocrats are 
indestructible a few pages later: “Do not fancy, as some contend, that the aristocracy would 
fall if the king fell. Not a whit of it. You may sweep the House of Lords if you like; you may 
destroy titles; you may make a bonfire of orb and ermine; and after all your pains, the 
aristocracy would be exactly as strong as ever” (2: 260).  
 The solution to a declining England then lies in a strong, efficacious, and almost 
draconian government, “never yielding to [the people’s] will, because always providing for 
their wants” (1:190, emphasis original).  A good government is “a directive government. It 




them” (1:240, emphasis original). For the government to carry out its work effectively and the 
citizens not to rebel, aristocrats must be the intercessors between the people and government 
because “In political quiet, the aristocracy are the natural dictators of society, and their 
sentiments are the most listened to” (1:180). And “it is the property of an enlightened 
aristocracy… to foster sentiments of honour” (1:48). This sentence is almost replicated in 
another chapter on ridding corporeal punishment in the military: “we must inculcate the 
sentiment of shame” to instill a sense of honor and discipline among soldiers (1:101).  The 
parallelism in the sentences indicates that for Bulwer-Lytton, shame is not the opposite of 
honor but rather, shame and honor are different sides of the same coin. Therefore, for male 
aristocrats to act as mediators—for they are inevitably men according to Bulwer-Lytton—
between the government and the people, they must necessarily instill and inspire a sense of 
shame and honor in all parties.   
 But hasn’t the aristocracy been eroded by money, and fashion? If so, how can aristocrats 
be trusted, and be honorable enough to juggle between state and people?  Bulwer-Lytton replies, 
“For [aristocrats’] power is not in a tapestried chamber, or in a crimson woolsack, or in ribbons 
and stars, in coronets and titles; its power is in the aristocratic spirit and sympathy which 
pervade you all” (2:260). In sum, anyone who has a sensibility to shame and honor, which 
leads to a betterment of the nation, is an aristocrat. Herein lies the contradiction of Bulwer-
Lytton’s doctrine: although any Englishman could be an aristocrat spiritually, and all 
Englishmen should aspire to possess the spirit, they should not wish to transcend their social 
class. Bulwer-Lytton despised fortune- and title-hunters. In all of his novels, aristocrats are 
only compatible with other aristocrats; aristocrats only marry other aristocrats, unless the 
person who marries someone socially superior does not know of it. For instance, Jemima in 
My Novel marries Italian aristocrat Riccabocca who lives incognito in exile in England, 




Mr. Trevanion marries Lady Ellinor before she comes unexpectedly to inherit a large sum of 
money. While the “aristocrat” sentiment could exist in anyone, class lines should not be crossed, 
that is, one can aspire to achieve the spirit of aristocracy through the sensibility to shame. 
However, this shame should also keep middle-class Englishmen in check, and they should not 
plot to become aristocrats in rank; here, Bulwer-Lytton differentiates interiority of the self from 
the external manifestation of the class system.  
Furthermore, even when a character has aristocratic, that is, honorable intentions, he 
may not make the best politician for England; he can strive for perfection as an Englishman to 
make the country proud, but he cannot be expected to govern the nation. In My Novel, for 
instance, Honorable Audley Egerton, with decades of political experience, is praised because 
he is steady, collected, and speaks his mind for what is best for England. When voters champion 
a misguided idea, he does not agree with them to win their votes and instead, he corrects them. 
He ends up in great debt because he has focused on the welfare of England, and neglects to 
look after his estate. But for all his years of experience, he could not be compared to Lord 
Harley L’Estrange, who, roused out of his lassitude, “had the rarer gift of eloquence in itself” 
when canvassing votes on Egerton’s behalf (2:354). “Both Leonard [Egerton’s son] and Audley 
spoke well, from the good sense which their speeches contained; but Harley could have talked 
nonsense, and made it more effective than sense” (2:354). This scenario, in which true blue 
aristocrats have natural inborn talents, is replicated across Bulwer-Lytton’s writing. Hence, 
Bulwer-Lytton believes that while every Englishman could possess a sense of aristocracy, 
which is a sensibility to honor and shame, only bona fide aristocrats have inherent aptitude for 







The Caxtons: Shame of the Name, Homosociality of Fathers and Sons, and Englishness 
First serialized anonymously in Blackwood’s Magazine, and when Bulwer-Lytton was assured 
of its success, published in three volumes in 1849, The Caxtons recounts the tribulations of a 
middle-class family.  Pisistratus Caxton, son of Austin and Kitty Caxton, takes on the position 
of an amanuensis under Mr. Trevanion, a member of parliament, whose wife, Lady Ellinor, is 
the object of Austin’s affections when they are young. As fate would have it, history repeats 
itself as Pisistratus falls in love with Fanny, Lady Ellinor’s daughter. Knowing that there is a 
gap in their social class, Pisistratus resigns his post and, having little opportunity in the 
overpopulated England, goes to Australia for five years to seek his fortune. In the meanwhile, 
taking over the role of Trevanion’s amanuensis is Francis Vivian who is later revealed to be 
Pisistratus’s paternal half-Spanish cousin. Vivian and his father, Captain Roland Caxton, have 
severed ties because of the son’s dissolute ways. Vivian kidnaps Fanny with the intention to 
force a marriage on her, but his plan is foiled by Pisistratus and Sir Sedley Beaudesert. 
Although Pisistratus is now financially comfortable, his social class cannot match Fanny’s and 
the languid Sir Sedley marries Fanny while Pisistratus marries his cousin, Blanche, who is 
Vivian’s sister. Status quo is maintained.  
 Although the title, The Caxtons, announces that it revolves around the history of a 
family in the English empire, it is also a Sternian bildungsroman of Pisistratus Caxton in the 
first person narration. The novel begins with the birth of Pisistratus, as Mrs Primm the servant 
announces “SIR—sir, it’s a boy!” and Augustine (Pisistratus’ father), much puzzled, replies, 
“What is a boy?” (5). The passage quickly evolves into a discussion of “What is man?” and 
one of the possible answers, made in mockery and satire, is “Man is a tailless monkey—boy a 
male young tailless monkey” (5). Being a staunch Christian, Bulwer-Lytton was not receptive 
to the idea of evolution: the phrase “a male young tailless monkey” is used in mockery, just as 




Bulwer-Lytton informs us, comes from a tyrant who ruled Athens “six hundred years before 
Christ was born” and was said to be “the disputed arranger of Homer” (14). The despot reduced 
the privileges of the aristocracy and empowered the lower classes. The significant, 
anachronistic name of The Caxtons’ protagonist connects several threads in the narrative: 
although Bulwer-Lytton championed the supremacy of aristocrats, he also believed that the 
middle classes could better their lives, and the protagonist reifies the idea that a member of the 
middle-class could gain success through honest hard work with the help of aristocrats, and not 
by working against them. Bulwer-Lytton’s moralistic tales of class conflicts are also often 
about the human condition. The association of Victorians with a line of descent from a revered 
race belittles any evolutionary theory, exalts the English and reminds them that even a proud, 
advanced civilization may fall if there is no constant progress, a recurring theme in Bulwer-
Lytton’s historical works such as Athens: Its Rise and Fall, and The Last Days of Pompeii. 
Hence, in The Caxtons, Bulwer-Lytton explores the human condition through Englishness, 
class, and masculinity.  
 Rosemary George argues that Victorian “Novel after novel suggests that it is the daily 
construction in the home country as the location of the colonizer’s racial and moral identity 
and as the legitimization of the colonizer’s national subjecthood that made possible the carrying 
out of the work of Empire” (107). Sinnema adds to George’s argument that, in The Caxtons 
trilogy, male homosocial tutelage is valorized as a necessity for maturation before young men 
are sent out to the colonies. What Sinnema has missed out in his analysis is what gets imparted 
to young men: a sense of honor and shame, which is crucial in the formation of the English 
identity and nationhood. “A brave and honorable man [has] a brave and honorable father. 
Therefore, all the qualities which attention to race should perpetuate are the manly qualities 




 In Pisistratus’ life, he has several male figures who school him into masculinity of 
honor and shame at one time or another – his father Augustine; his paternal uncle Roland de 
Caxton; his maternal Uncle Jack; Mr. Squills the accoucheur/physiognomist who follows the 
family everywhere they go; Mr. Trevanion, a politician whom he works for; and Sir Sedley 
Beaudesert. Pisistratus rejects several of these figures as role models, Uncle Jack and Mr. 
Squills, both comic figures. In an early episode where Uncle Jack tries to convince Augustine 
to turn his garden into a profitable orchard and the equanimous Augustine refuses, Pisistratus 
reads the episode as a lesson in contentment and of knowing one’s place. His “revered parent 
rose in my estimation after that conference,” he confesses (41).  Later, Uncle Jack disgracefully 
loses half of Augustine’s fortune which includes Pisistratus’ inheritance, affirming Pisistratus’ 
initial judgment of Uncle Jack’s inadequacy as a mentor.  
 Not only are Uncle Jack and Mr Squills relegated to the status of comic figures, their 
inadequacy as mentors is also implied through their bachelorhood. Mr Squills’ singlehood is 
mentioned twice at the start of the novel (18; 38). When in Australia, Pisistratus pointedly 
laments over the dearth of women: “Alas! We are three bachelors, but we are better off than 
bachelors often are in the bush” (410). While Sinnema mentions that masculinity requires 
homosocial mentoring, he neglects to mention that at the end of the schooling, the honorable 
young man must reject any same-sex overtures, and marry. The threat of same-sex desire hangs 
heavily throughout Bulwer-Lytton’s writings. Men’s pulchritude is always described in far 
greater detail than women’s, and almost every good-hearted man, regardless of his suitability 
as a mentor, is beautiful. Uncle Jack is “comely… clear-skinned and florid, had a little mouth, 
with good teeth” (33). Pisistratus talks of the handsome Sir Sedley Beaudesert (old enough to 
be his father) with great adoration even though they are rivals in love. Like a lovelorn 
schoolboy, Pisistratus, “leaning my elbow on the table, and my chin upon my hand, am gazing 




day’” (121). “How loveable Sir Sedley was, that I loved him, and yet was jealous of him” (147). 
Again, and again, Pisistratus consults Sir Sedley, and Pisistratus “felt my heart as gratefully 
move towards him” (263). Though Mr. Trevanion has “a careworn, eager, yet musing 
countenance…it was one of those faces which take dignity and refinement from that mental 
cultivation which distinguishes the true aristocrat… Very handsome might that face have been 
in youth” (103). Pisistratus’s own father, Augustine, is said to look exceeding young and has 
“handsome eyes” (11). Leonard Fairfield, Lord Harley L’Estrange, Audley Egerton, Richard 
Avenel, Frank Hazeldean, Lionel Haughton, Guy Darrell are a few men whom Bulwer-Lytton 
describes as good-looking in the other two novels of the Caxtons trilogy.  
 To be honorable and do one’s duty to the nation is to marry and reject any extension of 
homosocial bonding with handsome men beyond the completion of mentorship. The 
bachelorhood of Uncle Jack and Mr Squills signals their refusal to enter a heterosexual 
relationship and, in turn, their continual indulgence in homosocial environments implies their 
unsuitability as mentors.  In a scene where the dashing Francis Vivian, Pisistratus’ cousin, who 
has “large, brilliant eyes, raven hair, long and wavy, but not curling… teeth dazzling as 
pearls…[and] the singular beauty of the countenance,” bids valediction to him (87), “Vivian 
came to me hastily, flung his arms around my neck, and kissed me as a boy kisses his brother” 
(226). Vivian “cried in a faltering voice: ‘I did not think to love any one as you have made me 
love you, though sadly against the grain. If you are not my good angel, it is that nature and 
habit are too strong for you” (226). The phrase “as a boy kisses his brother” is almost redundant 
in the Victorian context: most nineteenth-century readers would have known the kisses are 
fraternal. The extra-cautious emphasis that prefaces the “unmanly” declaration of love and 
being “against the grain” makes the scene suspicious: the more one conceals, the more one 
reveals. But in the end, any romantic same-sex attachments seem impossible in Bulwer-




to borrow Eve Sedgwick’s term, and project his desire and marry his other (female) cousin, 
Vivian’s sister. Good men in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels move out of homoerotic ties into 
heterosexual marriages, a movement repeated in many Victorian novels from Dicken’s David 
and Steerforth to Ouida’s writing, but while other novelists were restricted by the unwritten 
societal law of compulsory heterosexuality of their time, Bulwer-Lytton reasoned that the 
necessity of the movement was due to the duty to the Empire and out of a sense of Englishness.  
The sense of duty to the Empire and Englishness is exemplified by the importance of 
bearing sons because masculine Englishness could not be passed down through females. The 
effeminate bachelor Sir Sedley in his 50s, who seems set to be single for the rest of his life, 
marries Fanny Trevanion after unexpectedly inheriting the title of marquis. His marriage is 
done out of a sense of duty, as he has known Fanny for a period of time and does not make a 
move until he comes into his unlikely inheritance, and he has begotten two sons, ensuring heirs 
for both his and Mr Trevanion’s properties, a symbol for England’s longevity. Mr Trevanion’s 
lack of son causes some embarrassment to his wife, Lady Ellinor, and is the subject of 
discussion between the Caxtons: having no sons “must vex the poor, foolish, ambitious man,” 
comments Roland de Caxton, Pisistratus’ uncle (101; 115). The homosocial mentorship 
between an older man and a younger boy that teaches shame and brings honor to England 
involves a vigilant guard against same-sex attractions, and a marriage; this movement from 
homosocial ties to heterosexual marriages is why bachelors, like Mr Squills who never 
outgrows his homosocial stage, sticking to Augustine Caxton constantly, can never be mentors 
to young English men.  Yet it seems that having only one son is proof enough of one’s 
masculinity and the repulsion of homosociality. When asked if he wants any more children, 
Augustine exclaims indignantly, “I am sure Mrs. Caxton will never think of such a thing, sir… 




 Unlike Pisistratus, who by the end of the novel, has assumed an honorable English 
identity, joining the ranks of “men who have won noble names, and whose word had weight 
on the destinies of glorious England” (192), Vivian is not so lucky to have the privilege of 
male-male tutelage. Despite the fact that Roland de Caxton, Vivian’s father, places honor above 
everything else, Vivian’s Spanish mother has raised him according to her own culture and 
religion, and traduced Roland to him, thus nullifying any positive influence Roland has on him. 
Roland is so thoroughly ashamed of Vivian’s reprobate ways that he disowns his son and 
prevaricates to the Caxtons, declaring him dead.  Sons are important, as we have learnt, because 
having no son brings the shame of not continuing England’s succession of superiority, as if 
committing treason to one’s English identity. But for Roland’s “natural grief for a son’s loss, 
that proud father was consoled. For he was less himself a father than a son—son to the long 
dead. From every grave where a progenitor slept, he had heard a parent’s voice. He could bear 
to be bereaved, if the forefathers were not dishonoured” (240). That is to say, although it is 
detrimental not to have a son, it is even worse to have a son who shames one’s name. “What 
matter one foolish old man’s sorrows?” Roland says. “The name, the property of generations, 
is saved, thank Heaven—the name!” (240). Having sons with honors is best, but it is better to 
be dead than to live in shame. 
 With no mentors, Pisistratus takes up the burden of coaching Vivian. From the first 
time he meets Vivian, he is intrigued by Vivian without knowing they are cousins, “[because] 
I have often thought of you; because you interest me; because—pardon me—I would help you 
if I can—that is if you want help” (178).  Although they are similar in age, differing from the 
usual older man-younger boy tutorship, under Pisistratus’ mentoring, Vivian “felt gradually, 
however, that pudor, or instinctive shame, which the contact with minds habituated to the 
distinctions between wrong and right unconsciously produces” (190). Bulwer-Lytton mentions 




the Romans called it PUDOR—which, under hairs white as snow, preserves the aspects of 
youth to all personations of honor, of valor, of genius” (59). For Bulwer-Lytton, only mature 
men could possess pudor. The author implies to his readers that his characters have pudor by 
their youthful appearances, such as Augustine and Sir Sedley in The Caxtons, Lord Harley 
L’Estrange and Audley Egerton in My Novel, and Guy Darrell in What Will He Do with It? For 
the time being, Pisistratus could tame Vivian because his “habits of gentle birth, and that silent 
education which English gentlemen commonly receive from their very cradle, should have 
preserved his honor, at least, intact through all” (221). Even though Vivian is only half-English, 
Pisistratus’ nurturing of Vivian’s innate sense of honor and shame—innate because all English 
have this sense—gradually makes Vivian a true Englishman.  
 But perhaps the young Pisistratus has not acquired enough prowess to influence, or 
perhaps the time they spent together is not sufficient to overcome Vivian’s Spanish half, he 
loses the pudor he achieves, and eventually kidnaps Fanny, and forces her to marry him. 
Luckily, Pisistratus and Sir Sedley rescue Fanny. (The scene of the innocent virgin being seized, 
and coerced into marriage by a villain but saved at the last minute is repeated throughout 
Bulwer-Lytton’s oeuvre; a metaphor found in many early Victorian novels, symbolizing that 
England was nearly corrupted by foreign powers but ultimately saved by manly English men 
who banded together.) When Vivian is caught red-handed, he “showed how little even shame 
had subdued his fiercer passions” (356). Bulwer-Lytton has represented Vivian’s Spanish 
mother as a creature of Id, “wild and passionate” (375). Here, it is evident that Vivian’s Spanish 
upbringing and passions have taken control over his English sense of shame.  
After the abduction and the failed attempt of a Scotch wedding, Pisistratus has several 
interviews with his cousin, noting that “He seemed to feel more shame at the exposure than at 
the guilt” (395). This observation of Vivian is strange and incongruous, given that his shame 




a person feel s/he is a bad person intrinsically, while guilt is directed towards an action. Shame 
shakes up one’s belief of what a core self is, and has devastating effects on one’s identity, 
whereas guilt is reparable with positive actions. At this stage, the homosocial mentorship 
continues its domination over Vivian. When shame has pervaded Vivian and breaks down his 
identity as a villain, the affect causes him to be receptive to changes and to be transformed into 
an Englishman. Hence, shame is imperative because the affect expunges one’s core selfhood 
to construct another, and in this case, an English identity. Shame can break down villainy and 
reconstruct one as an honorable Englishman.   
Pisistratus, sensing that he can improve Vivian no further, enlists the help of his father, 
resuming the older man-young mentee dynamics. Augustine and Vivian are locked up in a 
room for days on end, and at hours each time. In due course, Augustine brings Vivian to visit 
their ancestors’ graves, recalling the importance of family lineage, an assurance of England’s 
continual sovereignty. When they are outside Roland’s house, Vivian longs to enter but does 
not because he is ashamed. “HOME,” Bulwer-Lytton writes, “its perfect trust and truth, its 
simple holiness, its exquisite happiness—being to the world what conscience is to the human 
mind” (400, emphasis original). Augustine taunts Vivian, “it would be a brother’s duty to… 
shield [Blanche’s] innocence—to protect her name! A good name is something, then. Your 
father was not so wrong to prize it. You would like yours to be that which your sister would be 
proud to own!” (400). At this moment, Blanche appears, but Augustine refuses to let Vivian 
go to his sister, and says, “Your sister is a part of Home. If you think yourself worthy of either, 
go and claim both; I will not object” (400). Obviously, Vivian “could not yet return home… 
He is fully anxious to redeem his name—to regain his home” (400, emphasis original). He goes 
to Australia for a few years with Pisistratus, and then becomes a soldier in India. Instead of 
using “ancestral house,” Bulwer-Lytton stresses and repeats the word “home” in capitalization 




if it did, Vivian would have not go leave England. He could have atoned for his shameful deeds 
in England. Home is a metonym for England here; his innocent sister, and by extension, women 
represent England as an entity that requires protection, and a place to bring honor and pride to. 
Driven by shame to the colonies, Vivian wants to attain honors not merely to exonerate his 
charges and redeem his family name, but also for the glory of his home country, as he 
significantly becomes a soldier. Shame, then, is not merely a personal quirk of an old man 
wanting his son to be honorable; shame and honor drive the English to become English. “It is 
only by home-truths, not refining arguments” that Augustine can rehabilitate Vivian (402); it 
is only the affect shame, not logic, that defines Englishness.  
 In the end, Vivian does and does not return “home.” The shameful stain on his family’s 
name is so immense that only an honorable death on the battlefield, securing a victory of 
England against the colonized Indians, could efface his wrongdoings. Now his name is 
“covered... with new honors” (455). Everyone is cheered by his honorable death. Roland is 
“gladden[ed]… that his son, at the last, was worthy of his line” (456). Pisistratus believes, “He 
died, as I knew he would have prayed to die, at the close of a day ever memorable in the annals 
of that marvelous empire, which valor without parallel has annexed to the Throne of the Isles” 
(455). Even Vivian himself knows he must die to expunge his shame. His death is “a 
desperation action” (455). He instructs a fellow soldier, as he dies, to give Roland his will, and 
his father “can take it without shame” (456). Not only does his death wipe out his ignominy, 
he gains honor and a place among the graves of his ancestors, with an inscription on his tablet: 
“HE FELL ON THE FIELD:/ HIS COUNTRY MOURNED HIM,/ AND HIS FATHER IS 
RESIGNED” (456). His sword, along with a military death notification letter, hangs under a 
portrait of his ancestor, Sir Herbert de Caxton, who fought with Sir Philip Sidney and Sir 
Francis Drake. “The son [Vivian] was grown an ancestor” (458). The reason his noble death is 




because he uses his shame as a form of empowerment to drive him to achieve honors for the 
country. Pisistratus notes, “We, grumbling English, always quarrelling with each other—the 
world not wide enough to hold us; and yet, when in the far land some bold deed is done by a 
countryman, how we feel that we are brothers!” (426). In other words, the greatest deed Vivian 
achieves is rallying the people of England together because of his shame and honor. His death 
also reiterates Roland’s belief as mentioned earlier: it is better to die with honor than live in 
shame. The only way to atone for shame is death.   
As Vivian’s foil, Pisistratus has male tutors to guide him. His first tutors are his father 
and uncle, Augustine and Roland. As their names suggest, both paternal figures are different, 
one scholarly, the other military; one “slow and mild, the other “quick and fiery”; one 
“reasoned,” the other “imagined;” one “was very seldom wrong,” the other “never quite in the 
right”; one was “sweet, polished, and rounded into a natural grace,” the other “stern, rough, 
and angular” (67). To develop into a brand of British masculinity, Pisistratus must absorb what 
is good in both of them—they are both honorable—and reject what is bad.  
 While Augustine is honorable and intelligent, the sort of man that the British Empire 
requires, he is a recluse, unwilling to stir himself from his lackadaisical comforts of home. 
From the beginning, Augustine, not his wife, has played a prominent role in bringing up his 
son. “As I grew older,” Pisistratus says, “I became more sensibly aware that a father's eye was 
upon me” (16). Despite Pisistratus’ declaration that “We come to men for philosophy, to 
women for consolation,” it has always been Augustine who is the moral compass and emotional 
crutch (207). As a boy, Pisistratus breaks a flower-pot his mother prizes on purpose to elicit a 
response from his father, and his father teaches him that “good actions mend bad actions,” a 
lesson that Vivian would come to learn (18). When Pisistratus is heartbroken by Fanny, it is 
Augustine, not his mother, who comforts him: “The next moment I was sobbing on his 




(200). While it is peculiar that Augustine plays a domestic, almost feminine role in the family, 
Pisistratus must not set out to slay the Oedipal father. When being teased for being a daddy’s 
boy, he “was piqued. Why we should be ashamed of being taunted for goodness, I never could 
understand; but certainly I felt humbled. However, I answered sturdily: ‘If you had as good a 
father as I have, you would not think it so very extraordinary to do as he tells you’” (93).  In 
other words, while Pisistratus must respect and learn from his father, he must be critical enough 
to see the faults of his fathers. And in Augustine’s case, Pisistratus must circumvent his father’s 
effeminate lassitude and domesticity; he must be a man of action to be useful to the Empire.  
 If Augustine is ever a man of action, it is his contribution to literature as he writes “The 
History of Human Error,” known (satirically?) as the “Great Book.” The title suggests that 
Bulwer-Lytton by proxy of Augustine is interested in the human condition, like Darwin. The 
irony of the “Great Book” is such that Augustine himself retreats from society, ashamed that 
his love is not returned by Lady Ellinor, who is—no surprise here—Fanny’s mother. (It should 
be noted that the parallel between two generations demonstrates that change and improvement 
are possible: Augustine has withdrawn into an existential defeat, but his son rises to the task 
and marches forward to become a man of the Empire.) He warns his son not to repeat his 
mistake, “Master books, but do not let them master you… my servitude (to books) must not be 
a hereditary bondage” (25). If books are taken to be a torpid state that Augustine recedes into 
because of a personal shame, Pisistratus must master his shame of unworthiness to Fanny’s 
social class and use that shame to spur him on; he is not his father.  
 But for Augustine, and his brother, Roland, servitude has indeed been a hereditary 
bondage, and the cause of their falling out. Augustine believes that his ancestor is William 
Caxton the printer, which is the reason he is consumed in a world of books. The Caxtons 
frequently implies that the world of books has a reality for Augustine that society lacks. For 




to Cicero?—I invoke him. Do I want to chat in the Athenian marketplace, and hear news two 
thousand years ago?—I write down my charm on a slip of paper, and a grave magician calls 
me up Aristophanes. And we owe all this to our ancest[ors]” (111). Even human beings are 
objectified, and have become books for Augustine to be taken down “after dinner as he would 
a volume of Dodwell or Pausanias” (34). It is from this deterministic servitude to hereditary 
bondage that Pisistratus must escape.  
Whereas Augustine retreats into his scholarly world because he is ashamed that his love 
is not returned, Roland, who also fails to win Lady Ellinor’s hand, seeks another form of honor: 
he becomes a soldier because he believes that his ancestor is Sir William de Caxton, who fell 
at the last significant battle of the Wars of the Roses, Bosworth, fighting for Richard III. 
Augustine’s fault is hebetude, Roland’s, pride. He has such a strong aversion to shame that he 
overcompensates in having excessive pride.  “Honor was his idol, and the sense of honor paid 
him for the loss of all else” (71). Despite being in the military all his life, he does not mind 
having little money because he treasures his medal, his source of pride, which he wears next to 
his heart, more than money. “Honor,” he claims, “is the reward of a soldier” (52). Although 
Roland has his follies, Bulwer-Lytton gives him a speech which England and the English 
endorses: “Man, I say, recreates himself. How? BY THE PRINCIPLE OF HONOR” (emphasis 
original 54) and “that honor is the foundation of all improvement in mankind." As we have 
discussed, man, or what Roland would have meant, English man recreates himself by having 
sons to carry on the principle of honor. And with this honor, the English improve England. 
However, his hamartia is that he overvalues honor to the point of pride. Pride, in 
Bulwer-Lytton’s novels, cuts both ways: it is associated with honor because one is proud of 
one’s achievements, but excessive pride, or avoidance of shame to a phobia, is detrimental 
because one refuses help when one needs it most. Early in the novel, Roland tells a story of a 




cripple, by the way, like myself—strange coincidence!” (73). His friend’s son steals from his 
friend and others. When the police are at the friend’s door, “shame had entered” (75). Because 
“he could not lift the crime from his son’s soul, nor the dishonor from his son’s memory” (76), 
he chooses to shoot his son, and takes his own life. (This story of a son stealing from a father 
and turning into a robber repeats in Bulwer-Lytton’s oeuvre.) Roland identifies with his friend, 
and it is apparent that Vivian has stolen from Roland, turned rogue, and brought disgrace to 
the family. Roland is so humiliated by Vivian that he is “ashamed of such greetings” from his 
fellow-soldiers (118). It is his aversion to shame that drives a wedge between his son and him. 
Instead of saving and correcting his son, he chooses to sever the kinship. Vivian’s desire to 
make his father proud and to be worthy of his martial ancestors drives him to commit a 
desperate and violent act to kidnap Fanny. By marrying her, Vivian believes that he would 
become an aristocrat, making Roland proud. Roland’s excessive pride shows that there must 
be a balance between pride, honor, and shame: shame can be a motivating force to achieve 
honors, but having excessive pride to avoid shame completely may ruin one’s life.  
 Unlike Augustine, Roland, and Vivian, who are trapped by their ancestry, Pisistratus 
rejects his heredity. He remarks early in the novel to Roland, “We can never escape the ghosts, 
uncle. They haunt us always. We cannot think or act, but the soul of some man, who has lived 
before, points the way. The dead never die” (79). But he does escape in the end. Pisistratus 
does not become a scholar or a soldier; he is a colonist. To Bulwer-Lytton, Pisistratus the hero 
reifies his concept of Englishness. One should never try to marry above one’s station, or 
transcend a preordained social class, but one can strive for honors because that is what English 
do, or should accomplish. In Bulwer-Lytton’s words, one can have aristocratic spirits, without 
being born an aristocrat. Although this way of thinking is deterministic (because it seems like 
lives are fixed based on individuals’ parentage), it is also liberating because one must keep 




 Besides Augustine and Roland, Pisistratus also learns masculinity from Trevanion and 
Sir Sedley who are both aristocrats. Both Trevanion and Sir Sedley are reluctant aristocrats, as 
if aristocracy is a burden, a curse, and not a gift. Although Trevanion marries Lady Ellinor, 
who belongs to “the lower aristocracy of rank” (160), he is in a way driven to excel and to 
contribute to England because “Lady Ellinor was ambitious; that she had a love of fame, for 
fame itself; that she was proud; that she set value (and that morbidly) on the world’s opinion” 
(131). It seems that whoever marries Lady Ellinor, as Pisistratus’ mother tells him, “would 
have roused himself, been more ambitious” (59). Furthermore, after they are married, Lady 
Ellinor comes into an unexpected fortune, an event that Trevanion laments over, claiming that 
it is shameful that money comes from the wife’s family. He advises Pisistratus to “fly from the 
curse of owing everything to a wife! It is a reversal of all natural position, it is a blow to all the 
manhood within us” (206). The shame that he is over-reaching his status by marrying up in 
terms of rank and fiscal matters drives him to be ambitious. He becomes a patriotic, renowned 
politician and Pisistratus becomes his secretary for a short while. Trevanion is also the father 
figure who encourages Pisistratus to emigrate. From Trevanion, Pisistratus learns that it is 
undesirable, and even dishonorable to marry above one’s station, and to be worthy of being a 
father and to start a family, he must first be established in his career, or at least gain financial 
stability.  
  Sir Sedley, the other reluctant aristocrat, has, at the start of the novel, confessed that 
he has “lived the life of the butterfly. Summer is over, and I see my flowers withering; and my 
wings are chilled by the first airs of winter” (124). Although he proclaims himself to be a 
butterfly and although he has led an apathetic, languid life, no one is more sagacious than him 
in the novel. Instinctively, he sees through Pisistratus, and advises him on every count. This 
mysterious dominance and perspicacity seem to stem from the sole power of his aristocracy. 




and is the envy of many young boys. Sir Sedley’s trajectory is to outgrow his French-like 
effeminacy and homosociality and marry. Lord Castleton, a distant relative, dies, and 
unexpectedly, Sir Sedley inherits the title. As the new Lord Castleton, his duty is to carry on 
the lineage. Eventually, he has two sons by Fanny Trevanion and says to Pisistratus presciently, 
“I perceive a very different world rising round the next generation from that in which I first 
went forth and took my pleasure. I shall rear my boys accordingly. Rich noblemen must 
nowadays be useful men; and if they can’t leap over briers, they must scramble through them” 
(451). Sir Sedley’s function in the novel is not only to remind Pisistratus that he must repudiate 
homosocial circles and establish a family after his success, Sir Sedley is also a reminder that 
no matter how hardworking or intelligent or honorable Pisistratus is, he is no match for the 
aristocrat, simply because he is an aristocrat.  
 While establishing a family is the ultimate aim for the Empire—after all, scores of 
Englishmen were required to become colonists—a lot of shame is involved in the making of 
families. All three men, Augustine, Roland, and Trevanion, who fall in love with Lady Ellinor, 
are ashamed that they can never measure up to her social status. Pisistratus learns from their 
mistake, but still cannot help himself falling in love with Fanny, and he flees away from her in 
shame. When Fanny discovers that Pisistratus is sobbing into her miniature, he “felt as if I had 
committed a crime—as if dishonor clung to me” (196). The arrogant Vivian, however, has no 
qualms that he is a match for Fanny, but the kidnapping ends up in disgrace for him. On the 
other hand, marriages without love are marriages without shame, and this is the kind of 
marriage Bulwer-Lytton espouses in the novel. Augustine, Pisistratus, and Sir Sedley all marry 
people they do not love at first, and all three marriages turn out to have happily ever after 
endings. Pisistratus’ mother tells him that Augustine “never was in love with me; and what is 
more he had the frankness to tell me so!” (58) Augustine is so forthright in this union that he 




Likewise, Sir Sedley is not in love with Fanny at first and it is not clear if he has even come to 
love her. The late Lord Castleton is engaged to Fanny, and in inheriting Lord Castleton’s title, 
Sir Sedley also inherits the fiancée. For Pisistratus, he returns from Australia to marry his 
cousin, Blanche, Vivian’s sister, who has blossomed. Her beauty and her gentleness may be 
the inducements behind the marriage, but we, as readers, are never explicitly told how beautiful 
or gentle she is, or at least, not as explicitly as how beautiful and intelligent Vivian is.  
  It seems that Bulwer-Lytton has associated loving a woman with shame, and he 
advocates a marriage based on respect, rather than love/shame.2 The three happy marriages 
share an uncomfortable aspect: the women, much younger than their spouses, are reared from 
youth to have marriageable qualities. “When my old tutor died,” Augustine says, “and his 
young child become my ward, and somehow or other, from my ward my wife, it allowed me 
to resign my fellowship, and live amongst my books still as a book myself” (171). Here, 
Augustine, who does not love his wife at the beginning, lets slip that it is his wife’s inheritance 
that enables him to live a country gentleman’s life. His intention of marrying his ward seems 
dishonorable, as Bulwer-Lytton in England and the English despises fortune-hunters, and as 
Trevanion is ashamed to be unable to match his wife’s status. But Augustine’s dishonor is not 
highlighted in the novel precisely because he molds and grooms his wife to be the “angel in 
the house.” Likewise, Sir Sedley has to tame Fanny. He says to Pisistratus, “He who marries 
Fanny Trevanion should have little other object, for the first years of marriage, than to correct 
her failings and develop her virtues” (354). After Sir Sedley and Fanny’s marriage, only when 
Sir Sedley thwarts the seduction plans of a European prince for Fanny does she fall in love 
with him. In Pisistratus’ case, Blanche, having to live with the family, is carefully cultivated 
by both Pisistratus, and his paterfamilias, Augustine (282-3). As her name suggests, she is carte 
blanche, waiting to be written with the wishes of men. Coincidentally, if men shape women to 
                                                




become their wives, Pisistratus shapes both Blanche’s and her brother’s characters. He 
confesses, “I had grown to love [Vivian] so well; I had been so proud when men praised him. 
My love was a sort of self-love—I had looked upon him in part as the work of my own hands” 
(422). However, what we do know is that, as a man of the Empire, Pisistratus must reject the 
homosociality Vivian provides, and he marries Vivian’s sister. From their union, they have a 
son named after Vivian, naturally. In essence, to be a man of the Empire, homosocial male-
male tutorship must occur, but for women, instead of a female-female instruction, they must 
fall under men’s tutelage.  
 Women in The Caxtons not play only supporting roles to men, they are deemed as a 
viable option only after the men have established their social and financial superiority over 
women. Bulwer-Lytton argues that, as “aristocracy have higher and more chivalrous notions, 
the people generally have shrewder and livelier ideas,” and as wits are inherited from mothers, 
and morals from fathers, “an admixture [of aristocrats] with people” must necessitate that the 
mother comes from a lower class (62-3). To marry a woman of a superior class is shameful 
even if she inspires a man to ambition as Lady Ellinor does in the men who love her. In the 
event that one does indeed fall in love with an aristocrat, the best thing is to give her up. Sir 
Sedley praises Pisistratus for his “self-sacrifice”: “All the marquisates in the world would never 
give me the pride I should feel, if I could see in my life one steady self-sacrifice to duty and 
honor, equal to that which I have witnessed in you” (363). At the peak of Pisistratus’ heartbreak, 
the book Augustine gives him tells “a life of remarkable fulness [sic], great study, great thought, 
and great action” and “how small a place those feelings, which have tyrannized over 
[Pisistratus], and made all else seem blank and void, hold in that life” (emphasis original 215). 
To excel and reach for honors is better than love; by giving up love for a woman, one gives up 




 In The Caxtons, shame works in a different way from in Darwin. Darwin’s shame is 
private, secular, and individualizing, but in The Caxtons, the shame takes on a national and 
nationalistic sweep. At various points of Bulwer-Lytton’s writing on being English, he 
interchangeably claims that shame and honor must be inculcated. For him, the flipside of shame 
is not pride, but honor. To place honor above everything else, like Roland, would be excessive 
pride. The Caxtons shows that shame and honor are passed through the male line, which is why 
it is so important for characters to have sons. Even though men teach women honor and virtue 
in the novel, and hence tame them, it is ultimately the men who will represent England and 
bring honor to the country. The English women’s duty—“duty to her birthright, to the career 
of the noblest of England’s patriot”—is to marry the correct man (326).  
 
My Novel: Keeping Status Quo of Gender and Class Through Shame      
Unlike Darwin who believed that shame is individuating in a secular world, Bulwer-Lytton, 
who was a staunch Christian with numerous references to God in his novels, wanted to explore 
the emotion of shame in a religious society. For instance, like The Caxtons, My Novel begins 
with speculation on the origin of species: Augustine, who makes an appearance in My Novel, 
claims that “Danes, whose descendants make the chief part of our northern population, (and 
indeed, we must suppose all the ancient worshippers of Odin,) are of the same origin as the 
Etrurians” (1:1). Whether Augustine’s claim is true or not is not the point here; what is 
noteworthy is that Bulwer-Lytton announces the purpose of his novel, that is, to explore the 
human condition, where we descended from, and how we should live. His conclusion of how 
to live a moral life in My Novel is the same as in The Caxtons: shame works as a motivating 
force to build England. 
 As in The Caxtons, the young male characters are schooled about shame and honor by 




because he comes from an impoverished, working-class family. As a boy, he fights with Randal 
Leslie, the antagonist, as Randal rests on the parish stocks, which Lenny is tasked to look after. 
Even though Lenny is battered badly, the town’s steward blames him completely without any 
investigation and locks him in the stocks because Randal is a gentleman’s son, and a relative 
of Squire William Hazeldean. In the stocks, Lenny feels a “smarting and envenomed [emotion] 
for the time—shame!” (1:106). After Lenny escapes, Hazeldean visits Mrs Fairfield to 
persuade Lenny to apologize to Randal. But the Fairfields have “a peasant’s pride,” and instead 
of apologizing, they move out of Hazeldean, and Lenny, the smartest boy in the school, drops 
out and works for Signor Riccabocca for very miserable wages (1:8). At this time, while Lenny 
has a sensitivity to shame, it appears that he has too much of it.  
 The shame of his lowly birth could have been misguided had not an older man pointed 
him in the right direction. Lenny purchases seditious, socialist books and is quite convinced by 
them until Riccabocca chances on him reading the books. Riccabocca warns him, “Men rarely 
succeed in changing the world; but a man seldom fails of success if he lets the world alone, 
and resolves to make the best of it. You are in the midst of the great crisis of your life; it is the 
struggle between new desires knowledge excites, and that sense of poverty, which those desires 
convert either into hope and emulation, or into envy and despair. I grant that it is an up-hill 
work that lies before you; but don’t you think it is always easier to climb a mountain than it is 
to level it?” (1:168). But the reader can rest assured that Lenny the Genius will not turn into a 
revolutionary because, as the narrator (Bulwer-Lytton?) states it, genius is “shamefaced, 
because [shame and genius are] so susceptible to glory” (1:163). In short, the encounter 
between Riccabocca and Lenny is the author’s didactic message that if a man—and it must 
necessarily be a man in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels—is hardworking and intelligent, and has a 




 Lenny’s next male mentor is his dashing uncle, Richard Avenel, who has recently 
returned from America with a fortune, and who teaches Lenny not to be ashamed of his social 
class. When Lenny is reunited with his maternal grandparents, he discovers that he is a “child 
of shame,” an illegitimate son of deceased Nora Avenel, sister to Mrs Fairfield (1:297; 2:330). 
While his grandmother cannot accept his “sin,” Richard takes him under his tutelage to groom 
him as a successor to his farms. However, Richard forbids Lenny to write to Mrs Fairfield, his 
foster mother. During a dance Richard throws, Mrs Fairfield suddenly appears with “such thick 
shoes” to look for Lenny, embarrassing Richard in front of his upper-middle class friends 
(1:249). Richard has contradictory emotions about her unannounced arrival: he is angry at Mrs 
Fairfield whom he thinks disgraces him, yet he defends her, telling the guests that they must 
be aware he is a self-made man who comes from a family of tradespeople. “I’m not ashamed 
of them,” he announces (1:252). At one point, “the whole shame was removed from Richard 
Avenel, and rested in full weight upon the bystanders” who mock Mrs Fairfield’s appearance 
(1:249). Although Richard defends his poor and uncouth sister, he locks her and Lenny in a 
room so that they cannot interact with his guests. Lenny jumps out of the window with Mrs 
Fairfield to escape from Richard. What Lenny learns from the negative example of Richard is 
that there is no shame belonging to a lower class so long as one is respectable and upright. The 
society’s jaundiced eyes on class are deplorable, but it is possible to rise above the ranks when 
one works hard, as long as one does not aspire to be an aristocrat.  
 John Burley, who shares the same first name as Lenny’s maternal grandfather, teaches 
Lenny the shame of failure, degeneration, and atheism. Like Lenny, Burley is a genius, comes 
from a destitute family, and is made fun of by his fellow undergrads because of “his thick shoes 
and coarse linen,” connecting Burley to Mrs Fairfield (1:307). Burley is a writer, something 
Lenny aspires to become. But associating with Burley has blurred Lenny’s notions of morality, 




to God?’ asked Helen” (1:311). Later, an inebriated Burley barges into Lenny and Helen’s 
lodging, raising a ruckus, indecorous for a young lady to be around. Their landlady 
remonstrates about the impropriety. Lenny feels the shame but lacks the moral rectitude to ask 
Burley to leave.  When Helen confronts Burley instead, the writer comes to a realization, “I am 
a demon… I never saw it before—but it is true—I should be this boy’s ruin” (1:332, my 
emphasis). While the episode puts forth a Victorian stereotype that women instinctively are 
custodians of Christian morality, Burley exemplifies the shame that Lenny faces should he fail 
in his career.  The uncanny similarities between Burley and Lenny show the youth the 
possibility of what he might become—a godless, failed, drunken writer. While Lenny’s uncle 
teaches him that the recipe for success is hard work, Burley teaches him the shame of failure 
from profligacy and impiety.  
 Lenny has a complicated tutorship with his last and most important mentor, Lord Harley 
L’Estrange, whom Lenny picks up on a bridge. The bridge in London, according to Matt Cook, 
was a sexualized locale where Victorian men cruised each other (10). In Teleny, Des Grieux 
contemplates suicide on a bridge, meets Teleny, and starts to have sex there. In the scene where 
Lenny chances upon L’Estrange, L’Estrange has arranged to meet a Member of Parliament, 
Audley Egerton his “dearest and most intimate friend,” “inseparable” when they were 
undergrads, at a desolated bridge at night (1:24). (It should be noted that the intimate friends’ 
first names rhyme, perhaps suggesting that their relationship surpasses a normal homosocial 
friendship.) On the bridge, Lenny, who is later revealed to be Egerton’s son, “lifted his head 
and looked wistfully, eagerly into Harley’s face. Those eyes, bright, clear, yet so strangely deep 
and absent… met his own, and chained them. For L’Estrange halted also; the boy’s 
countenance was not unfamiliar to him. He returned the inquiring look fixed on his own” 
(1:354-5). A modern gay man would read this scene as two men cruising each other. Suspecting 




on him with earnest and kindly eyes” (1: 360). Later, on a sudden impulse, L’Estrange “the 
soldier bent down his manly head and kissed [Lenny] the poet’s brow” (2:100). Like the kiss 
between Vivian and Pisistratus in The Caxtons, homoerotic bodily contact between men is 
always prefaced that the affectionate displays are manly, brotherly, fraternal, to avoid the 
shame of scandal.3  
The homosocial desires between the three men are complicated: 4  L’Estrange and 
Egerton, both bachelors, form the closest bonds in the novel—deeper than married couples—
and the aristocrat suddenly finds himself attracted to Egerton and Nora’s son. All three 
bachelors are devastatingly handsome (1:61). Egerton admits that he is “proof against all 
feminine attractions” (1:278). It is explained later that L’Estrange is in love with Nora, and 
requests that Egerton pursue the suit on his behalf. However, Nora and Egerton marry in secret, 
and due to a marital tiff, Nora runs back to her parents’ home and dies in childbirth without 
having a chance to tell her parents she is married. While Nora triangulates the homosociality 
between the two men, their desire slips through cracks: “Lord L’Estrange leant his cheek on 
his hand thoughtfully. Audley Egerton sate [sic] near him, with his arms folded, and gazed on 
his friend’s face with a soft expression of aspect, which was very unusual to the firm outline 
of his handsome features” (1:222). Later, Egerton, “fixing upon his friend’s earnest face, eyes 
which, when softened by emotion, were strangely beautiful,” confesses to L’Estrange, “If I 
ever lose your love, your friendship—nothing else is left to me in the world” (2:190). The 
                                                
3  Not only are affections between men explicitly masculine, the descriptions of the male 
characters are purposefully manly. L'Estrange, has a “beautiful countenance,” and “his 
complexion was delicate, though not effeminate: it was rather the delicacy of a student than of 
a woman” (1:222).  
4 It should be noted that homoerotic tensions exist not only between L’Estrange, Egerton, and 
Lenny. For instance, before knowing Richard is his uncle, Lenny “stole many a glance at the 
acute, hardy, handsome face of his companion [Richard]” (1:209). Or consider the encounter 
between Lenny and Burley: “The two men felt an interest in each other, and they walked some 




tenderness between the two men could not be denied.5 If L’Estrange’s and Egerton’s desires 
are triangulated through Nora, this triangulation of desires is complicated when Lenny, a 
handsome lad who inherits Nora’s eyes and Egerton’s good looks, comes into the equation.  
 The complex web of desires between the mentor and mentee gets even more convoluted 
when Helen and Violante come into the picture. As with Augustine and his wife, and Pisistratus 
and Blanche in The Caxtons, women in My Novel are treated as objects, and brought up from 
youth to be brides for men. Both Helen and Violante are trained to be wives so that the men 
who marry them can avoid the shame of marrying an inept spouse. If in The Caxtons the 
December-May romance between Augustine and bride, and between Sir Sedley and Fanny, is 
disquieting for modern readers, the romance in My Novel is even more disturbing. Both Helen 
and Violante appear as preadolescent children at the beginning. A young Lenny chances upon 
Helen, a newly orphaned girl, mourning at a graveyard, and adopts her as his sister immediately. 
But the number of kisses he showers on her is disturbingly prodigious, inappropriate and 
paedophilic (1:269; 1:288; 1:289). As Lenny is not financially able to support Helen, he gives 
her up to L’Estrange. At the moment of separation, Lenny “muttered to himself, ‘Strange—
strange—so mere a child;—this cannot be love!” (1:374). At the same time, on seeing the 
moving scene, L’Estrange thinks, “This heart… will be worth the winning!” (1:374), although 
whose heart is worth winning, he doesn’t make clear. L’Estrange takes her as his ward and then 
molds her into a young, marriageable lady to his liking,6 whose, unlike all the handsome men 
in the novel, features are irregular, and who has “a cultivated taste, and a charmingly womanly 
mind; but… accustomed to take its colorings from another’s” (2:70). When L’Estrange gets 
                                                
5 For other instances of tenderness, see 1:225, 2:432. 
6 The idea that men should bring up girls and mold them so that the girls become compliant, 
marriageable, and to the men’s likings is repeated twice. L’Estrange posits, “If I could but find 
some child with sweet dispositions and fair intellect and yet formed, and train her up, according 
to my ideal” (1:354). Also see 1:224. As a foil to Helen and Violante, nice girls who are “trained” 
by men to be nice wives, Beatrice di Negra, Count di Peschiera’s sister, is portrayed as a woman 




Egerton to vet Helen’s suitability as L’Estrange’s wife, Egerton notes that Helen has “no vivid 
enthusiasm, no remark of striking originality, no flash of the self-kindling, creative faculty,” 
ill-suiting L’Estrange (2:70). And as a contrast to Helen’s plain, asymmetrical face, the author 
reminds the reader of Egerton’s “handsome features” (2:70). L’Estrange proposes to Helen 
anyway, without loving her, and against the advice of his most intimate friend, and his mother. 
Helen accepts out of childish gratitude and respect. Not knowing about their engagement, 
Lenny declares his love for Helen. The triangulation of the previous generation between 
Egerton, L’Estrange, and Nora repeats itself. Although L’Estrange loves Violante and not 
Helen, although he treats Helen more as a daughter than a lover, although he has broken off his 
engagement with Helen, although everyone notes how compatible Helen and Lenny are and 
L’Estrange and Violante are (2:117; 2:131; 2:137), and although he knows Lenny does not 
intentionally trespass on his engagement with Helen, L’Estrange strives to bring about Lenny’s 
downfall. His unreasonable fury, out of character with his languid, insouciant self, is because 
L’Estrange finds out at this moment that Egerton has betrayed him, and snatched Nora from 
him, and Lenny is a result of the union. L’Estrange imagines that the son of his most intimate 
friend seeks a repeat of history. What the reader can easily deduce is that it is Egerton and 
Lenny, father and son, who stir up violent emotions in L’Estrange, not Nora and Helen, women 
he purportedly loves. Hence, women are objects brought up from young to be suitable wives 
for men in different social standing. Women are objects passed from father (L’Estrange) to son 
(Lenny), intimate friend (L’Estrange) to friend (Egerton), and even father (Riccabocca, 
Violante’s father) to father (L’Estrange). L’Estrange’s rage is simply not justifiable because 
women are merely objects, while relationships between men are passionate, loyal, deep-rooted, 
and time-honored. Women then are used as subterfuge to mask the shameful homoeroticism. 
 Violante, like Helen, operates on two levels: besides diverting men from shameful illicit 




by her father who is an exiled Italian count ensures that she is a suitable exchange to other men. 
(In fact, her father has inculcated in her since her youth that L’Estrange is a benefactor to their 
family; it is L’Estrange who saves Violante’s father from a capital punishment in Italy.) Her 
aristocratic bloodline, like many aristocrats in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels including L’Estrange, 
automatically ingrains in her superior aptitude like intelligence, grace, and originality. And as 
Bulwer-Lytton’s credos go, that happy marriages must be socially congruent, Violante is the 
perfect match for L’Estrange, despite their vast age gap, despite L’Estrange smarting each time 
one character or another mentions how he makes such a good “father” to her (2:131; 2:250; 
2:335). But what attracts L’Estrange most to Violante is her resemblance to Nora: “her 
countenance… reminded him of Nora… the likeness, which had thus impressed him, come 
from some similarities in character between the living and the lost one—the same charming 
combination of lofty thought and childlike innocence—the same enthusiasm—the same rich 
exuberance of imagination and feeling” (2:328), all the traits that the poet Lenny possesses. In 
a sense, because Lenny is unavailable because of his sex and because of his lowly birth, 
Violante (or women in general) is a device to prevent shameful same-sex desires from 
expression.  
 Secondarily, not only to avoid shame, Violante is a tool to produce honor for England. 
In general, women do not need to be smart as long as they are gentle and excellent house 
managers. When Riccabocca confides in parson Dale that he could not find intellectual 
resonance in Jemima, his wife, the parson advises Riccabocca that companionship is more 
important that compatibility. Although the reader is told that Violante is clever, she has never 
shown her cleverness, much like Jemima: “There is little difference between your clever 
woman and your humdrum woman” (1:132). What is required of Violante and Jemima for their 
roles as women is to reproduce. As in The Caxtons, My Novel ends with L’Estrange’s heavy-




stake—, England’s honour and peace will be great… when you are tempted to believe that the 
gifts you may inherit from both entail no duties, or that duties are at war with true pleasure, 
remember how I placed you in your father’s arms, and I said, ‘Let him be as proud of you some 
day, as I at this hour am of him” (2:426-7). The boy “manfully” answers he will try. In spurning 
his homosocial attachments, L’Estrange, the only son of the wealthy Earl of Lansmere, allied 
by intermarriage to the most powerful English families, has done his duty for England, in 
marrying one of the most powerful Italian royal families and producing an heir to ensure the 
future of the country. When earlier, L’Estrange lets slip, “I have a great deal of the woman in 
me,” the feminine in him is effaced with the marital union (1:349). If L’Estrange is “an 
effeminate humorist,” as Randal calls him, then his effeminacy is redeemed by the birth of the 
son (2:79).  The reader can rest assured that all signs of effeminacy are eradicated through 
having heirs, and L’Estrange’s boy will bring glory to England because he would be naturally 
gifted from his aristocratic ancestry, and that he has a male tutor in L’Estrange.  
 Randal is the cautionary tale L’Estrange warns his infant about. Sinnema claims that 
Randal is an “outright villain… the incorrigibly avaricious heir to a disorderly home and much 
diminished fortune” (167), but a careful reading reveals that Randal is a complex character. 
Right from the start, unlike Hazeldean, Egerton, and all the other handsome men in the novel 
who are “of tall stature, and strong, sinewy, English build” (1:61), Randal’s sallow complexion 
and pale lips mark him as of inferior English stock. “He has no youth left in him,” L’Estrange 
observes of Randal, and the lack of youth is Bulwer-Lytton’s shorthand for lack of pudor 
(2:110). But worse still, according to Bulwer-Lytton’s weltanschauung, Randal lacks two 
essential attributes to make him a proper Englishman. First, he has no positive male role models 
in his life. Randal’s father is a slovenly sluggard who does nothing to bring honor to the 
family’s name. When Egerton adopts Randal, a young adult then, to be his protégé, Randal’s 




welfare of the country to notice. Randal meets and has dealings with two older villains, Count 
di Peschiera, and Baron Levy, a bastard son of a long line of English peers with a Jewish opera 
singer, who is a money-lender. Without proper mentorship, Randal becomes a villain.  
More importantly, because Randal has no suitable male teachers, he isn’t taught the 
value of shame: “He was without shyness,” a degree of shame (283).7 Although he is without 
shame, Randal comes from an old, proud family, hence (in Bulwer-Lytton’s strand of logic), 
he is gifted, winning prizes in school, known for his cold intellect. His raison d’etre is to restore 
his family name to its previous glory; his ambition and avarice stem from his pride in his 
familial lineage. But that does not mean he is portrayed as a flat evil character. A childhood 
memory is seared into his mind as his mother refuses to let Frank Hazeldean into their house 
because of its decrepit state and the filthy, worn clothes of their family. He wants to be 
successful to provide a dowry for his sister so that she can marry well. When Egerton faces 
trouble, Randal is sympathetic, albeit to a limited extent (2:148). He “recoiled” when Count di 
Peschiera recruits him to kidnap Violante (2:153). Like the self-made man Richard Avenel, 
Lenny’s uncle, Randal vows in “a strange sort of haughty kindness, ‘What I may have 
hereafter… I shall owe to myself; and then if I rise, I will raise my family’” (1:60). Randal is 
not unkind, but his circumstances leave him little choice; his fault is to reduce shame into the 
mechanism of calculating intellect. The difference between Richard and Randal is that the 
former feels shame, but the latter depends on his intelligence: “my books don’t tell me that it 
is a good heart that gets on in the world: it is a hard hard” (1:60). Squire Hazeldean tells him, 
“You speak like a book” (1:369). Randal’s pride for his old family name, coupled with his cold 
intelligence without a sense of shame, is his downfall. Bulwer-Lytton then separates shame, 
                                                
7 Another villain who is not acquainted with shame is the Italian Count. When he is caught red-
handed for kidnapping Violante and forcing her to marry him: “the Count had preserved a 
profound silence, showing neither repentance nor shame” (2: 276-277). Shame is necessarily a 




honor, and pride. Pride is required for honor, that is, one must feel proud of what one has 
achieved, but excess pride leads to a downfall because one cannot feel shame and becomes 
selfish and egotistical, working for one’s own glory, instead of glory for the country.  Shame 
is an affect that necessitates and pushes one towards honor for the country. Contrasting with 
Randal who pursues glory for his own selfish sake, L’Estrange becomes a soldier and a 
politician for the sake of the country, and Lenny, who since youth “had already learned so 
dearly to prize the sweets of an honourable name” (1:106), writes a book so transformative to 
readers that miscreants who read it weep and repent (2:445). In short, shame is required for 
nation-building.  
 
Conclusion: Shame, and Nationhood 
In an essay titled “On the Moral Effect of Writers,” Bulwer-Lytton writes, “As two travellers 
may arrive at the same inn by different roads and in different company, so two writers can 
arrive at the same moral conclusion through very different paths” (Caxtoniana 118). His 
apothegm, however and unfortunately, does not ring true for Darwin and himself; their notions 
of nationhood differ. In reading a scene of Amy Dorritt roving the streets of Rome, Amanda 
Anderson argues that an awareness of cosmopolitanism rouse thoughts and emotions of the 
limits of self and nation (89). Pheng Cheah further supports Anderson’s claim in that Victorians 
thought of global connectivity in light of incipient nationalism and colonialism, despite the 
concept of globality preceding nation-states (28). Both well-travelled, Darwin and Bulwer-
Lytton—one on his naturalist trails, and the other his colonial postings—express divergent 
attitudes of nationhood through the affect of shame.  
 Darwin, who read Kant, presents shame as not dissimilar to Kant’s pioneering idea of 
“a universal cosmopolitan existence,” recasting individuals as “citizens of a universal state of 




international trade ushering in an era of common humanity, Darwin argues scientifically that 
all humans—men, women, whites, blacks—blush, an indication of shame, suggesting that 
humans across races and sexes are more similar than dissimilar, breaking down boundaries, 
national or scientific.  
 Bulwer-Lytton, however, facing the destabilizing Victorian culture of migration, 
colonialism, and politics, has chosen the other, narrower path: to erect more borders. Unlike 
James Clifford’s theory of “discrepant cosmopolitanisms” and Homi Bhabha’s hybridity which 
argue for the death of the nation-state with the rise of migrancy, Bulwer-Lytton despises 
“citizens of the world.” In his description of the evil Count di Peschiera in My Novel, “he was 
composed and as free from gesture as an Englishman…[though] you would have supposed him 
a Parisian… as if ashamed of his country and his birth, he affected to be a citizen of the world. 
Heaven help the world if it hold only such citizens!” (2:4). For Bulwer-Lytton, to be an 
Englishman is to be proud of the country, and individuals must strive to the pinnacle of their 
abilities to make England proud, driven by a sensibility to shame, as evident in the epigraph 
and elsewhere in this chapter. Having a sense of shame is often the distinguished trait of a noble 
Englishman in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels.  
 But even within Bulwer-Lytton’s England, he demarcates classes and gender. In the 
mouthpiece of Parson Dale in My Novel, Bulwer-Lytton writes, “It is not the character of the 
aristocracy of this country to keep people down. They make way amongst themselves for any 
man, whatever his birth, who has the talent and energy to aspire to their level. That’s the 
especial boast of the British constitution, sir!” (1: 184). What Bulwer-Lytton writes in his 
essays and what is shown in his novels are antithetical to the parson’s proselytizing. In his work, 
aristocrats, like Bulwer-Lytton himself, always turn out gifted, always rising to occasions 
merely because they are aristocrats. Even when Egerton has spent his entire life giving prepared, 




L’Estrange. If a character tries to over-reach his class by fraud or by marrying an aristocrat, he 
will inevitably be shamed and end up badly. For instance, Vivian in The Caxtons used his life 
to atone for his shame. Randal’s plight is even worse: his sister could not marry Frank 
Hazeldean because of his disgrace, and she marries an ensign instead and dies of neglect after 
childbirth. Because of Randal’s scandal, his brother becomes impoverished and becomes a 
commoner. Randal himself plunges into the world of debauchery, gambling his life away, 
becoming paler and more sickly as time goes by, so ashamed of his name he takes on a 
pseudonym, till, one day, Riccabocca (now duke) chances upon him in a hospital bed with a 
severe head wound from being exposed of chicanery. Not only does Randal suffer for his 
misdemeanor, his family has to be punished for his shame because a proper Englishman 
possesses shame enough to drive him to excel but not to over-reach to a better class. Pisistratus 
rather quits his political job in which he has a bright future and leaves for the colony than to 
remain in England to be close with the aristocrat he is in love with. In the words of parson 
Dale’s sermon—and, in Bulwer-Lytton’s imagination, a clergyman’s sermon is directive—
“inequality is necessary and essential” (1: 89), encapsulating and recapitulating the importance 
of maintaining the status quo of the English class system that—again, to Bulwer-Lytton—
benefits all the English, including landed gentry, aristocrats, and the working class. Shame is 
Bulwer-Lytton’s weapon of choice for his spirited crusade against the American-style 
democracy of the encroaching world.   
 Like how shame is utilized to characterize the English identity, and to delineate social 
class, shame also facilitates the workings of gender. Bulwer-Lytton’s writings reify Ruskin’s 
belief in biological essentialism: “each [sex] has what the other has not, each completes the 
other, and is completed by the other: they are nothing alike” (Sesame 59).  To maintain a 
distinction of classes is to prevent marrying across social lines for both men and women. 




reaching—like Nora who runs away from L’Estrange’s suit—or are docile creatures, 
acquiescing to their parents’ arranged marriages, such as Fanny in The Caxtons, or are 
portrayed, like Helen, as unworthy and unsuitable for marriage with aristocrats. 8  Sexual 
stability is achieved only because the novels follow, as Nancy Armstrong has generalized in 
Desire and Domestic Fiction, “a set of moral norms that exalted the domestic woman” (5). The 
male characters, on the other hand, have no innate sense of shame and have to be taught by 
elder male tutors. These tutored boys feel shame when they fall in love with ladies who are of 
a superior position to them. In fact, shame in Bulwer-Lytton’s work drives a boy to establish 
his career, capable to look after his family, before he should think of marriage to a lady of an 
equivalent class, a lady much younger than the male so that he can control and provide guidance 
to her. Those without mentors evolve into villains without shame, who try to over-reach by 
kidnapping or resorting to skulduggery and duplicity to coerce an aristocratic lady’s hand; they 
are always unsuccessful, fall deeply from grace into the direst circumstances, and use their 
deaths to wipe out their shame. It is not difficult to observe Bulwer-Lytton’s oppressive 
sociopolitical eugenics and propaganda at work: using shame as an Althusserian ideological 
apparatus, not only are families kept within their social class, a financially stable family 
corresponds to a country that spends less time and money on social welfare.  
 While Bulwer-Lytton in his novels depicts heterosexual bonds between sexes as 
auxiliary to homosocial bonds between men (between the tutor and tutored), his novels also 
ratify heterosexual domesticity. While this contradictory state of affairs may hinder the 
protraction of the pride and honor of England, constant regeneration of generations of 
Englishmen through heterosexual procreation in the long run brings honor and glory to the 
                                                
8 It should be said here that while most female characters in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels play the 
role of angels in the house, there are few exceptions. For instance, Arabella in What Will He 
Do with It? is a determined and furtive woman who hunts and traps her first love, the reprobate 
of the story. But, like all villains, Arabella, who has dealings with the underworld, does not 




country, something the barren fruits of homosocial bonds could not achieve. The author uses 
shame to manipulate the feeling of manhood in his characters. Before marriage, a character—
usually an aristocrat—is effete, effeminate, and languid, all traits that pointedly express that he 
is not masculine. (Examples: Lord L’Estrange’s and Sir Sedley Beaudessert’s effeminacy are 
signalled by their French-like name and extravagance.) The shame and attack on his 
masculinity is compounded with the shame that he is not bequeathing his superior genes to 
ensure the perpetuation of England’s pride; shame precipitates his marriage, demonstrating his 
masculinity. After marriage, he usually achieves honors for England, which coincides with the 
birth of an heir, associating his heir with honors. In other words, as Donald Hall claims, “a 
viscous, if not fluid, Victorian male subjectivity [is] inextricably bound up with his perception 
of, demarcation of an Other” (3), Victorian masculinity exists in Bulwer-Lytton’s novels 
because female characters remain one-dimensional angels. Furthermore, as Judith Butler 
argues convincingly, the “radical dependency of the masculine subject on the female ‘Other’ 
suddenly exposes his autonomy as illusory” (vii), the masculinity of Bulwer-Lytton’s 
characters and whatever powers that come with masculine authority are but illusory.  Hence, 
unlike Darwin’s notion of shame that constructs, deconstructs, and reconstructs selfhood and 
identity continuously, allowing slippages, changes and possibilities, in Bulwer-Lytton’s 
universe, pride, honor, and shame exist in an eternal, cuneiform stasis to contribute to 










Chapter Three: Elizabeth Gaskell as St Sebastian: Shame and Transgendered Identity 
in Cranford and Ruth 
Bulwer-Lytton’s notion of a God-given interiority of shame makes it so that he could only 
envision a single purpose of the affect to achieve honors for the country, and, in turn, to the 
patrilineal family name. As a result, his novels have a running strand of disgraced sons and the 
return of the prodigal sons from colonized lands with honors; his female characters are often 
indistinguishable. Similarly religious or perhaps even more so as the wife of a Unitarian 
minister, Elizabeth Gaskell, on the other hand, presents another model of shame that could 
encapsulate both Darwinian shame and her Broad Church leaning; unlike Bulwer-Lytton, 
Gaskell (and many Victorians) did not see Darwinian theory as antipodal to Christianity. 
Although Darwin’s writing on emotions did not appear until 1872, Elizabeth Gaskell who 
claimed to be a cousin of Darwin—Gaskell and Darwin shared ancestors, Thomas Wedgwood 
(1685-1739) and his wife Mary Stringer,1 and they travelled in the same social circle—had 
clearly perused Darwinian evolution theory, and deduced the implications of his theory on 
human subjectivity, which she ruminated in her novels.  
During Gaskell’s lifetime, her detractors, who insisted that her writing was “feminine,” 
emotional, and not serious, shamed her. Based in industrial Manchester, she was shamed by 
the failure of her body and extensions of her body in the age of mechanical reproduction. As a 
female writer whose body of works was paraded publicly, the exposure shamed her; this is, of 
course, the problem many Victorian women writers faced. To counter the shame, Gaskell uses 
the affect as a way of transforming her own gender, seeing herself in the figure of St Sebastian, 
someone who is shamed, martyred, and dying at once. This transgenderism with its association 
of shame, pride, and death is often reflected in the heroes and heroines of her novels, and often 
                                                
1 For a detailed genealogy of the Gaskells, Darwins, and Wedgewoods, see The Wedgewood 





lacking in her villains. In this chapter, I will first note the dissonance between how her 
contemporaries read her novels and how she intended her novels to be read. While many critics 
argue that the dissonance could be explained by analyzing how sympathy operates in Gaskell’s 
novels, I suggest shame provides a more fundamental and thorough understanding of her work 
that sympathy fails to explicate. Finally, I will demonstrate the shame in Gaskell’s life using a 
psychological lens, before examining Ruth and Cranford in detail.   
 
Emotions and Truth: Criticism of Gaskell’s Writings 
At Elizabeth Gaskell’s untimely death, and with the publication of her posthumous novel, 
Wives and Daughters, Henry James wrote an unsigned review in The Nation, evaluating 
Gaskell’s oeuvre: “For Mrs. Gaskell’s genius was so very composite as a quality, it was so 
obviously the offspring of her affections, her feelings, her associations, and (considering that, 
after all, it was genius) was so little of an intellectual matter” (qtd. in Critical Heritage 464). 
James claims that Gaskell’s biography on Charlotte Bronte “could not possibly have [been] 
written” by an intellectual woman (464). The biography is “of fine qualities, of affection, of 
generosity, of sympathy, of imagination [but] it lacks the prime requisites of a good biography. 
It is written with a signal want of judgment and of critical power” (464). In James’s early 
review, already demonstrating his attention for an exact phrase and his search for a literary 
theory, he categorizes Gaskell as a writer who feels, not thinks, that her emotions are keen and 
sympathetic, but her intellect untrustworthy, although, he notes, genius takes on many forms 
and possessing warm sentiments is one of them.  
 James’s critique echoes previous contemporary reviewers of Gaskell’s: they 
characterize her writing as feminine, and emotional. John Forster, a reader for the manuscript 
of Mary Barton, knowing the identity of the then-anonymous author, surmises publicly in The 




emotions displayed (qtd. in Critical Heritage 68). Even though the book on industrial unrest, 
a theme that is decidedly “unfeminine” by traditional standards, had incensed many 
manufacturers, Forster declares that it is not a political novel and connects it back to emotions, 
“The internal passions and emotions are its materials of interest” (69). Henry Fothergill 
Chorley, in an unsigned review of Cranford published in The Athenaeum, states that the beauty 
of the novel with “inane” characters lies in the “touches of love and kindness, of simple self-
sacrifice and of true womanly tenderness” (qtd. in Critical Heritage 194). In a later review 
upon the publication of Ruth, Chorley argues strongly that the feelings behind the novel are 
“more admirable, however, than its logic” (qtd. in Critical Heritage 204). Chorley’s opinions 
are parroted in Sharpe’s London Magazine, which states that the tenderness and emotive 
powers of Ruth have no intellectual purpose (208). George Henry Lewes in The Leader 
emphasizes that Ruth “cannot be read with unwet eyes, nor hearts uninfluenced” (qtd. in 
Critical Heritage 215). The Guardian calls Ruth a “touching story” with “profound feeling” 
(234). All these reviews culminate in Lord David Cecil’s 1934 study of Early Victorian 
Novelists: “a minor novelist,” Gaskell “was all a woman was expected to be; gentle, domestic, 
tactful, unintellectual, prone to tears, easily shocked. So far from chafing at the limits imposed 
on her activities, she accepted them with serene satisfaction” (198). Most contemporary 
reviewers valued Gaskell’s work because of its sensibility and sentiments, not its intellect, truth, 
logic and rationality. These early reviews of her work produce a profound aftermath of how 
we read Gaskell now. In a book giving an overview of Gaskell’s oeuvre, first published in 1960 
for the British Council, Miriam Allot regurgitates similar thoughts to those of these reviewers: 
known for her “compassion” and “humanitarian principles,” her “ambitious novels, interesting 
in spite of all their imperfections… show that if her heart was in the right place her intellectual 
equipment was amateurish” (4). The reviewers have positioned Gaskell as an emotional (and 




 However, time and time again, Gaskell insists that her novels are rational, logical and 
truthful. Her copious private correspondence may divulge her intentions, both countering and 
supporting her public male detractors. On Mary Barton, she explicates to Catherine 
Winksworth, “I believe I wrote truth [sic]… I like you to understand it. It is a painful subject 
and must be painful, and I felt it all deeply myself I could hardly be light-hearted any part of 
the time I was writing it” (Letters 66, emphasis original). She reiterates her first novel’s veracity 
to Mary Ewart, “I have personal evidence… No one could feel more deeply than I how wicked 
it is to do anything to excite class against class… I could only repeat that no praise could 
compensate me for the self-reproach I shall feel if I have written unjustly” (Letters 67, emphasis 
original). When asked if she would write a sequel of Mary Barton from the point of view of 
the mill-owners, she replies, “whatever power there was in Mary Barton [sic] was caused by 
my feeling strongly (and as it is impossible I ever should,) on the other side, the forced effort 
of writing on that side would {be} \end in/a weak failure… I believe what I have said in Mary 
Barton [sic] to be perfectly true” (Letters 119). While Gaskell vows that she writes the truth, 
her truth carries with it strong emotions, usually of suffering: “I felt it all deeply”; “no one 
could feel more deeply than I”; the power of Mary Barton “caused by my feeling deeply.” In a 
sense, her male detractors are both correct and wrong about her writings: she intends her work 
to be logical and truthful, despite critics’ claims, and to be emotional, in accordance with their 
observations. To Gaskell, logic and emotions are not opposites, but they are complementary.  
Gaskell intends truth and emotions to operate in tandem to engender social change. As 
Angus Easson and Deirdre D’Albertis have noted on separate occasions, Gaskell, when writing, 
considers that emotions and truth might convert to philanthropic actions to better the dire 
circumstances of a discontented industrial society, as implied by the epigraph of Mary Barton, 




coining the phrase “Condition of England,” Carlyle charges men-of-letters2 “to interpret… the 
dumb deep want of the people” (“Characteristics” 168). And as if answering Carlyle’s behest, 
the raison d’etre of Mary Barton, Gaskell writes in the preface, is “to give some utterance to 
the agony [of workers] which, from time to time convulses this dumb people” (37-8). Returning 
the compliment and acknowledging what Gaskell tries to achieve, Carlyle writes to her, “the 
result is a Book deserving to take its place far above the ordinary garbage of Novels" (“TC to 
Elizabeth Gaskell”). Overjoyed that Carlyle recognizes the intent of her writing, Gaskell 
mentions in several letters to several people that “Mr Carlyle’s letter remains my true gain” 
(Letters 68).3 The advocacy and knowledge conveyed through the emotions of her books have 
precipitated and translated to actions. For one, William Arnold, son of Thomas Arnold of 
Rugby and brother of the poet, raised funds for the poor in Manchester (Critical Heritage 18). 
Among the modern Marxist critics who argue that the affective force of Mary Barton could 
reshape Victorian class struggles and dynamics, Thomas Recchio observes that the novel 
requires of its readers for introspection and “self reformation,” humanizing people of lower 
classes (17).   
Clearly, Gaskell was not the only Victorian author to possess a sense of social 
responsibility in her writing. Dickens’s novels tell the abuse of child labor and Bulwer-Lytton, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, uses shame to enforce a nationalistic spirit in Englishmen. 
Like Bulwer-Lytton, Gaskell employs shame to produce actions. However, her understanding 
of shame stems from her own projection of the self onto the figure of St Sebastian; Gaskell 
commiserated with the saint because they were both spectacles who were shamed publicly and 
suffered for a worthy cause. While Bulwer-Lytton’s rigid Christian worldview means that God-
given shame is immutable, Gaskell’s Broad Church notion, which could assimilate theories of 
                                                
2 I deliberately use a gendered term here to illustrate the point that Gaskell was writing in a 
male-dominated arena, and because Carlyle’s call-to-action was specifically addressed to men.  




evolution and science, gives her shame a fluidity that could break down identities and 
boundaries between people of different classes and sexes. The breakage allows communication 
and mutual sympathy for each other. Scholars have sought for answers in her sympathetic 
portrayal of destitute characters to forward her social activism; however, sympathy is but a 
component of shame, which scholars tend to overlook. Shame causes immense change in the 
makeup of the self, and by extension, fosters changes in society.  
 
Shame, Sympathy, Selfhood, and Suffering in Gaskell’s Oeuvre 
Jill Matus notes that Gaskell embraces complexity and contradictions and proposes to examine 
emotions in her novels. Emotions, Matus states, may act as a connection between classes and 
at the same time a reinforcement of class stratification. While emotions may be complex and 
contradictory, Matus does not pinpoint the exact emotion. Gaskell herself encourages her 
readers to look for sympathy in her novels. In the preface of Mary Barton, she claims “the 
sympathy of the happy” could alleviate “the agony of suffering” (38). In her private letters, she 
writes that she wants to create in John Barton “an ignorant thoughtful man of strong power of 
sympathy,” that is, a man who can transmit sympathy to her readers (70). She reiterates in 
another letter that John is “an ignorant man full of rude, illogical thought, and full also of 
sympathy for suffering, which appealed to him through his senses” (74); John’s bodily 
suffering produces sympathy in both readers and the author as she transgresses class and sex 
boundaries and places herself in John’s shoes: “he was my hero, the person with whom all my 
sympathies went, with whom I tried to identified myself at the time, because I believed from 
personal experience that such men were not uncommon, and would well reward such sympathy 
and love as should throw light down upon their groping search after the causes of suffering, 




 The male critics, as previously stated, had certainly assumed and noted the excess 
sympathy in her novels, and attributed it to her femininity. Compared to the male critics, Maria 
Edgeworth gives a more nuanced understanding of Mary Barton: “I think, or rather I feel, that 
not only there are too many deaths but too many living creatures in this book. The reader’s 
sympathy is too much divided, cannot flit as fast as called upon from one to another without 
being weakened. The more forcible the calls and the objects of pity, the more the feelings are 
harassed & in danger of being exhausted” (qtd. in Critical Heritage 92, emphasis original). 
Putting aside the noted numerous deaths, which John Ruskin too brought up in his letter to 
Gaskell,4 and which will be discussed later in relation to shame for mourning and mortality, 
Edgeworth’s exposition illustrates the pervading nature of affects in Gaskell’s novels, affecting 
the mind—“I think, or rather I feel”—and the body, for she uses “weakened” and “exhausted” 
as if sympathy is embodied.5  
Edgeworth’s idea that Gaskell’s sympathy is limited, quantifiable, and economical is 
explored in Jill Rappoport’s article, “Conservation of Sympathy in Cranford.” Rappoport 
claims pessimistically that Gaskell, inspired by the scientific theory that energy is neither 
created nor destroyed but is conserved, transferred, and transformed, creates a hermitic 
Amazonian community of closed system where “sympathy—like money—is a limited 
commodity in Cranford” (97). Rappoport’s reading, while it may be accurate for Cranford, 
opposes Gaskell’s intentions and could not be applied across her oeuvre; Gaskell’s sympathy 
extends to factory workers, fallen women, disabled people, and anyone who is underprivileged. 
Demonstrated in novel after novel, Gaskell’s sympathy has no bounds.  
                                                
4 At first, Ruskin refused to continue reading Cranford after the death of Captain Brown. But 
his mother persuaded him and he wrote to Gaskell to compliment her, even though she was 
“fond of killing nice people” in her novels (qtd. in Critical Heritage 198).  
5 It should be noted that George Eliot is the only critic who thought Ruth “does not secure one’s 




Patsy Stoneman seizes upon Gaskell’s boundless sympathy and asserts that her 
working-class male characters possess a traditionally “feminine” sympathetic and nurturing 
aspect, a radical concept for Victorians. Other feminist critics, such as Hilary Schor, Jill L. 
Matus, Lisa Surridge, and Laurie Buchanan, continue along this train of thought in their various 
publications. However, while concentrating on subversive elements of sympathy, they neglect 
that Gaskell’s intention is not to excite class against class. Although feminizing working class 
men appears to be emasculating, Gaskell’s working-class characters’ trait of being sympathetic 
allows readers to side with them over the middle-class factory owners, pitting class against 
against class, and, like scholars, many manufacturers misread Gaskell’s intention at the time 
of publication and were riled by the difference of portrayal between classes of men.6 It cannot 
be overemphasized that although Gaskell was sympathetic to the working class, she desired 
better treatment of them, and not an overthrow of the industrial system.  
While the previous critics focus on the radical and feminizing aspect of sympathy, 
Melissa Schaub, reading against the grain, imagines sympathy flowing from Gaskell’s Mary 
Barton to working class readers, not middle-class readers, and as a result, the manipulative 
nature of sympathy paralyzes the working class in their self-victimization, interpellates them 
into a hierarchized, subservient ideology, and is utilized as a tool of discipline for the working-
class. Like other critics, Schaub disregards Gaskell’s intentions of giving voice to victims, 
clearly stated in the preface of Mary Barton and in her letters. Furthermore, Gaskell, when 
writing, aims to publicize the pains of the working class to the middle class to bring about 
social change, distinctly targeting middle-class readers. From my knowledge of her private 
letters, she received encomium and opprobrium from literary figures, personal friends and 
acquaintances, factory owners, and clergymen, all middle-class or aristocrats, but there is 
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seldom mention of letters from the working class. To be even more specific, Gaskell directs 
her writing for mature middle-class adults—married women and adult men—because they had 
the ability to effect social changes. For example, regarding Ruth, she writes in a private letter, 
“Of course it is a prohibited book in this, as in many other households; not a book for young 
people, unless read with someone older” (Letters 221, emphasis original). Her books are 
written with a specific mature middle-class audience in mind. This is not to say the working 
class did not read Gaskell, merely that Schaub has ignored Gaskell’s purpose in writing.  
Schaub derives her thesis from but opposes Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy. Jaffe 
theorizes that sympathy can induce immense unease in the sympathizer as the affect reduces 
her or him to the position—social class, bodily suffering, identity, etc—of the victim. “The act 
of looking,” she argues, “fills the spectator with the anxiety of bodily contagion, the fear of 
inhabiting the beggar’s place” (5). Such vicarious bodily pain is viewed with anxiety by the 
Victorians because “to view suffering was potentially to collapse the rational boundaries 
between imagination and reality and to relinquish the power of self-control” (Vrettos 86). Like 
previous critics, Jaffe contradicts the traces of evidence Gaskell leaves behind and hints at in 
her oeuvre and life. Many scholars have argued persuasively that Gaskell’s work and life are 
guided by her beliefs in Unitarianism.7 In 1832, Gaskell became a Unitarian minister’s wife, 
and “while it is possible to read her works without becoming aware of that fact… it was a fact 
intensely important to her personally and to her background… in that faith she found a rule of 
conduct, a way to the inner or ideal life that yet stressed the full play of reason, and a sympathy 
which sought to include all Christians and understand other creeds” (Easson, Elizabeth Gaskell 
4-5). With the elimination of the “three-person’d god” in the belief of Unitarianism, that is, the 
death of Jesus does not wash away the sins of humanity, collapses the doctrine of salvation by 
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Mary Elizabeth Hotz’s “ ‘Taught by Death What Life Should Be’: Elizabeth Gaskell’s 




predestination and grace alone. It follows then that within each person exists a godhead, and 
every person has her or his own way to God. Implicit in Unitarianism, because everyone is 
equal in the eyes of God, everyone is equal in spite of class and gender differences. For instance, 
women were encouraged to be educated so that they too could find their way to God. (Gaskell 
believed strongly in educating her daughters.) Jaffe’s underlying assumption that sympathy 
transmits from the sufferer to the sympathizer connotes an imbalance of power, privileging the 
latter who appears to be superior. This assumption runs counter to Gaskell’s Unitarian beliefs; 
to volunteer and to help, as she often did among the poor in her parish, do not suggest 
superiority.  
A brief critique of articles on sympathy in Gaskell’s work, with the flaws inherent in 
the affect conflicting with her beliefs, demonstrates that perhaps sympathy may not give us 
best access and understanding to her world. Gaskell writes of surfaces, observes Felicia 
Bonaparte. Her letters reveal things and everyday details of the chores she did, the flowers she 
planted, and the food she cooked, but they seldom disclosed her interiority. In a letter she wrote 
to a budding female novelist, she advised her to describe things, and not interiority (Letters 
694-5). Building on a deconstructed reading on the history of objects, Elaine Freedgood argues 
that the checked curtains in Mary Barton are a metonym for Victorian domestic economy and 
globalization. Just like ideas are hidden in things, affects can be concealed in affects.  
Considering how closely related shame and sympathy are, and that sympathy is a 
compounded emotion while shame is a basic affect, one could easily hide under the guise of 
the other. Jaffe’s study on sympathy borrows an experience from queer theorist Kaja Silverman 
to exemplify the transference of emotions through sympathy: Silverman assiduously avoids 
looking at homeless people because, as Jaffe reads it, the homeless pose a threat to the middle-
class observer’s identity, and the observer may suffer and occupy the place of the victim (5). 




in Eve Sedgwick’s thought experiment that bears great similarities to Silverman’s experience. 
Sedgwick conjures an unwashed, half-insane (homeless?) man who stumbles into her lecture 
room, mumbling accusations, urinates publicly, and leaves. “I pictured the excruciation of 
everyone else in the room: each looking down, wishing to be anywhere else yet conscious of 
the inexorable fate of being exactly there, inside the individual skin of which each was 
burningly aware; at the same time, thought, unable to stanch the hemorrhage of painful 
identification with the misbehaving man” (Sedgwick 37). The specular panic-sympathy that 
Jaffe reads in Silverman’s distress when she averts her gaze from the homeless transpires from 
shame in the possibility of being in the homeless person’s position, which moves towards 
individuation, and, at the same time, securing connection between the sympathizer and the 
abject. Silverman’s distress is the shame that arises from her middle class status. Gaskell, 
whose humanitarian work as a minister’s wife, put her in the same position as the middle-class 
Silverman and as Sedgwick facing homeless people.  
The connection between sympathy and shame could further be elucidated in the early 
uses of “empathy,” a word coined by psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener in 1909, and 
defined by Vernon Lee in 1912 as “sympathetic aesthetic feeling” (qtd. in Morrell 46).8 Like 
Jaffe, Silverman, and Sedgwick who locate the gaze as the initiator of transferences of affect, 
Titchener locates meaning in visual images that are “oftentimes” accompanied “with 
kinaesthesis. Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, but 
I feel or act them in the mind’s muscle” (21). The interconnectedness between “sympathetic 
aesthetic feeling” and shame is evident when Titchener (unconsciously?) mentions variations 
of degree of shame or strategies to ward off shame. Like shame, gravity, modesty, pride, 
courtesy, and stateliness are relational affects in which the self measures its identity against 
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term to Titchener. For an explanation of the origin of “empathy,” see Michael Morrell’s 




others. Gravity, courtesy, and stateliness are social rules individuals recognize, abide by, and 
manipulate to avoid shame, whereas pride and modesty are permutations of shame. To define 
“sympathetic aesthetic feeling” in terms of shame, it is a form of epistemology arising not 
necessarily from logic and reason, but from shame-based experiences and emotions that initiate 
kinesthesia or actions and reactions. 
For shame to be concealed in sympathy isn’t surprising for its etymology stems from 
“to hide.” Applying shame to Gaskell’s corpus allows a reading that treats her intentions with 
integrity and refines previous scholars’ imperfections. Their binary reading of gender 
necessitates the pitting of class against class, suggesting superiority and inferiority, a most 
“wicked” thing in Gaskell’s opinion. However, employing shame, since everybody—men, 
women, working class, factory owners—feels shame or at least possesses an ability to feel 
shame, the characters could be considered equals despite the class and gender differences. 
At the root of sympathy, shame induces transmission of emotions from one suffering 
body to another body that possesses the possibility of suffering. When Gaskell’s books are 
interpreted accurately, or as accurately as possible, her intentions to improve society impel 
positive actions: “half (and the best half) are buying it to give to their work-people’s libraries” 
(Letters 68). But sometimes the transmission may be interrupted, misconceived, and 
misunderstood, causing shame-rage—“Half the masters here are bitterly angry with me” 
regarding Mary Barton (ibid)—and shame-indignation—two men burnt Ruth and “a third has 
forbidden his wife to read it” (Letters 223). Sympathy can prompt limited actions because when 
out of sight of the abject, the sympathizer forgets about the other’s plight, indulging in his or 
her life of luxury; sympathy exists in the locus of sight. Shame, on the other hand, changes the 
identity of the self and cannot be switched off completely. At the moment of shame, identity is 
shaken, torn down, and rebuilt to accommodate the other figure of sympathy, spurring and 




The Shame of Elizabeth Gaskell 
Although Gaskell does not use the word “shame” often in her body of books and letters 
(because she writes little of interiority and because the definition of shame prevents disclosure 
of self to self and others), her proclivity to be ashamed reveals itself in her actions, especially 
during the births of her novels. Prior to her first novel, Mary Barton, she harassed the publishers 
for an exact publication date, and when they did not respond, she sent more letters, secretly 
fearing rejection (Letters 54-6). She intended to hide her name behind a male pseudonym 
“Stephen Berwick” but the novel had already gone to print (59). Anxious about the sales, she 
requested the publishers to get her book reviewed even though she would later claim she didn’t 
care about the reception (60; 115). She concealed her authorship and deliberately misled her 
friend into thinking that a “Mrs Wheeler” wrote Mary Barton, and even spun a story about Mrs 
Wheeler, “a clergyman’s wife, who once upon a time was a Miss Stone, and wrote a book 
called ‘The Cotton-Lord’” (62). What Gaskell underwent for the gestation of her first novel 
would be what psychologist Leon Wurmser identifies as “shame anxiety,” an anxiety from “the 
imminent danger of unexpected exposure, humiliation, and rejection” (49). More shame arose 
from the accusations that she provoked class conflicts, a most “wicked” thing in her opinion 
(Letters 67). When the “Masters” raged at the book, she was at first shame-indignant and 
shame-defensive [“I believe I wrote truth” (66, emphasis original)] and later shame-
reconciliatory [“I have represented but one side of the question” (119, emphasis original)]. The 
shaming she experienced made her want to write no more: “le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle” 
(72), keening aware of “the enemies which [Mary Barton] has made me” (115). 
“An unfit subject for fiction,” 9  an oft repeated phrase when she discussed Ruth, 
indicates her ashamedness of the novel. She “dislike[d] its being published so much, I shd [sic] 
                                                




not wonder if I put it off another year” (204). And when her friends “smashed into Ruth [sic] 
in grand style,” the shaming “frightened [her] off [her] nest again” (205). She claimed she 
wouldn’t give any copies away, and that “when Ruth will be published whether this year, next, 
or 10 years hence I don’t know. It is not written yet,” but three months after this letter, Ruth 
surfaced in the literary market (Letters 209, emphasis original). As shame is relational, the 
reason for Gaskell’s reluctance over and prevarications regarding Ruth is clear: “I hate 
publishing because of the talk people make, which I always feel as a great impertinence, if they 
address their remarks to me in any way” (ibid, emphasis original). By publishing, she allowed 
others to judge and shame her. She forbade people to write to her “for their expressions of 
disapproval” (220). Despite her avowals of seeming indifference to reception of the book, she 
asked Charlotte Bronte to delay the release date of Villette for fear of competition in sales 
(Critical Heritage 201). Despite her avowals to disregard people’s opinions (Letters 225), she 
learnt that the book was burnt (227), a library withdrew it from circulation (223), and not a 
single newspaper praised it (ibid). Despite her avowals to not care about the public, she wrote 
“I think I must be an improper woman without knowing it… you can’t think how ‘improper’ I 
feel under [the fellow churchgoers’] eyes” (ibid). Paradoxically, only two months later, she 
confessed, “The difference between Miss [Charlotte] Bronte and me is that she puts all her 
naughtiness into her books, and I put all my goodness… my books are so far better than I am 
that I often feel ashamed of having written them” (228). Gaskell’s shame maps a conflict of 
public disapproval and private misrepresentation of her self, and this shame reveals itself in the 
contradictory stance she had over her books, sometimes seeing her books as “an unfit subject” 
and sometimes seeing them as possessing “all my goodness.”  
Like Darwin, whose body is wreaked with shame, Gaskell suffers bodily for her writing. 
Writing was difficult for her, giving her headaches and dizziness (Letters 294). She was 




writing Mary Barton and Ruth, she felt the painful subjects deeply, and if she hadn’t felt pain, 
she claimed, she couldn’t have written the books (66, 119, 220, 225). This pain is associated 
with the shame she felt over the books. Sometimes her actions of writing frightened her (67, 
205). She cried over nasty reviews and public opinions (352). She suffered a spinal irritation 
after intense responses for and against Mary Barton, during which doctors forbade her to write 
(132); a “‘Ruth’ fever” from which she believed she would never recover (222); bouts of 
insomnia over The Life of Charlotte Bronte [“I found head & health suffering” (411)]; and an 
unknown illness that forced her to remain supine when composing Wives and Daughters [“Oh 
dear! I am nearly killed, but the stress of every thing [sic] is nearly over” (772)]. And she 
passed away before finishing the novel. Her experiences mark shame onto her body.  
Reading the internecine struggles between shame, bodily suffering, and writing, 
Gaskell’s mandate to a budding female novelist, “Get Strong” (Letters 694), takes on both 
literal and metaphorical implications: both physically strong to weather the hardship of creation 
and birth of writing; and emotionally strong to endure the shaming of (male) critics. Health and 
morbidity are discussed in Deirdre D’Albertis’s brilliant article on the two competing literary 
models that Gaskell and Charlotte Bronte utilized. While Bronte understands art as a traumatic 
tortured feminine creativity of psychic and physical suffering, renouncing “the body in order 
to write,” D’Albertis argues, Gaskell “renounces ego in pursuit of a communal literary ideal” 
by depicting others who suffer (3). Gaskell’s ideal of “Get Strong,” however, is but an 
unachievable dream because all bodies eventually fail and because she knew the impossibility 
of the mandate from experiencing the deaths of her mother, brother, and son.  
Inherent in death, the failure of bodies carries the burden of shame psychologically, 
culturally, and historically. Psychologists agree that shame is a persuasive feature in humans’ 




birth, the libido matrix, that is the wish to look, to approach, to interest, requires reciprocity; 
the infant reaches and grabs hold of the mother. But when a child fails to find reciprocity, 
shame is observed; a child’s refusal to be held by a stranger is signalled by burying her head in 
her mother’s body, averting the gaze. Attachment, psychologist John Bowlby suggests, brings 
security while dissociation and absence, a failure of reciprocity linked with shame, may 
symbolically represent a developing awareness of death. Shame is the grieving of the self’s 
experience of itself. As most psychologists agree, since selfhood is based on relationships as 
personality and character are relational,10 the rupture of contact denotes a sense of rejection, 
disapproval, and desertion, bringing on shame. The broken bond between the self and the other 
caused by death devalues the self because the detachment disconnects the self from the social 
world. Bowlby argues that mourning could repair the shameful loss. Following Bowlby, 
psychologist Victor Schermer argues that the shame in deaths diminishes the self because a 
part of the self is felt to be left behind to die through identification with the deceased, leaving 
the self broken, fragmented, and disorganized. Hence, when shame occurs in mourning, the 
bereaved cannot heal.  
In a Lacanian reading of the Victorian culture of death and mourning, David McAllister 
employs a Heideggerean metaphor of a potter fashioning a vase around a hole to defer the 
terrifying absence of the dead. Gaskell, he argues, incorporates quotations on death as 
“analgesic words of comfort,” numbing the pain, but never truly healing and mourning (235). 
Because death is ineffable and cannot be tamed into the visual order of the Imaginary through 
the symbolic function, death, as the Other, as part of the Real, is unknowable, terrifying, and 
cannot be induced into the Law of the Father. To venture into the Real is to enter a state of 
neurosis, and thus Lacan argues that in order to maintain psychic health, it is necessary to create 
                                                




something ex nihilo; a subject’s pain for the deceased is sublimated into cultural texts and 
objects, acceptable to society. The subject creates continual signifiers to be distracted from the 
terrifying unknown, and in this case, death. Using Lacanian theory, McAllister suggests that 
Gaskell uses poetic fragments as quotations to “disguise and obscure the vacancy left by the 
loss of the dead, rather than seeking to ameliorate it” (230).  
Applying the previously mentioned psychological aspect of death, shame, and 
mourning to Gaskell’s life could explicate McAllister’s reading of Gaskell’s prorogued 
mourning. While any hypothesis regarding the absence of the mother who passed away when 
Gaskell was one is flawed and perhaps even callous, most psychologists would agree11 that 
Gaskell’s infantile disconnectedness from her mother would influence her understanding of 
death, loss, and shame in her emergent sense of identity; many female characters in Gaskell’s 
body of works are motherless. Her brother’s death, presumably lost at sea or disappeared in 
India, might have suspended Gaskell’s healing through mourning, because the absence of a 
body inhibits proper mourning; there remained hope that he would return one day. During the 
eight years John Stevenson, her brother, was in India, he paid her much attention, wrote her 
many letters, urging her for news from home and encouraging her studies. The break in 
correspondence, the inability for reciprocation, might have caused her shame. Although she 
seldom referred to her brother, her fiction repeats the motif of the lost and/or returning male. 
As selfhood is relational, the death of her son, seen as an extension of her self, might bring her 
grief and shame since the demise could be construed as the failure of self by self. Her shame 
regarding her son is not dissimilar to Darwin’s. He questioned his consanguineous marriage to 
his cousin, which he believed might have caused the weak constitutions of his children. As a 
scientist studying the evolution and the fitness of species, he could not but feel ashamed that 
                                                




he produced unfit offspring. In Wives and Daughters, the success of Roger Hamley, who is 
modelled after Darwin, comes partly because he is fit enough to weather the colonies. Living 
in this scientific milieu, both Gaskell and Darwin saw their children as extensions of their 
selves, and the deceased ones were unfit to survive in the world.  
Besides the psychological analysis of death and shame, culture provides a teleological 
explanation of the association of death and shame. In the Western culture, death 
phenomenologically excludes the living from the inscrutable death, exemplified by the 
cessation of Gaskell’s brother’s letters, and exclusion creates shame between the “in” and “out” 
groups; she is not worthy to communicate with others. The absence of her brother’s corpse and 
the illness of her infant child could abstractly signal death as a shameful, diseased secret to be 
kept out of sight, and swept under the carpet.  
As Gaskell was writing about death, the burial reform debate reached its peak in mid-
19th century England. Mary Elizabeth Hotz contrasts the treatment of death by Gaskell and by 
Edwin Chadwick, Secretary to the New Poor Law Commission (1834-42) and the 
Commissioner for the Board of Health (1848-52). As Hotz points out, Chadwick argues in The 
Supplementary Report that working-class corpses are agents “of contagious diseases and a lag 
on economic productivity,” requiring centralized disposal of corpses. This clinical solution to 
dispose the dead suggests an exigency to separate the healthy from the dead quickly for sanitary 
reasons. Chadwick not only links death with disease and economic slack, the rapid disposal of 
corpses suggests a shame in death. Hotz also notes that Gaskell, unlike Chadwick who treats 
corpses clinically, utilizes deaths in her novels to heal the differences between the working- 
and middle- classes. However, Gaskell’s approach to death does not preclude shame in it. Hotz 
analyzes a passage in North and South that Margaret’s father objects to her going to a funeral 




certain class do not attend funerals because they “are ashamed of showing” grief in public (261). 
While Chadwick and Gaskell have different ideologies about death and burial, they both 
associate death with shame.  
It could be countered that ill-health and death were a normal part of everyday life for 
the Victorians, as Pat Jalland has argued, and as such there could be no shame in deaths. 
Deborah Lutz in Relics of Death in Victorian Literature and Culture has posited that the bodily 
relics of a person’s death, such as hair and teeth, represent non-reproducible unique beings. 
The proximity of Victorians with death and death objects seems to imply that they were 
comfortable with death, that deaths were not shameful. But such a counterargument confuses 
what is commonplace with what is shameful. In the realm of the mid-19th century movement 
of muscular Christianity, Gaskell’s “Get Strong” mandate to a budding female writer clearly 
indicates her own desire to be healthy, and there is a sense of failure to her work if her body 
could not handle the pressure of production of writing. In her novels, as I will demonstrate later, 
she often conflates death and shame.  
The inherent shame in death could also be accounted for at the historical moment of 
industrialization in Victorian times. Bruce Haley argues that society, individuals, and art are 
judged by capability and “the production of useful, creative labor” (21). He continues, “the 
concept of the healthy mind gave the Victorian critic not only a standard of evaluation but also 
an analytic technique” (57). The assessment of writers based on health and production should 
be read according to the living conditions of the writer. Living in Manchester, which saw a 
boom in textile manufacture in the 19th century, causing a sharp population increase, and 
problems in unplanned urbanization, and where the world’s first steam passenger railway sits, 
Gaskell depicts the conflicts between Masters and workers in Mary Barton and North and 




by science and machinery. In an age where exacting machines could reproduce material goods 
precisely, in a society that values productivity and control, and in a culture that valorizes 
materialism, the body, like machines, is expected to produce and reproduce. But dead and 
sickly people are not only worthless in a time of reproduction, they consume materials that 
could be better used on productive people; draining resources and not contributing to the 
system bring shame by non-conformity to the rule of production. Psychologist Ernest Becker 
argues in The Denial of Death that the motivation to succeed comes from the fear of death, as 
if somehow by producing and by accomplishing, individuals could renounce the limitations of 
the body, and transcend the corporeal. As in Becker, Catherine Belsey’s model of cultural 
production argues that artistic creations are a means to defer the terror of the Real of death. 
Even when Gaskell was not thinking of her loss, her mind was not far away from death: she 
wanted to title North and South “Death & Variations” (Letters 324). Gaskell’s fear of her own 
mortality,12 that she would never recover after a bout of illness, mirrors the Victorian concern 
for productivity, and perhaps this shame drives her to produce, to write.  
In the Victorian period of industrialization, while an individual might work to stave off 
the shame of death, the bereaved could not escape the idea of death in the loss of a loved one. 
A loved one by definition is the extension of self—in Gaskell’s case, her mother, brother, and 
son are literally her genetic selves—and the death of a loved one reminds an individual of the 
“narcissistic wound of mortality,” to borrow Darcy Harris’s term (80). The death of a loved 
one parallels the death of the self, reminding her of the shame of death. Furthermore, mourning 
fosters shame in a productive system because the process of grieving suspends work. This is 
not to say that mourning is shameful, but incapacitation from work due to mourning is. 
Aristocrats, by virtue of their social class and English tradition, are the exceptions to the rule: 
                                                




Queen Victoria mourned for her husband for 40 years and wore only black, but her status as an 
aristocrat, by and large, excused her from the middle-class burden of production. As Barrington 
Moore writes in his groundbreaking work, “Because aristocratic status was supposed to 
indicate a qualitatively superior form of being, whose qualities were hereditary rather than the 
fruit of individually acquired merits, the aristocrat was not expected to put forth too prolonged 
or too earnest an effort in any single direction” (488). Tennyson himself mourned without 
shame and publicly for his friend’s demise in his poem, “In Memoriam,” but his poem is the 
productive result of his mourning. However, it would be shameful to persist in the loss of self-
control and to waste energy in grieving without work.  
The twofold shame of industrialized England—to be productive to ward off the shame 
of death, and to limit grieving to reduce inefficiency—drives Gaskell’s writing, evident in the 
deterred and deferred mourning for the three deaths she experienced. Too young to mourn for 
her mother’s death, she developed a shame for dying young, and leaving her children 
motherless, a dereliction of her productive duty: “in case of my death, we all know the 
probability of widowers marrying again,” she entreated her sister-in-law, Nancy Robson, to 
care for her children (Letters 46). This shame is projected in Wives and Daughters where Molly 
Gibson’s mother dies, leaving her father to marry a flighty wife. More significantly, it is well 
known that Gaskell began producing her body of works at the suggestion of her husband to 
overcome the loss of her son. The husband’s suggestion implies that mourning is unproductive 
and even shameful enough to be truncated. Not only was her mourning for her son curtailed 
and held in abeyance, she cathected her shame, replacing one mode of reproduction of body to 
another mode of production in a society that valued productivity and materialism.  
So painful was the subject of Mary Barton to her that she had to write the first volume 




are integral to her production. As mentioned earlier, her shame divulges itself in her bodily 
suffering: a spinal irritation from Mary Barton, a “‘Ruth’ fever,” bouts of insomnia over the 
Life of Charlotte Bronte, and an unknown illness during the production of Wives and Daughters. 
Her supine posture of lying in pain on the sofa to write symbolically embodies the acts of 
production and parturition.      
Much shame in her production emerges from navigating in a male-dominated arena 
where Victorian male writers attempted to masculinize writing as a virile labor.  As many 
scholars have noted, 13  Carlyle charges the male intelligentsia—he calls them “men of 
letters”—as modern heroes to reinvigorate Victorian society, enervated by materialism and 
metaphysics. The problem lies in the wasting of good health in urban spaces, a symptom caused 
by a society looking inwards on itself. As Deidre D’Albertis notes, “to become aware of one’s 
genius, or to cultivate inspiration through self-examination, is to destroy its essential integrity” 
(21) Carlyle advocates for a “Get Strong” school of thought that describes surfaces, not 
interiority, a school Gaskell abides by.  
To revivify English society, Carlyle in his alter-ego, Teufelsdrockh, in Sartor Resartus, 
urges, “Produce! Produce! Were it but the pitifullest infinitesimal fraction of a product, produce 
it, in God's name! … for the night cometh, wherein no man can work” (148). Working to avert 
the night of death, the productive hero is, as Brian John reads Carlyle, “characterized… by his 
silence, his denial of cant and noise, and his struggling to articulate the inarticulate” (139). 
Carlyle sees the superiority of the “silence practice” (John 115) of Romans, the English, and 
Russians over “the ever-talking, ever-gesticulating French” (Past and Present 158). The man 
of letters diverges from the “twangling, jangling, vain, acrid, scrannel-piping man” (Past and 
Present 293). Hence, in a man-of-letters as a hero, Carlyle equates silence with mental strength 
                                                




and poetry with “musical Thought” that is affective and inspirational. The epigraph of Mary 
Barton clearly signals Gaskell’s familiarity with and adherence to Carlyle’s doctrine: she calls 
the novel “my idea of a tragic poem” (Letters 68), working to give voice to the suffering of the 
abject, a quality the man of letters should possess; she produces! produces! in the face of her 
son’s “night”; and when she wrote Ruth, she “tried to make both the story and the writing as 
quiet as I could” (Letters 225). Seen in this light, Carlyle’s letter of commendation to Gaskell 
should not be read ironically and disparagingly as D’Albertis does: the meaning of silence at 
the end of his letter, "May you live long to write good Books,--and to do silently good actions” 
(“TC to Elizabeth Gaskell,” emphasis original), is not, as D’Albertis implies, a silencing of 
Gaskell’s voice; silence here refers to that elusive, heroic Eternal Silence that affects and 
changes the society. Given Carlyle’s notorious contempt for the novel form and novelists, the 
word “silently” in the letter may be the highest praise he could dispense to any novelist, and 
Gaskell clearly appreciated and understood his compliment, judging from the numerous times 
she repeated in her missives to various people that his epistle remained her only comfort amidst 
the criticism for Mary Barton (see Letters 65, 68-70). Gaskell, to Carlyle, is a man of letters.  
Although Carlyle acknowledged privately and implicitly in his letter that an unexpected 
hero/man of letters might be a woman, his public credo that a man of letters is necessarily 
masculine and male heavily impressed on the contemporary (male) literati. D’Albertis observes 
that Carlyle “worked to construct a strenuously masculine ideal of the literary profession… 
[and] demonized the merely commercial ‘hack’ writer of reviews and occasional essays as 
effeminate” (23). As the century wore on, D’Albertis notes, “Carlyle’s critique of an 
emasculated intelligentsia was advanced by a chorus of male critics” (23). G. H. Lewes argues 
that writing as a profession should not be from “the army of Xeres, swelled and encumbered 
by women, children, and ill-trained troops…[but] a Macedonian phalanx, chosen, compact, 




the pressure of the democratization all contributed to a heroizing of the male writer’s role” (30). 
Hence a man of letter as a hero should rid himself of any signs of effeminacy.  
As a Carlylean acolyte, Gaskell herself noticed the masculinization of the literary circle 
and faced discrimination from the male intelligentsia. She sent the manuscript of Mary Barton 
to “all or nearly all the publishers in London” and was rejected almost immediately (Uglow). 
Fortunately, through a connection, John Forster read it. Forster, Charles Dickens’s biographer, 
largely responsible for bringing Charles Kingsley, William Thackeray, Carlyle, Robert 
Browning, Arthur Hugh Clough, and Anthony Trollope to print, “swinging into the office [of 
publishers Chapman and Hall] as though the whole place belonged to him,” recommended 
publication (Uglow). Even then, Edward Chapman led her to believe that the book would be 
released in Spring. She sent several unanswered letters to him, and eventually, the book was 
launched in October. Chapman would, in later years, keep her in the dark about her book sale, 
and forthcoming editions, and even print the first two volumes of Ruth without her knowledge. 
The delay in publication of Mary Barton, Chapman’s reluctance to reply to her letters, and his 
remiss attitude towards her indicate that he did not take her, a woman writer, seriously.  
Her clash with the male intelligentsia consisted not only with her publisher, but also 
with Dickens (see Uglow and Schor), and with Thackeray (see Easson). Exclusion based on 
her gender, the impediment in entering the masculine literary coterie, caused her shame to the 
extent that she was ashamed to use her name and identity to publish Mary Barton. Like George 
Eliot, and Currer Bell, Gaskell wanted to use a masculine nom de plume because she “did not 
want it to seem ‘the work of a lady.’ Authority meant more to her than ‘popularity’” (Uglow). 
Quoting Poet Laureate Robert Southey’s admonishment to Bronte in Life of Charlotte Bronte—




the Carlylean masculine ideal in a man of letters, and of the antagonism and condescension 
female writers faced; her shame grew from the exclusion.  
While to realize the Carlylean ideal is to expel effeteness, the man of letters should 
retain certain feminine characteristics. As G. H. Lewes notes: “In poets, artists, and men of 
letters, par excellence, we observe this feminine trait, that their intellect habitually moves in 
alliance with their emotions” (“Condition” 132). Hence, Deirdre D’Albertis argues that the 
difficulty for a man of letters is to strike “a proper balance between masculine rigor or control 
and feminine responsiveness; if improperly managed, this trans-gendered combination could 
lead, as in the case of Bronte, to illness and morbid introspection” (23). Thus, D’Albertis reads 
Gaskell’s advice, “Get Strong,” following Carlyle, as expressing her authorial duty to good 
health to the propagation of good deeds. But D’Albertis neglects that Gaskell, like Bronte, 
often did fall ill, during the writing of the novels and when they were reviewed. Following 
D’Albertis’s strand of thought, Gaskell then had failed to incorporate successfully masculine 
composure and hard work with feminine sympathy.   
But Gaskell did not necessarily see herself as failure, churning out book after book. The 
shame that Gaskell felt, from the suspension of mourning in an industrial society and from 
being excluded from a select fraternity, drove her to “get strong” so that she could produce and 
write. Shame can tear a person’s ego down but shame can also build resilience. When reviewers 
shamed her, she likened herself to the figure of St Sebastian “tied to a tree to be shot at with 
arrows,” and she “must be endured with as much quiet seeming, & as little inward pain as I 
can” (Letters 220-1, emphasis original). She continues and puns, “I am in a quiver of pain” 
(221). Her shame coalesces in a male saintly figure, transgendering her, a woman writer 
holding a pen amidst the male literati; like St Sebastian who is shamed and glorified, beheld as 




themes, in order to do good.  The writing brings her shame, but like the strong, silent hero/man 
of letters, she endured “with as much quiet” to do good; shame has brought her strength. The 
arrows in her body are clearly symbolic of the phallic quills of her male counterparts, and yet, 
even as she suffers their abuse, her shame transforms her body into the Carlylean phallus of a 
quiver. The moribund figure of St Sebastian thus emblematizes Gaskell’s inward shame, death, 
bodily suffering, and godly philanthropy, affecting her female body to produce her body of 
novels, enabling her to work alongside the boys.   
 
Ruth: Shame, Beauty, and Death of a Son 
For in remembrance of the Past there was Remorse, — how had she forgotten 
Leonard these last few days! — how had she repined and been dull of heart to her 
blessing! And in anticipations of the Future there was one sharp point of red light in 
the darkness which pierced her brain with agony, and which she would not see or 
recognise — and saw and recognised all the more for such mad determination—
which is not true shield against the bitterness of the arrows of Death. (Ruth 251) 
Situated at the penultimate paragraph of Book II, this passage, which could be read as the 
climax of the novel, occurs after Bellingham recognizes Ruth, who has been living incognito 
as a governess for the Bradshaws, learns that he has a child, Leonard, with her, and requests a 
private meeting to discuss Leonard’s future. He proposes to her; she rejects him. Then she 
returns to the seaside vacation house where she is taking care of her wards and receives news 
that Leonard is gravely ill. The sequence of events must be read as interconnected. In Ruth’s 
mind, the shame that Bellingham brings her in this meeting is linked to Leonard’s illness. 
Throughout the novel, Ruth fears greatly that her iniquity will be visited on Leonard. At his 




make an idol of the infant (135-6). In the beginning, Ruth cannot help but privilege her son 
over God, loving Leonard more than Him, but as the novel progresses, Ruth slowly learns how 
to let go of Leonard and leave him in the hands of God. The conflation of religious allusion in 
the penultimate paragraph, “true shield against the bitterness of the arrows of Death,” from 
Ephesians 6:16 (shield and darts) and I Samuel 15:32 (bitterness of death), suggests that Ruth 
has come, or is coming to terms with the fact that the life and death of Leonard lie in the 
decision of God.  As evident in this penultimate paragraph, Gaskell could not separate shame 
and death.  
 When Ruth is read as a novel of bereavement, the distress Ruth experiences for fear of 
losing her son hints at the grief Gaskell felt for losing her son. Leaving lives and deaths in the 
hands of God may be a message in the novel for Ruth and the readers as well as Gaskell’s 
reminder to herself.  The image of death in the passage (“arrows of Death”) also recalls 
Gaskell’s image of St Sebastian; the over-determined image of the “sharp point of red light” 
may suggest the spot of blood at the point of an arrow.14 In the penultimate paragraph of Book 
II of Ruth, shame is doubly linked with death by the sequence of events and by the evocation 
of the figure of St Sebastian, hinting at the biographical nature of Ruth.15 Just before receiving 
news of Leonard’s mortal danger, the reunion with Bellingham stirs in Ruth a sense of shame 
for her past and present. After Ruth rejects Bellingham’s proposal, the scene of reunion implies 
that Bellingham would have been violent sexually, just as he has taken her to London against 
her wishes, had a local fisherman not been nearby: “Mr Donne put his hands on her arms…He 
looked very fierce and passionate and determined” (247). The presence of a stranger, so 
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feels for her past and allowing herself to fear for Leonard’s life, which should be in God’s 
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prominent in the scene, prevents Ruth’s sexual danger and also acts as a reminder of the shame 
and ostracism she has once faced in Wales when she is still with Bellingham. At Wales, an 
infant slaps her for her shamelessness. When Bellingham threatens that he will expose her 
identity if she does not accept his proposal, she replies, “To save Leonard from the shame and 
agony of knowing my disgrace, I would lie down and die” (247). Like Gaskell’s own 
experiences, connecting shame and death, the spectre of shame in Ruth is also closely 
intertwined with death. 
 Ruth dies. Charlotte Bronte protested against the denouement: “Why are we to shut up 
the book weeping?” (Critical Heritage 200). Sara Malton claims that the pervasive sickness 
and deaths in Ruth are metaphors of the fallen woman as a figure of moral and social plague 
(196). But such a reading contradicts the message of Ruth, that fallen women may not be 
iniquitous; Ruth is an innocent woman, fallen because of her circumstances and lack of parental 
guidance. Besides, deaths and illnesses are prevalent across Gaskell’s oeuvre; even an idyllic 
book as Cranford tells of numerous deaths. In the introduction to Ruth, Angus Easson also 
argues that Ruth’s death is not a punishment for her shameful sin; her death shouldn’t be seen 
as redemption. Rather, her death should be read for what Ruth has proudly accomplished in 
her life and for what her death has caused the world. Whether Ruth’s death could be read so 
callously in terms of achievements, the good death connects both shame and pride, like the 
figure of St Sebastian. When her shameful secret comes to light, nursing is the only work 
available to her. A profession ennobled by Florence Nightingale, who was Gaskell’s friend, 
nursing deals with lives and deaths. In an epidemic where nurses and even the relations of 
patients are afraid to be tainted by the disease, Ruth risks her life and walks among the 
quarantined outcasts; just as how Ruth is shunned in Wales, disease/death is associated with 
shame/sin in a time of plague. Although Ruth’s shame drives her to her occupation, Gaskell 




as Ruth’s penance for her sexual transgression (351); nursing is done out of Christian charity, 
as an old man defends Ruth, claiming her work is “for the love of God” (351). Hearing the old 
man’s words, Leonard’s heart swells with pride, and he comes out as her son to the mob upon 
which he is eavesdropping (351). Ruth’s death is further associated with shame when she 
catches the fatal illness while nursing Bellingham. Even in her death, her body is a carrier of 
both shame and pride. Her corpse is so beautiful that Bellingham is awed and that Sally cannot 
help lionizing her, and yet death itself is so disgusting and shameful that Bellingham recoils 
when he espies Sally kissing the corpse.  
The trope of shame/pride associated with the corporeality occurs in Ruth’s first perilous 
illness. After Ruth attempts suicide for her abandonment and falls critically ill, Faith comments 
that she is better off dead for her shame. But upon seeing Ruth’s infirm and sickly but youthful 
body, Faith softens and relents. The first words Faith says of Ruth focus on her body: “how 
young she looks! quite a child, poor creature!” (96). After a night of nursing Ruth, Faith learns 
from the doctor that Ruth is pregnant, and Ruth is determined to live for the child. Shame again 
is associated with the body. Although close to death, the young, virile body survives because 
of its useful ability to reproduce. Ruth’s young body produces her offspring and, at the same 
time, her nursing work restores patients to their health, or in Marxist terms, her work produces 
more workers for more reproduction. Even Ruth’s demise extends her productivity. At the 
close of the novel, although her death cannot be read as redemption for her shame, it functions 
to reconciles the disagreement between quondam friends, Bradshaw, her most hostile opponent, 
and Benson, her greatest apologist; her death reproduces the friendship that once existed 
between the two men. For the first time in years, Bradshaw enters Benson’s house to comfort 
Leonard over Ruth’s death. Unlike Bulwer-Lytton’s notion that shame can only be wiped out 




England represents shame as non-productivity and waste, while bodily shame drives an 
individual to reproduce.  
 Although it is shameful to be critical ill, bringing about a hiatus in productivity, illness 
often indicates growth, maturity, and emasculation in a character. Illnesses as representations 
of less-than-perfect reproductions of the daily functioning healthy self cause suffering, which 
leads to sympathy and understanding of fellow-sufferers. Like Ruth, Leonard undergoes two 
bouts of serious illnesses, both brushes with death associated with his shameful illegitimate 
birth. The first incident occurs in the penultimate paragraph in Book II, and the second when 
Ruth, upon discovery of her identity by the town people, confesses to Leonard about his birth 
before someone else can inform or taunt him. The two other bastards in the novel, both male, 
meant to illustrate Leonard’s plight and future, result in a suicide and a successful career as a 
doctor. Although one of them drowns himself when he learns of his illegitimacy, “rather than 
present the record of his shame” (105), and although he does not advance the plot in any way 
except as a by-line from Faith, Gaskell names him—Thomas Wilkins—thus according him an 
identity, not objectifying him even as the author links death with shame. The other bastard, a 
doctor who trades in life and death, informs Ruth about Bellingham’s critical condition without 
knowing their relationship. Ruth pleads to nurse Bellingham, and when he refuses to allow her, 
she confides to him about the identity of Leonard’s father. “Secret for secret” (360), the doctor 
confesses his own illegitimacy, and sympathizes with Leonard, wishing to take him into 
apprenticeship. In all three illegitimate characters of the novel, their shame is integrated with 
death and illnesses, and it is this shame that forms their identity and imbues in them a nature 
for sympathy. 
 For Leonard, and, to a certain extent, the doctor, their shame emasculates them, giving 




specifically, better men. Throughout the novel, Leonard, as a newly born baby, is said to be a 
“badge of her shame” (100), “a cloud of shame and disgrace” (135), and “heir of shame” (279). 
Like the slap Ruth receives from an infant that makes her cognizant of her shame, shame for 
Leonard is both physical and psychological. When Ruth informs Leonard of his origin, he 
learns shame for the first time in his young life; he pulls away from her, finding her repugnant 
(282). Although G. H. Lewis claims that a child knowing the shame of his illegitimacy is 
improbable and unrealistic since Leonard would not have known of sexual matters (Critical 
Heritage 270), Gaskell’s concern is with the transmission of shame. Like an illness, shame is 
transmitted from body to body, from Ruth’s sexual sin to Leonard’s illegitimate birth, through 
the conduit of knowledge, which allows Leonard to gain an awareness of his identity, or self-
consciousness. The double meaning of self-consciousness—of a reflexivity of the self, and a 
traumatic sense of exposure—breaks down when shame enters. According to Freud, shame is 
first instituted when one internalizes the death of the other (Father). The recognition of shame 
in self-consciousness is the shame of the “death” of the self, and when shame happens, one 
sickens mentally and falls into neurosis.  
The weakened constitution of Leonard reflects his interiority and shame. The burden of 
shame and the knowledge of his identity enfeeble Leonard physically, and cause his health to 
be shaken (300). The shame and the autognosis transform Leonard’s sense of self-identity 
drastically: usually well-mannered, he utters “sad words of shame” (300) and his “temper 
became fitful and variable” (300). But when he accepts the “disgrace attaching to him and to 
the creature he loved most” (315), that is, when he accepts the shame as part of his identity, he 
is emasculated by his poor health but gains a sense of sympathy. It is this sense of sympathy 
and emasculation that bridges the conflict between Bradshaw and Benson. “My mother is dead, 
sir,” he cries to Bradshaw “with a wild look of agony, as if to find comfort for that great loss 




tears), bringing about the reconciliation. In Leonard, shame gives rise to a self-awareness of 
his identity in relation to the outside world—part of his identity involves internalizing the 
shame of his birth—and the suffering that shame brings precipitates understanding and 
sympathy for others who suffer. For Gaskell, shame transgenders people. In women, shame 
works to masculinize them—even though nursing was fundamentally feminized in the 19th 
century, Ruth takes on an active role in volunteering and deciding her own fate, refusing to be 
relegated as an outcast, and Gaskell transfigured herself as the figure of St Sebastian, seemingly 
helpless tied to the stake but evangelizing the teaching of God—while shame in Gaskell’s male 
characters feminizes them, and as a result, the men become kinder, more sympathetic, and more 
understanding.  
Like Leonard and Ruth, Bellingham suffers grave illnesses twice, but unlike them, he 
does not improve much upon recovery. He remains narcissistic, and unconcerned with other 
people’s lives. His failure to be transmogrified by illnesses stems from his failure to feel shame 
because of his socioeconomic status. As an aristocrat, he is not affected by a hiatus from work; 
he is not expected to be productive and exists outside the economy that entraps and defines the 
working class. Even as Ruth is shamed from the exposure of her true identity, she seeks work 
desperately, and eventually becomes a nurse because the dying working class shares the affect 
of shame with Ruth. Living outside the economic necessity to work for his living, Bellingham’s 
sense of entitlement involves employing the best medical care money can buy. Thus, for 
Bellingham, while there is a fear of mortality, the shame that often accompanies such a fear is 
lost because of his great assurance of recovery.  
Although Jemima does not undergo any serious mortal threats, her great change from 
being a detractor of Ruth to a defender emanates from her sense of shame, making her 




shame is the affect of self-consciousness through the eyes of the other (see Chapter 1). Her 
sense of shame changes her identity and marks her maturation from being a girl to becoming a 
woman. When at first she is petulant, contradicting Farquhar for the sake of attracting his 
attention and defying her father’s notion of how a girl should behave (docile and agreeable), 
she later navigates and negotiates to an identity that allows her to have her voice and remain 
compliant to the social rules set by her father and Farquhar as she develops her sense of 
selfhood through shame. When she observes that Farquhar has diverted his affections from her 
to Ruth, she withdraws into herself, not talking or replying to Farquhar’s provocations. In this 
lovesickness, she is shamed because her feelings are not reciprocated, like a baby who turns 
into the mother’s body when the baby’s needs are not met. Her quiet suffering and turmoil 
from her shame, which she does not yet confess to anyone, cause her to become physically 
pallid, unattractive, and emaciated, withering away. Furthermore, the sexual jealousy that 
Jemima experiences turns to shame when she is the first person to discover Ruth’s true identity. 
Upon knowing Ruth’s status, Jemima’s “cheeks [are] flushed and red, but her lips pale and 
compressed, and her eyes full of a heavy, angry sorrow” (267), all of which are physical 
manifestations of shame. Shame is an affect but it carries with it packets of knowledge; a 
woman blushes at the sight of a man she is in love with because she has sexual knowledge. Just 
as the knowledge of Ruth’s sexual shame is transferred to Leonard, the mere knowledge of 
shame shames the beholder.  
Even though the information gives Jemima a power over Ruth, Gaskell imbues shame 
in Jemima, instead of the easy solution of allowing Jemima to triumph over Ruth morally. 
Jemima’s shame emanates from the idea that she was ever jealous of Ruth: “She now thought 
that she could never more be jealous of her. In her pride of innocence, she felt almost ashamed 
that such a feeling could have existence” (268). In Jemima’s contemplation of the “true” 




to put distance between Ruth and herself, and reflect on her self-identity in comparison to 
Ruth’s. Shame and suffering have also given Jemima a sense of sympathy for the abject, just 
as she is relegated by Farquhar. She bears the suffering of sexual jealousy in the same way as 
her shame—quietly and secretively. Her sudden maturity may appear anomalous, but in her 
shame, her old identity of being a tetchy girl breaks down and metamorphoses into that of a 
thoughtful and intelligent woman, capable of weighing right and wrong, and behaving the 
“right” way. When Bradshaw finds out about Ruth and castigates her severely, Jemima defends 
her. This rousing defence is unlike the dissensions from her past childish self where she is 
deliberately being difficult and defiant and rebellious. It comes as a mature apology for Ruth, 
as Jemima bares her own shame, admitting that despite her sexual jealousy—a taboo, shameful 
subject as “her face was double-dyed with crimson blushes” (278)—she is “full of pity, and 
the stirrings of new-awakened love, and most true respect” for Ruth (278). As shame 
emasculates Gaskell’s male characters, shame gives Jemima a sense of sympathy that allows 
her to grow into her own identity and, at the same time, to understand others’ plights.  
While shame emasculates male characters, shame in female characters appears to 
empower them: Ruth becomes a nurse who actively saves lives because her shame leaves her 
no other option, and Jemima manages to find her voice. When Jemima knows of Ruth’s shame 
and is, in turn, shamed, she transforms from being surveyed to a surveyor. In the beginning 
when Jemima withdraws into herself, Bradshaw who notes her change in temperament polices 
her behavior by instigating Ruth to draw her out. But when Jemima discovers Ruth’s identity, 
she is transformed from a passive role of being looked at to the active role of observer, carefully 
watching Ruth’s behavior toward Farquhar (if she encourages his advances) and toward her 
two younger sisters to whom Ruth is a governess. Instead of being protected from ignominy, 
Jemima becomes the protector of virtue because shame has reconfigured her sense of selfhood, 




gains a perspective that allows her to behave in a socially acceptable manner that entitles her 
to her own voice while not contravening male authority. For instance, instead of defying her 
father’s orders of not visiting Ruth, Jemima makes it clear to the intransigent Bradshaw in a 
reasonable, not truculent, manner that he is making a mistake but obeys him quietly without a 
sense of rebellion. Jemina’s sympathy, a result from shame and suffering, allows her to view 
matters from all points of view, including the males’. She sends a surrogate, Farquhar, who 
visits Benson, not Ruth, to assure Ruth obliquely that both Farquhar and Jemima support her. 
As a result of her ability to feel shame, and in turn, suffering and sympathy, Jemima, like 
Gaskell amidst the Victorian male intelligentsia, is able to manipulate patriarchal social rules, 
and, in the end, gains the reciprocal love and respect of Farquhar.  Although shame has 
paralyzed Ruth and Jemima, it is only through shame that they manage to grow and change 
into different personalities that enable their triumphs in the end.  
While Jemima and Ruth learn to live with shame to be inducted into (male?) social 
rules, their journeys differ. As Ruth is read as Gaskell’s novel of bereavement and mourning, 
and as mourning is the process of recovery from shame, Ruth’s journey of shame can be seen 
as analogous to Gaskell’s. Ruth starts as an ingénue, not knowing shame, or rather more 
accurately, knowing shame for the “wrong” reasons. She claims she is pretty without shame 
but is ashamed of her dress (14); what is important to her at first is her exterior, and not any 
inward thoughts or decent behavior. Her pulchritude represents a recurring motif, associated 
with desire and shame. Bellingham falls in love with her merely based on her appearance, not 
caring about her personality or kindness or gentleness—“Her beauty was all that Mr 
Bellingham cared for” (64)—and as she suffers more and becomes more beautiful, his 
attraction for her beauty increases to the point that he almost sexually violates her. Her allure 
is proportional to the shame and suffering she undergoes. While at first she is pretty, she is 




discovers it is best to live without pride for her appearance. A baby slaps her; Bellingham’s 
mother debases her; Sally humiliates Ruth by giving her a wedding band, a boy’s haircut, and 
a widow’s cap, exposing the lie that she is married (121-3)—the suffering Ruth withstands 
gradually teaches her a sense of shame for her interiority and identity, not her looks. Like 
Benson who undergoes the indignity of his deformity and still remains “beautiful” (59), Ruth’s 
beauty comes from her shame, which transforms her self.  
Of course, “beauty is deceitful,” as Sally notes when Faith comments on how handsome 
Ruth has become with the suffering and shame (173). Bellingham himself is extremely dashing 
but his good looks come from his aristocratic genes which are seemingly atavistic and bestial. 
Jemima scrutinizes him “with something like the curious observation which a naturalist 
bestows on a new species of animal” (217). To Jemima, Bellingham’s beauty is like a horse’s, 
an indication that he is beastly.  Gaskell makes the distinction between those who possess 
physical beauty and those whose beauty comes from within.  
All Gaskell’s characters in Ruth become beautiful after shame and suffering because 
the author sees shame and suffering as a form of purification of the self. Leonard symbolizes a 
constant reminder of Ruth’s “badge of her shame” and, at the same time, as Benson notes, her 
way of “purification” (100). Even as she fears that Leonard might turn out to become his father, 
bringing her more shame, Leonard allows her to forget the notion of suicide, and motivates her 
to improve herself so that she can teach him. “She prayed that, through whatever suffering, she 
might be purified” (235). As she lives with her shame and suffers more, she becomes more 
beautiful. Even though Ruth’s and Jemima’s shame are not the same, Jemima similarly endures 
the purification of the self that shame and suffering bring. The silent shame of her pointless 
sexual jealousy for Ruth, the burden of knowing Ruth’s secret and secretly policing the 




for Farquhar to her father—all of which belittles Jemima and gives her “some humility,” which 
causes the change in her identity (303); her suffering and her sympathy for others’ suffering 
have “purified [her character] from pride” (303). Like St Sebastian who suffers humiliation, 
and whose pain apotheosizes and aestheticizes him, the tribulations of shame that Jemima and 
Ruth withstand beautify them; the blossoming beauty of characters signals not their femininity 
but their inward transformation, strength, and resilience. 
 
Cranford: Shame of Poverty, and Death of a Brother 
Cranford was conceived as a sketch, and the first two chapters appeared in the December 1851 
edition of Household Words, a weekly journal managed by Charles Dickens. It took Gaskell 
some time to think of Cranford as a book: chapters three to seven were published in 1852, and 
nine to fourteen between January and May 1853. The conception and birth of Cranford 
coincide with Ruth, which appeared in January 1853, but the reception of the two books 
couldn’t be more different. Critics found Ruth controversial—some denounced it and others 
defended it—whereas Cranford is “charming” and “delightful.”16 On the surface the two 
novels are different in material and tone—one is a heartwarming, genteel comedy, revolving 
around an Amazonian community of aging gentlewomen, published in a serialized form, and 
the other a risqué tragedy of a fallen young girl in a triple decker—but the two stories share the 
thematic concerns of death, mourning, and shame. While several characters in Ruth are only 
threatened by the shadow of death by plagues, drowning, illnesses, suicides, and weak 
constitutions, Cranford’s characters actually die from accidents or old age. Included in the 
death toll: Captain Brown, Miss Brown, Deborah Jenkyns, Thomas Holbrook, Peter Jenkyns 
                                                




(presumed dead at first), Mr and Mrs Jenkyns, Lady Glenmire’s husband, Carlo the dog, and 
Mrs Brown’s six children. Gaskell defies the traditional literary conventions of humorous 
narratives of keeping good characters alive, an indication of her preoccupation with the thought 
of death and the demises of her loved ones.  
 But unlike Ruth which takes place in an industrialized society, death in Cranford exists 
in a space where time has stood still. Cranford is a town that resists the encroaching 
industrialization: the ladies of Cranford “vehemently petitioned against” a neighboring railroad, 
signalling their hostility to industrialization (42). As death is shameful in an industrialized 
society because a good machine/body is a functional one that produces and reproduces, having 
a purpose in life, there should be no shame of death in a pre-industrial society like Cranford 
where the ladies are not expected to work—but there is still shame in death at Cranford. 
Sometimes deaths in Cranford may be satirical and metaphoric: Captain Brown is run over by 
a train with Dicken’s Pickwick Papers in his hand, demonstrating the resistance against 
technology, Gaskell’s friction with the Victorian male writers represented here by Dickens her 
editor at Household Words where Cranford was first published, and the expulsion of males in 
a matriarchal society.17 But even in Captain Brown’s metaphoric death, there is a sense of 
shame shrouding it. The women do not inform Miss Brown, the elder daughter, of his decease. 
Like a dirty little shameful secret, every senescent lady of Cranford knows of their and others’ 
imminent deaths but do not speak of dying.  
  “Death,” Mary, the narrator of Cranford, explicates, “was as true and as common as 
poverty; yet people never spoke about that, loud out in the streets. It was a word not to be 
mentioned to ears polite” (42). There is a deliberate obfuscation in the narration between death 
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and penury; “that,” which people never speaks of, may refer to one or the other. Like death, 
money is an unspeakable subject in Cranford. Although the Cranford ladies are not ashamed 
of their “elegant economy,” any help to assist them, reminding them of their privation, is seen 
as disgraceful and improper. When Captain Brown carries a heavy basket home for an old lady, 
the Cranford society construes his action as unbecoming because a gentleman should not 
perform menial work and because his actions expose the old lady’s pecuniary situation that she 
cannot afford to have servants. Cranford does not speak “of money because the subject 
savoured of commerce and trade, and though some might be poor, we were all aristocratic” 
(41). In pre-industrial Cranford, where it is degrading for gentlewomen to work and be 
productive, the shame of death is associated with money: When faced with the deaths of men 
who support them monetarily, how do women live with dignity without much money?  
 For the youngish Jessie Brown, the daughter of Captain Brown, the solution is marriage. 
When Captain Brown and Miss Brown pass away one after the other, the mourning Jessie 
experiences gives her strength, not shame (57), because Miss Jenkyns refuses to allow Jessie 
to be ashamed. Mourning as a private act removes oneself from society and deprives a person 
of a sense of belonging within a community; shame sets in. Since Miss Jenkyns never allows 
Jessie to be alone, the mourning, like Gaskell’s, is suspended. But the shame is projected onto 
her material needs when she has no financial means for upkeep. When Jessie mentions she can 
live by sewing, nursing, housekeeping, or retailing, Miss Jenkyns objects “in an angry voice,” 
saying “some people hav[e] no idea of their rank as a captain’s daughter” (59). By marrying 
her old flame, Jessie escapes the ignominy of social degradation.  
 But for Matty, who outlives her father, mother, sister, and (presumably) brother, 




live in Cranford—and her old flame, Thomas Holbrook, dies after a trip to Paris.18 Through 
Matty, Gaskell works out what it means to be a woman who works for her own living, 
negotiating the social conventions of how genteel women should not work and still maintain 
the dignity of her social class, like Gaskell herself who contributed to household expenses and 
bought a house for her family with the money she earned from writing. Like Gaskell, whose 
writing was seen by her critics as complementary to and separate from the male literati, Matty 
seeks permission from a shopkeeper before she starts a tea business in her private home, 
catering to a female genteel clientele, and thus avoiding the shame of working for money. 
Furthermore, even though Matty is in her twilight years, she is portrayed as a child—as when 
she buys a silk dress for the first time in her life (173), and does not understand the value of 
money (195)—whose innocence makes people ashamed (201). As her friends set up the tea-
selling enterprise for her, Matty is free from the blame of a genteel woman having to work.  
Her childlike innocence and her ignorance about money free her from any shame of working 
for a living in an aristocratic society.     
While the possibility of Matty losing her social position may not directly arouse shame 
in her—the readers are not privy to Matty’s interiority—the shame is transferred onto her 
friends. When her friends convene secretly to discuss Matty’s situation, they “cried in concert” 
after days of repressing their emotions as if they are mourning (192); “Even Miss Pole cried, 
who had said a hundred times that to betray emotion before any one was a sign of weakness 
and want of self-control” (192). The secret meeting of Matty’s friends resembles a wake to 
mourn for her loss of fortune. Matty’s friends show discretion, an act of repressing the self to 
refrain from hurting the other, not dissimilar to how friends of the bereaved act. Their 
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repression of their grief parallels that of Jessie’s for her father’s death. Although she longs for 
some time to cry over the grave of her father alone, “uninterrupted by sympathy, and 
unobserved by friendship” (57), Jenkyns does not allow her to be alone at the grave, causing 
Jessie to suppress her mourning.  
 In the absence of Matty, the mourning for her money brings about a sense of 
surreptitiousness and shamefulness in the secret “ceremony” (193). The furtiveness of the 
“ceremony” of writing a sum of money each friend can assist Matty on a piece of paper, the 
sum unknown to others, and sealing the paper “mysteriously” (192) until the narrator’s father 
can open them in absolute confidentiality, signals shame of Matty’s loss and their own 
impoverishment. Even though the “ceremony” is among friends, each woman seeks to speak 
to the narrator privately, just as friends seek to comfort the bereaved individually, as if the act 
of helping Matty is illicit. During one of the private conferences, Mrs Forrester is “trembling 
all the time as if it were a great crime which she was exposing to daylight, in telling me how 
very, very little she had to live upon; a confession which she was brought to make from a dread 
lest we should think that the small contribution named in her paper bore any proportion to her 
love and regard for Miss Matty” (193). Poverty, for Matty and the other ladies in Cranford, is 
an unspeakable secret shame, almost criminal, that requires confession. While death is dealt 
with differently from Ruth in Cranford, both novels associate shame with death. For Cranford, 
the problem is to avoid the shame of social disgrace while waiting for death.  
 Just before Matty’s failed investment that triggers her downfall, Cranford is besieged 
by robbers, linking money with the threat of death once again. After a call at their friend’s 
house, and “having braved the dangers of Darkness-lane,” the narrator and Matty divulge their 
individual fears to each other (147): the narrator’s apprehension lies in being policed, fearing 




strange man as she hops onto bed “with a great fierce face staring out at you” (148). D. A. 
Miller’s influential study of Victorian novels, The Novel and the Police, rejects Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s notion that the novel is subversive; Miller views the function of the novel as a 
societal way of policing culture, stealing into parlors to control our conceptions of sexuality 
and self. Miller extends his study to Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope, arguing that the camera operates 
as surveillance against anticipated illicit acts even as, in that anticipation, the camera already 
knows what the illicit acts are, like open secrets everyone tacitly knows but refuses to 
acknowledge openly. The rampant surveillance and its different incarnations in Gaskell’s 
novels—Jemima, and Bradshaw in Ruth, and now Matty and the narrator—not only 
demonstrate the author’s concerns with policing, the surveillance is often associated with 
shame. As in Hitchcock’s Rope, and as in Jemima’s monitoring Ruth, people police others 
because they are waiting for a chance to catch a shameful act. Louis Althusser’s concept of 
interpellation is exemplified by a police person shouting “Hey you!” and whether the subject 
is guilty or not, the subject is already interpellated. The act of being policed already 
presupposes a criminal, shameful behavior.  In Cranford, the fear of being watched instils in 
the self a sense of shame in the single women, waiting for death yet afraid of dying impecunious, 
and afraid of being shamed before decease. As in Ruth, where the transmission of shame is 
physical, the act of looking in Cranford transmits shame.  
 While the women in Cranford fear to be watched, Peter, Matty’s brother, creates a 
spectacle to be watched, to give “the old ladies in town… something to talk about” (94).  But 
his shame is also associated with surveillance. He cross-dresses the first time in front of his 
father, and while he passes, he is dissatisfied with his passing, for he wants to be recognized as 
Matty recognizes him: “Peter was a lady then” (94). She repeats to emphasize the point: “He 
was the lady” (94). When Peter cross-dresses the second time, he makes sure he has an audience. 




“peeping and peeping” (96). This time, his father coming home “looked through the rails 
himself, and saw—I don’t know what he thought he saw, but old Clare told me his face went 
quite grey-white with anger, and his eyes blazed out under his frowning black brows” (96). 
The patriarch instructs the neighbors to stand there and continue watching while he storms in, 
tears off Peter’s clothes, and flogs him in front of everyone. The insistence that the crowd stay 
and see the flogging accentuates the shaming of Peter and his transgendered performance, just 
as to St Sebastian is put on display to be shamed, feminized by his helplessness, and pierced 
with phallic arrows. Peter’s cross-dressing is so abject and ineffable and shameful, bordering 
on the Real, that the Father sees something but does not understand or refuses to understand 
what he sees, and that Matty refuses to relate such an ignoble sighting. Such cross-dressing 
disturbs the distinction between Peter and Jenkyns, and self and other, disrupting the sense of 
self-identity. The scene of shame transmits the effect from the spectacle to the spectator; Peter’s 
shameful act shames his father, who in turn shames Peter.      
 What is shameful about Peter’s performance and what makes the father incensed is that 
he cross-dresses and ruins his sister’s reputation. Unlike Ruth, Jemima, and Gaskell, whose 
shame empowers them and provides them with a “masculine” resilience, parading their shame 
as pride, Peter’s transgendering emasculates him, and subjects him to the authority of the Father. 
Nothing could be more shameful and abject and humiliating for a transgender person than have 
his/her clothes ripped off in public, exposing the “wrong” sexed body. When Peter runs away 
from home, a servant speculates to Matty that his insurmountable shame will drive him to 
suicide, not dissimilar to Ruth’s attempted suicide. Although his shame does not kill him, “it 
was killing my mother,” Matty observes. “Yes! Killing her” (101). The ambiguity of “it”—
does “it” refer to Peter’s absence or his shame?—highlights the unspeakability and ineffability 




rumored to die in glory in the Great War, atoning for the shame of his crossdressing 
performance. 
 But Peter enacts as a wish fulfillment for Gaskell whose brother’s whereabouts were 
not known; Peter comes home. As psychologists agree that death is inherently shameful and 
mourning is the process of getting over the shame,19 the absence of the body of Peter/Gaskell’s 
brother suspends the process of bereavement, causing the griever to be in shame. Upon hearing 
the servant’s speculation about Peter’s suicide, Matty breaks down hysterically, demonstrating 
her great love for her brother. Their relationship mirrors Gaskell and her brother’s; Gaskell, 
like Matty, showed great affection for her brother. But while Matty is allowed a cathartic 
release, Gaskell couldn’t mourn for her brother because his death was rumored, not confirmed.  
When Peter is resurrected from the dead, he must at the same time redeem himself from shame. 
Unlike Bulwer-Lytton’s antagonists who regain their honor by dying in wars for the sake 
England’s glory, Peter’s absolution comes from money. Peter and Matty’s reunion is set in her 
tea-shop where he poses as a buying customer. When they eventually recognize each other, 
their first conversation is fraught with materialism: “what do you think I have brought for you 
from India? I have an Indian muslin gown and a pearl necklace for you” (207-8). His success 
as a soldier-turned-colonist enables him to provide Matty with a comfortable situation at 
Cranford till their deaths, freeing her from the shame of working in the public sphere; she is 
now able to live “very genteelly” (209).  
 His masculine return to Cranford may appear to be problematic to the feminine utopia 
that Rae Rosenthal has identified is upholding the beliefs of communalism, cooperation, and 
harmony (74-6), which clash with the cold commercialism and unfeeling technology 
emblematic of the masculine competitive marketplace. Unlike Ruth, which takes place in a 
                                                




patriarchal society where men have limited influence, Cranford, with the return of Peter and 
marrying of Jessie, is a society of aging and aged women saved by men. However, shame has 
emasculated Peter, and furthermore, he returns to Cranford at an old age when he is not eligible 
to marry nor does he care to, living with Matty, just as Matty used to live with Jenkyns. If 
Cranford seems conventional with men eventually saving the day, then the shame equalizes the 
sexes.   
 
Conclusion: Death of a Mother 
“There’s something I will never forget about the funeral,” her mother said. “It’s 
hard to talk about it. Coming home like that from Dublin and your father [dying] 
so young, and everybody looking and watching, there was a sort of shame about 
it. It sounds mad, doesn’t it? I know it does, but that’s what it felt like, so exposed, 
or maybe that isn’t the word. But it felt like shame, those days after he died when 
we came home.”  
Colm Toibin, The Blackwater Lightship.  
While Ruth depicts a dark psychological study of the maternal protagonist fearing for the death 
of her son, and Cranford presents a fantasy of the return of the dead, both texts (and other of 
Gaskell’s work) are connected by the absent mother figure. The lack of a maternal figure in 
Ruth may have led to Ruth’s downfall. Characterized by her avarice, Mrs Mason, who may be 
a maternal figure, cares only for Ruth’s beauty to represent her workhouse, and when she runs 
into Ruth and Bellingham, she kicks Ruth out of the employment, without giving her a chance 
to explain or redeem herself. (Mrs Mason and Ruth can be seen as the predecessors of the 
stepmother-and-daughter pair, Molly Gibson and Mrs Kirkpatrick, in Wives and Daughters 




Molly’s moral conduct.) This concern of motherless girls not only reflects on Gaskell’s own 
experience of losing her mother when she was a young child but also reveals her anxiety about 
her death and the state of her children. When Gaskell was sick for some time and couldn’t 
recover, she pleaded with Nancy, her sister-in-law, to look after her children “in case of my 
death [and] we all know the probability of widowers marrying again” (Letters 46).  
 Like Gaskell, the narrator in Cranford does not have a mother, and appears to mourn 
for Matty’s. Looking through and burning Matty’s mother’s letters provide the narrator the 
opportunity to examine the mother’s life, know her intimately, and give meaning to her life 
(and death). In the end, the narrator projects her own loss and mourning onto the Mother. In a 
short missive the mother writes after Peter runs away from home because of the public shaming, 
the word “sorry” appears twice to indicate the pathetic plight the Jenkyns suffer. Although the 
suffering isn’t directly linked to Peter’s shame, the suffering is a consequence of Peter’s 
performance to shame the family. “Your father,” the letter writer tells Peter, “cannot hold up 
his head for grief” (100), but this posture of head bowed is also that of shame. By going through 
incidents of shame, the Jenkyns gain new knowledge of their identity as a family; the word 
“know” crops up twice. In the short letter, Gaskell has demonstrated what this essay has argued: 
one gains knowledge, wisdom, and resilience through the shame of death.  
 The act of examination and burning of letters allows Matty to let go of her mother’s 
death, it also creates a chance for the narrator to mourn and get over the death of the Mother. 
After the missive that the mother writes, pleading for Peter to return home in spite of the shame, 
the narrator writes, “But Peter did not come back. That spring day was the last time he ever 
saw his mother’s face. The writer of the letter—the last—the only person who had ever seen 
what was written in it, was dead long ago—and I, a stranger, not born at the time when the 




read the letter because the letter has never reached Peter who is assumed to be dead. The 
narration carries a wistful and elegiac tone and as the sentence ends, as the narrator burns the 
letter, the process of mourning is complete. Gaskell’s own creative act of writing mirrors the 
narrator’s act of writing to overcome grief. As Gaskell’s husband persuaded her to cathect her 
grief for her dead son into her writing, she encodes and sublimates her mourning into her stories.  
 Written records and progeny are productions from a woman's body. Gaskell’s books, 
as well as Matty’s mother’s letters, are cultural documents in which shame of loss of loved 
ones is sublimated into culturally accepted products. To write is to transcend the body that 
suffers from shame. The burning of Matty’s mother’s letters, and the eventual deaths of the 
mother’s offspring eradicate all corporeal memories of the mother, as if she has never existed. 
This anxiety of non-existence produces shame in a time of industrialization when the influential 
Carlyle extorts his contemporaries to “Produce! Produce!” to leave an impact before death. 
Linda Hughes and Michael Lund argue that women’s letters in Gaskell’s fiction represent her 
own view of her work and the recurring motif of illegitimacy—from Ruth’s child to Peter’s 
pillow “baby”—mirrors her own sense of “illegitimacy” among the male Victorian writers. 
Following Hughes and Lund’s argument, the burning of Matty’s mother’s letters—Gaskell 
demanded her letters to be burnt after her death—signals a desire not to be read, and not to be 
seen, because of the shame of being an outsider.  
 Gaskell’s life and works demonstrate a complicated entanglement with private shame, 
deliberately hidden from sight, ashamed of shame seeing the light. Shame caused by the 
inherent shame of suspended mourning, and shame driven to produce and be useful pushed her 
to write. And at the same time, women who published, like Esther in Mary Barton who walks 
the streets or like Ruth whose sexual transgressions are known to all or like Molly’s seeming 




pain and suffering to publish and to be known show the shame of exposure; the pervasiveness 
of surveillance and policing indicates Gaskell’s awareness of how she was being watched and 
judged in her book reviews and as a minister’s wife. To counter this shame, she imagined 
herself to be a man, St Sebastian, whose suffering has a godly purpose. As Terence Wright 
notes of Gaskell’s writings, “We constantly witness the crumbling of absolutes, the clear 
becoming irresolute, the iron will a vulnerable flesh” (110). Gaskell utilizes the affect of shame 



















Chapter Four: Autobiographies About Sex: John Addington Symonds, Havelock Ellis, 
and Shame 
The late 19th century witnessed the birth of theories of sexuality, which still circulate in our 
society today. Many of the theories emanated from doctors on the continent via post-Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, “legitimatizing” these quasi-theories as biological, medical, scientific, and 
objective. The theories on sexual deviance utilize the notion of degeneration, degeneration not 
as a return to an atavistic state, but degeneration as a bastardization of a variety of species. In 
a letter John Addington Symonds wrote to Robert Louis Stevenson, he confided that Jekyll and 
Hyde “has left such a deeply painful impression on my heart that I do not know how I am ever 
to turn to it again. The fact is that, viewed as an allegory, it touches one too closely… Your Dr 
Jekyll seems to me capable of loosening the last strands of self-control in one who should read 
it while wavering between his better and worse self” (Symonds, Letters 3:120). Elaine 
Showalter’s analysis of the fin de siècle novel suggests that the animalistic, atavistic, criminal 
Hyde existing in the homosocial world is an allegory of the degenerated and degenerate 
homosexual, a reading reflected in Symonds’s lifelong battle for control over his sexual desires; 
Symonds, in his memoirs, frequently called his deviant desires the “Wolf,” a ferocious, savage 
and untameable animal. (Coincidentally, this image coincides with Freud’s Wolf Man, linking 
the image with ineffable terrors.)   By 1886, the time the letter was written, Symonds was living 
as an invert as openly as could be possible in the climate; he was living in Europe and had 
several long term relationships with working class men such that his relationship with a Swiss 
boy had “come to be recognized as beautifully, ideally natural” by the boy’s family and friends 
(Memoirs 269). Whether or not the letter is an oblique coming out to Stevenson, or whether 
Stevenson already knew of his old friend Symonds’s sexuality, the novelist replied, “Jekyll is 
a dreadful thing, I own; but the only thing I feel dreadful about is that damned old business of 




the letters and the novel arise issues still pertinent in the 21st century: the difficulty in disclosure 
of a homosexual identity to others, the disgust and refusal to accept a seemingly monstrous 
desire, and the association of homosexuality with criminality, perversity, and degeneration.  
  Symonds’ relationship woes are especially prescient: when writing about Willie Dyer 
a chorister, Symonds lamented, “I could not marry him; modern society provided no bond of 
comradeship whereby we might have been united. So my first love flowed to waste. I was 
unable to deal justly with him; the mortification of the anomalous position he and I were placed 
in did much to degrade my character” (104). This passage in Memoirs could have been a plea 
for same-sex marriage in our current society, that a marriage certification could sanction, 
sanctify, and seal the bonds between two persons, dignifying the relationship. Hence, studying 
what the British sexologists have to offer is not an esoteric project but it could better our 
understanding of the Western historical concept of sexuality and how it has affected our current 
clime.  
The renewal of interest in English sexologists is due to several factors. Phyllis 
Grosskurth outed Symonds in her 1964 biography but could only publish his Memoirs in 1984 
after a 50-year embargo on the autobiography had expired. With the Gay Liberation movement 
in the 70s, critics were able to interrogate the queer influence in 19th-century Britain. However, 
most criticism on the English sexologists focuses on their history of production of a body of 
works during the fin de siècle or/and the explicit explication of what the words and works mean, 
while they neglect to examine the personal impetus that brought the books into being. The 
scholarship on English sexology can be categorized into three areas. Firstly, many critics have 
usefully contextualized the sexologists’ works within larger cultural, political, literary, 
scientific, gender, and economic contexts. Sheila Rowbotham and Jeffrey Week’s 
groundbreaking work in 1977 examines the intersection of socialism and sexual politics in 




to the fore the political aspects in his work. Keith Nield re-assesses Carpenter’s reputation 
while Joseph Bristow traces the history of the collaboration between Symonds and Ellis in 
Sexual Inversion, arguing that despite the frustrated working relationship between the two, both 
contributed to the book, contrary to the popular opinion that Symonds played only an auxiliary 
role. Heike Bauer situates the sexologists apart from their continental counterparts because 
they are men of letters. Even Ellis admitted in his autobiography that he was not cut out to be 
a good doctor, and had always aspired to be a writer. Still contextualizing the sexologists’ 
works in a historical context: both Beverly Thiele and Margaret Jackson employ a feminist 
lens. Thiele’s article is a vehement obloquy against Carpenter for his uncritical assessment of 
women’s issues while Jackson’s is a nuanced reading of Ellis for eroticizing putatively sexless 
Victorian ladies yet essentializing their bodies. Joseph Cady, Christopher Craft, Ed Cohen, 
Oliver Buckton, Howard Booth, and John Simons examine a fleeting moment in time when the 
ontology of the subjectivity of the self is born out of sexuality, when the Foucauldian powers 
of superstructure institutionalize and produce the nascent homosexual subject, and when the 
homosexual subject, caught between being Victorian and becoming modern, engenders 
different ways of thinking about masculinity.    
While the aforementioned scholars situate the sexologists’ works in a historical context, 
the second form of criticism that other scholars offer is an explication of the sexologists’’ 
writings. Symonds, Carpenter, and Ellis produced a prodigious number of books, and some of 
the writings, especially Carpenter’s on cosmic consciousness, may be rather esoteric, while 
others, like Symonds’, may be obfuscated by the author’s own confusion about his sexuality. 
As early as 1976, Paul Robinson summarized Ellis’s tome on human sexuality. Jonathan Kemp 
attempts to solve the conundrum of Symonds’ public and private personas in “A Problem in 
Gay Heroics”; what Symonds advocated in his published books differs from his self-loathing 




morbidity inherent in the semiotics of homosexuality/degeneration through his love of nature. 
Through Symonds’s poetry, Ian Venable reads that Symonds relinquished his guilt and shame 
as he progressed in life and matured in his poetry. Hilary Fraser locates art as an epicenter 
where Symonds could work out his homosexual anxieties. Jana Funke persuades us that we 
have placed too much emphasis on Symonds’s Hellenic leanings since he exhorted in his 
memoirs, “We cannot be Greeks”; clearly Symonds, while nostalgic, was also sane and 
pragmatic. Tariq Rahman explains Carpenter’s millennial vision of the intermediate sex.  
The third group of critics focuses on the stylistic aspects of the sexologists’ works. 
Implicit in the analyses of the narrative strategies is how the sexologists used literary devices 
to deflect and pre-empt any denouncement of obscenity. As many critics have noted, the 
tactical sexologists discussed sexual issues freely, which were considered unfit for publication, 
under the aegis of medical discourses; the biological argot replaces the subjectivity of an 
apologist and essayist with the objective authority of a doctor. When the oppressed speaks in 
the same terms as the oppressor, Foucault calls it a “reverse discourse.”  In a letter Symonds 
wrote to Carpenter, he was relieved to find someone with a medical background to co-write 
Sexual Inversion: “I need somebody of medical importance to collaborate with. Alone, I could 
make but little effect – the effect of an eccentric” (qtd. in Bristow 79). As Wayne Koestenbaum 
has explained in Double Talk, sexology “promised to be a forgiving branch of an implacably 
homophobic culture” (43).  Although Sexual Inversion was banned as an obscene publication 
in what has come to be known as the Bedborough Trial, the authors were not charged. The trial 
was in part due to a hapless circumstance of being published by Roland de Villiers, one of the 
many pseudonyms of a notorious trickster wanted by the police on the continent and in Britain, 
and of being sold by George Bedborough, secretary of the Legitimation League, a small society 
dedicated to social reform, which Scotland Yard believed it to be a hotbed for anarchists, the 




Nottingham, the aim of the trial was to crush the Legitimation League. However, writing under 
the protection of medical discourse is not the only writing strategy of the sexologists, as critics 
claim. Sam Binkley observes the Romantic strand in Symonds’ work, while Oliver Buckton 
discusses the duality (public/private) of the lives and autobiographies of Symonds and 
Carpenter.  
The three areas of criticism—historicization of the sexologists’ works, explication of 
them, and analysis of style—are not mutually exclusive. Following Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s 
Plots, Ruth Bernard Yeazell deploys all three areas by exploring the narrative plot strategies in 
Ellis’s scientific writing. However, what is missing in the three areas of criticism, which 
examine the historical and cultural pressures that the sexologists faced because of their deviant 
sexualities, is that few have focused on the agency of the triumvirate. The sexologists objected 
to and rejected the continental brand of sexology and drew their own independent conclusions 
when they dealt with similar, limited information on inverts. Both Symonds and Carpenter 
came from upper middle class backgrounds; Symonds was the son of a wealthy physician in 
Bristol, Carpenter son of a well-to-do gentleman in Brighton; both excelled in school, won 
prizes, and intended to enter the academy. Carpenter and Ellis met through the Fellowship of 
the New Life which branched off into a splinter group, The Fabian Society. They traveled in 
similar milieux but arrived at different sexual theories and their works were treated differently. 
Ellis’s six volumes of Studies in the Psychology of Sex were generally well-received, but 
Carpenter was known to be eccentric and Symonds mad.1 Arthur Symons questioned “whether 
Symonds was altogether sane” when recalling “the morbid, disquieting, nervous, contorted, 
painful expressions of his face: the abnormal, almost terrible fixity of his eyes” (115). Given 
that they existed under the same repressive regime, how did they think outside the box? Why 
                                                





were their works treated differently? As Jerome McGann writes, "Every text enters the world 
under determinate sociohistorical conditions, and while these conditions may and should be 
variously defined and imagined, they establish the horizon within which the life histories of 
different texts can play themselves out" (9). Merely contextualizing the sexologists’ work in 
historical and cultural terms does not answer the disparities in the sexologists’ interpretations 
and the varying treatment they received.  
Hence, I propose in this chapter to examine the agency of the sexologists, particularly 
in terms of the incipient homosexual subjectivity amidst the antihomosexual medical 
discourse.2 The driving affect, shame, which constitutes much of the sexologists’ subjectivities, 
explains the different methods they used to handle, manipulate, and cope with their writings 
and environments. In particular, this chapter examines Symonds’s and Ellis’s autobiographies 
and how they dealt with shame. While, this chapter argues, Symonds’s shame reconfigured his 
subjectivity, allowing him to push the envelope for early LGBT advocacy, Ellis failed to be 
transformed by his shame because he hid it using various writing strategies.   
 
John Addington Symonds’s Shameful Sexual Subjectivity 
Much has been said about the subjectivity of Symonds revealed in his memoirs. In 1992, Joseph 
Cady focused only on the positivity of Symonds’s Memoirs, demonstrating that a homosexual 
subjectivity could exist even though the notion of homosexuality was not phenomenally 
available to the Victorian consciousness—Symonds himself believed that he was unique before 
researching his situation—and the sense of selfhood bore “no essential relations” to the 
pathologization of homosexuality, neglecting the self-loathing evident in the autobiography. 
Ed Cohen’s more nuanced reading explores the sexologists’ nonheteronormative “narrative 
                                                
2 There are studies of sodomy in the early modern period but the studies focus on the acts, 
which are not considered as a form of homosexual consciousness. Sexual acts do not define 




modes that encompassed non-unitary forms of male subjectivity” (88). As opposed to Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s suggestion that the same-sex relationships of Symonds, unlike those of 
Carpenter’s, were “not structurally threatening to the class system” due to his monetary sexual 
exploitation of working-class men, Ed Cohen suggests that the veracity of the memoirs subverts 
“the prevailing (discursive) standards that constituted the unitary male subject as the 
quintessential political, economic, and sexual agent” (91). Cohen reasons that since literature 
in the 19th century, be it moral or medical, reviles same-sex sexual relationships in part or in 
whole, Symonds’s emotional and imaginative act displaces the literature, but for such an act to 
occur, it necessitates that there lies a contradiction within Symonds’s character, 
“simultaneously conforming with and yet deviating from the class and gender proprieties which 
ideologically and materially circumscribed his behaviour” (93). In other words, Symonds’s 
subjectivity is split between the public and private, society and self, outside and inside, and the 
split subjectivity could only be sutured through his memoirs.    
 The duality argument is extended by Oliver Buckton in his book-length study of male 
Victorian autobiographers; the subjectivity of each writer he explores is bifurcated, including 
Symonds’s and Carpenter’s. Buckton argues that Symonds had projected his transgressive 
desires onto Charles Vaughan, the headmaster of Harrow School, which Symonds attended. It 
is worth going into the history of Vaughan and Symonds to explain Buckton’s point. Symonds 
considered the issue and waited for some time before he exposed Vaughan’s affair with his 
student, Symonds’s schoolmate, Alfred Pretor, to his father. Symonds’s father, who knew 
about Symonds’s same-sex attraction, wrote to Vaughan, warned him to resign from his post 
immediately, and never advance his position in the Church again, or he would expose 
Vaughan’s shameful deeds. Vaughan resigned with consummate skill, stating poor health as a 
reason so that no one knew the truth behind his retirement. He was later offered the bishopric 




Symonds’s father heard the news, he telegraphed Vaughan who again retired from the 
honorable role in the episcopacy. Despite Symonds’s disgust for his former headmaster, 
Symonds also retained a “dumb persistent sympathy” for him (Memoirs 97), likely because 
Symonds himself followed a similar trajectory. Symonds himself was involved with his student, 
“Norman.” In 1862, when he vied for the Balliol fellowship, he lost to an inferior scholar 
because, as Symonds implied, C. G. H. Shorting sent an incriminating document of Symonds’s 
private correspondence with a student to six Magdalen fellows, although, like Vaughan, 
Symonds eventually escaped unscathed. But his past was to haunt him. In 1877, when Symonds 
and Walter Pater vied for the position of professor of poetry in Oxford, R. St John Tyrwhitt 
attacked Symonds so vehemently for his research on Greek love that Symonds withdrew his 
candidature. Thus, Buckton argues that by projecting his abhorrent desires to characters like 
Vaughan, Symonds, through his memoirs, purged his self “of the contradictions and conflicting 
impulses that prevent it from achieving the status of a sexual ‘identity,’ in the sense of a 
coherent and consistent pattern of subjective meaning” (69). 
Both Cohen and Buckton attempt to iron out the contradictions within Symonds’s 
memoirs and other works so that his subjectivity can appear to be coherent and whole. But their 
readings inevitably neglect or belabor the evidence. Take for instance, while Symonds very 
clearly viewed Vaughan as his predecessor and as a cautionary tale, he also wished to have 
been the student lover of Vaughan. Symonds wrote, “I did indeed condemn Vaughan’s taste; 
for I regarded Pretor as a physically and emotionally inferior being” (97); that is, Symonds 
considered Pretor to be inferior to himself, and he judged that Vaughan would possess better 
taste if he had chosen Symonds. Although Buckton notes Symonds’s jealousy of Pretor, he 
reads the incident as part of Symonds’s formative years, associating the sexuality with 
Vaughan’s pederasty. Buckton does not explore Symonds’s desire to become Pretor because 




purging himself of Vaughan as a scapegoating symbol of deviant sexuality. The problem with 
Buckton’s and Cohen’s arguments about binary subjectivity is that they presuppose 
subjectivity to be always an either/or situation as if the self is split into (50-50?) halves, which 
need to be resolved and sublated uncomfortably to form a unitary whole. I propose that 
Symonds’s memoirs suggest viewing subjectivity in a constant flux within a spectrum, 
activated by the affect of shame. In the following, I will explain how Symonds’s subjectivity 
is not based on his masculinity, as Cohen and Buckton claim, but largely on his shame-prone 
sexuality.      
It is important to view that Symonds’s subjectivity stems from his sexuality because 
such an argument concerns our thinking about our selves. A contemporary homophobic 
statement that a gay person or a friend often makes is that their selves are more than their 
sexuality: “I think homosexuality is wrong, but you, as my friend, are more than your sexuality 
and I accept all other parts of you, parts bigger than your sexuality,” or “I don’t come out to 
everyone I meet because I am more than my sexuality, being gay is just a very small part of 
me.” But Symonds would have annihilated such homophobic announcements for he centered 
his memoirs on his sexuality, writing lewd passages page after page, interrogating what it 
means to be a sexual being and how his subjectivity was governed by his sexuality. Clinton 
Machann suggests that Symonds’s insistence on sexuality implies that “sexuality is central to 
the mental development of each individual, regardless of sexual orientation” (205). But here, I 
go one step further to claim that Symonds’s subjectivity is necessarily sexualized; his self is 
his sexuality and because sexuality is fluid, his subjectivity is also inconstant and difficult to 
be assimilated into a coherent whole.  
Symonds understood that his subjectivity and others’ are not merely grounded on 
(human) nature alone. Although he had publicly insisted and reiterated that “persistent passion 




Greek Ethics, and A Problem in Modern Ethics, he was also aware that he was partaking in the 
nascent genealogical formation in which sexuality was debated fiercely in medical and cultural 
fields, as he wrote Memoirs in order to “supply material for the ethical psychologist and the 
student of mental pathology” (182). In A Problem in Greek Ethics and elsewhere, he 
differentiated the true invert and the cultural invert. The culture in ancient Greek societies was 
such that pederasty was normative and pervasive, but the true invert was moderate in desires 
and was beneficial to his catamite, giving the boy a head start in life, just as Symonds carried 
out the practice in his own life. In Greek societies, cultural forces, Symonds demonstrated, 
could influence sexuality and he would go on to argue in “Culture: Its Meaning and Its Uses,” 
collected in In the Key of Blue, his last book of essays, that culture can improve human faculty, 
and shouldn’t be treated with suspicion, perhaps speaking to staid Victorians against the 
Decadence/Aesthetic movement which championed culture and artificiality over nature. 
Culture shapes sexuality.  
Even as Symonds argued that homosexuality is innate, he knew the import of cultural 
formation on the invert, as he demonstrated in A Problem in Modern Ethics, dismantling the 
fallacious arguments of the continental sexologists one by one. Paul Moreau, Richard von 
Kraft-Ebing, and Cesare Lombroso focused on the “morbidity” (or what we now call pathology) 
of same-sex desires, but Symonds countered that it is the society at fault:  
Under the prevalent laws and hostilities of modern society, the inverted passion has to 
be indulged furtively, spasmodically, hysterically; that the repression of it through fear 
and shame frequently leads to habits of self-abuse; and that its unconquerable 
solicitations sometimes convert it from a healthy outlet of the sexual nature into a 
morbid monomania. (13) 
Publicly, Symonds had clearly denounced the societal vilification of inverts. Inverts are normal, 




expression, damages the psychology of the invert. While scholars such as Jonathan Kemp and 
John Pemble accurately note that Symonds views sexuality as inherent and natural, it would be 
more exact to point out that Symonds, presaging Foucault, resisted the totalization of nature-
versus-culture. The sexologist located what Foucault calls “the modern experience of sexuality” 
at the interstices of “fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a 
particular culture” (5).  
 If there is any doubt in Symonds’ autobiography that subjectivity and sexuality must 
necessarily be imbricated with each other, his motivation for writing at the coalescence of 
discourse and desire clears any uncertainty. He wrote earnestly: 
It was my primary object when I began these autobiographical notes to describe as 
accurately and candidly as I was able a type of character, which I do not at all believe 
to be exceptional, but which for various intelligible reasons has never yet been properly 
analysed. I wanted to supply material for the ethical psychologist and the student of 
mental pathology, by portraying a man of no mean talents, of no abnormal depravity, 
whose life has been perplexed from first and last by passion—natural, instinctive, 
healthy in his own particular case—but morbid and abominable from the point of view 
of the society in which he lives—persistent passion for the male sex. (182) 
Throughout the memoirs, Symonds constantly avowed his veracity as in the above passage. As 
he assured his readers, because the memoirs would not be published in his lifetime, his 
insistence on truth engendered what the 19th century would call the baring of soul, or the telling 
of I, his subjectivity. Contemporary theory argues that the autobiography does not presuppose 
an existing subjectivity waiting to confess to the readers but that it “serves the author’s 
individual and rhetorical purposes, even as it responds to specific historical and cultural 
pressures” (Buckton 10). Therefore, Buckton argues that the self is produced by the 




of his subjectivity and this subjectivity overlaps with sexuality for he writes to encompass a 
novel taxonomy “of a type of man who has not yet been classified” (Letters 3:642). His self, 
produced by the act of writing, is necessarily a sexual one as he relates his passions for men; 
events in his memoirs were driven by his sexuality. The self-representation of his memoirs 
reveals Symonds to be both subject of his sexuality and object for scientific and cultural 
analysis, and therefore, for Symonds, his subjectivity is his sexuality.   
While his subjectivity constitutes his sexuality, his sexuality develops out of shame. 
We have briefly seen the shame that Symonds carried as he himself noted his parallel life with 
Vaughan, but the shame manifests itself in the Memoirs in uglier ways. As an apologia for 
homosexuality, the Memoirs exhibits a schizophrenia that could have supported Arthur 
Symon’s judgment that Symonds was mad. In public, Symonds claimed that homosexuality is 
natural, healthy, and even beneficial to society. Like Carpenter, Symonds preferred working 
class men because he was deeply influenced by Walt Whitman’s concept of comradeship 
among men. After reading Calamus, his “desires grew manlier” and he “imbibed a strong 
democratic enthusiasm, a sense of dignity and beauty and glory of simple healthy men” 
(Memoirs 189). Not only does such a comradeship bring forth a more “democratic,” and hence 
fairer society, same-sex relationships allow wealthier and older men to share their resources 
with usually impecunious youths, bequeathing life experience, knowledge, wisdom, and 
financial securities to youths, allowing youths who otherwise could not rise above their poverty 
a head start in their lives, as evident in Symonds’s account of his lovers, Norman his student, 
Christian Buol, the Swiss man whom Symonds lent substantial amount of money, and Angelo 
Fusato, the gondolier under Symonds’ employ.  
Yet, even as a same-sex union is beneficial to society, it is also unreliable. A “sensual 
enjoyment between man and man” cannot harm society because “there inheres an element of 




marriage settlements, no married life in common” (Memoirs 278). The unstable and temporary 
same-sex liaisons suggest Symonds’s inability to envision an enduring union between men 
(something which E.M. Forster did two decades later in the early 20th century with Maurice), 
which in turn implies that such relationships could exist only with the eventual aim of 
heterosexual marriages in mind. The three boys—Norman, Buol, and Fusato—whom Symonds 
was romantically involved with went on to be married. Seen from another perspective, same-
sex union destabilizes and holds in abeyance the ultimate purpose of heterosexual marriages, 
disrupting the smooth machinery of society.  
Furthermore, Symonds acknowledged that the boys he fell in love with appeared to be 
materialistic: “the responsibilities connected with this passion… tax a man’s resources. In 
many cases he must be prepared to support his friend with money or with influence” (278). 
Symonds counter-argued against naysayers by claiming that even women “come to money in 
the long run” (279). But the difference could not have escaped Symonds who visited both male 
and female prostitutes: supporting “women,” his wife and daughters, is part of familial 
obligation whereas paying a gondolier to be a companion is akin to prostitution. Jana Funke’s 
article, “‘We Cannot be Greek Now,’” demonstrates that Symonds was familiar with social 
anxieties about the corruption of youths in light of the Dublin Castle scandal in 1884 and the 
Cleveland Street Scandal in 1889, where rent boys were exploited economically and the blame 
was placed on the deleterious influence of older rich men. As Symonds responded to the 
concern about the corruption of youths in A Problem in Greek Ethics by emphasizing a 
consensual and age-appropriate same-sex relationship that could not have involved economic 
exploitation, he could not be unaware that his living arrangement with Fusato could have been 
construed, accurately or not, as him misguiding the youth. Therefore his facile and fallible 
argument that “I do not know what does not come to money in the long run” with regards to 




written.  Implied by his weak defence of his actions, try as he might to defend his relationship 
with boys, Symonds could not escape the sense that he was delaying the boys’ eventual 
heterosexual marriages and corrupting them, just as he had accused his headmaster Charles 
Vaughan of seducing and corrupting his classmate. 
  The tension within Symonds—arguing publicly that same-sex unions are beneficial to 
society, yet eventually privileging the heterosexual marriage, while giving into the shame of 
his behavior in society—writes itself on the body. As Case VII in Sexual Inversion, Symonds 
claimed that once he accepted his innate homosexual instincts, his health recovered (Memoirs 
287). But this is a falsehood, as he suffered ailments, phantasmagoric or real, throughout his 
life. As Phyllis Grosskurth, author of Symonds’s biography and editor of his Memoirs, notes 
that even as he insisted on the natural occurrence of homosexuality, “the frequency he uses the 
words ‘abnormal,’ ‘morbid,’ ‘unwholesome’ suggests a growing suspicion that he might be 
some kind of monster” (Memoirs 23). If he saw himself as a monster, it is because, even though 
he co-authored Sexual Inversion, Symonds’s personal experience with three of his boys getting 
married made him regard himself as an aberration. “In my personal relations to [people who 
slept with him],” he wrote, “I have never met with one who shared my own abnormal tastes” 
(267). There is shame in being the odd one out. Of course, in his extensive research on 
homosexuality, Symonds came across homosexuals like Michelangelo, but within his society, 
he believed that he was alone even though he knew other homosexuals. For Symonds, while 
his passion for men was permanent, he considered others’ desire as transitory, mostly because 
he paid for the services. While he knew other homosexuals such as Lord Ronald Gower and 
Marzials, he did not consider himself as part of their group since they indulged in and satisfied 
their desires without restraint. Grosskurth points out the double standard of Symonds who 
visited male and female brothels: “If he is to be exonerated from blame [of his homosexuality], 




hypocrisy recalls to mind the Vaughan incident where Symonds exposed the headmaster’s 
affair but later in his life, he himself had indiscretions with his own student.  
To answer Grosskurth’s question, we may recognize Symonds’ reprehensible behavior 
as traits of internalized homophobia today, not unlike Republicans and pastors who condemn 
homosexuality publicly but purchase private sexual services from male escorts, and Symonds’s 
acts originated from his sense of shame. Outwardly, even as his works are apologias for 
homosexuality, he could not escape the sense of shame. It is this sense of shame—as shame is 
both collective and individualizing—that engendered his aloneness despite his extensive 
knowledge of existent compatriots; it is shame that propelled him to proudly announce that 
homosexuals have healthy constitutions, despite his own personal experience belying his public 
pronouncement; it is shame that impelled one of the intelligent/insane leading men-of-letters 
to make specious and contradictory statements. Like many GLBT schoolchildren who are 
shamed and bullied into suicide, prompting the “It Gets Better” campaign, Symonds’s own 
shame drove him to contemplate suicide (173).   
It may be retorted that Symonds’s persistent usage of the word “abnormal” could mean 
“unusual” without any negative connotation, and not the derogatory definition of “morbid 
deviant.” The linguistic difficulty could be analogous to Gillian Beer’s argument that Darwin 
used religious expressions because of lacunae in the scientific lexicon. If we judge that this is 
the case, then Symonds’s identity can be viewed as unitary because he would have been 
consistent publicly or privately. But no evidence indicates that Symonds the wordsmith, who 
coined the word “homosexual,” could not find the words. To understate the frequent usage of 
“abnormal” is to ignore Symonds’ subjectivity and experience of shame. Like Darwin, much 
of Symonds’s shame comes from his sexuality. Like Darwin who, after experimenting with 
rudimentary genetics, blamed himself for the mortality and frail constitutions of his children 




to have any children because of his wife Edith’s inversion, Symonds thought he should not 
bear children: “It had become an article in my creed of social duty that men and women 
convicted of hereditary disease, phthisis or insanity, ought to refrain from procreation. Acting 
upon this principal I separated from my wife with her approval” (260). In view of the recent 
medical advancement and societal changes where openly gay people can have children, it is 
important to explore Symonds’s argument although he did not elaborate on the hereditary 
disease he suffered from. It might have been from his family history where he suffered from 
“night terrors, extreme shyness, nervous affections, somnambulism” (Memoirs 64), but if it 
was, he was certainly not against his sister and daughters marrying and having children. What 
is known, as many critics have pointed out, is that Symonds insisted that some homosexuals 
are congenital, and therefore, natural, undeserving of societal censure and legal persecution. 
Hence, even when Symonds championed what we may now call gay rights, he still suffered 
from shame.  
Unlike Ellis, who unequivocally declared that his wife and he did not want to propagate 
his wife’s genes for inversion and mental instability, Symonds presented a more complex thesis. 
In A Problem with Modern Ethics, he started, “We are all of us, as evolutionary science surely 
teaches, interested in the facts of anthropology, however repellent some of these may be to our 
own feelings. We cannot evade the conditions of atavism and heredity. Every family runs the 
risk of producing a boy or a girl whose life will be embittered by inverted sexuality, but who 
in all other respects will be no worse or better than normal members of the home” (4). He used 
the hook-and-bait method, in writing to a general audience that would be disgusted by inverts, 
finding such a topic improper for public discourse, and yet improper as it may be, it is still a 
necessary subject for the good of society. In such a way, this introduction is wrought with 
contradictions that are passed off as logical proclamations. He presupposed that inversion is 




except for his life being is embittered by tribulations caused by society? What is implied and 
consistent in the introduction is Symonds’ rudimentary understanding of evolutionary genetics 
that inversion is a natural seed that exists in humans for centuries. Even as Symonds argued 
that homosexuality has always existed in human civilization, as backed by his cultural research 
into the Dorian culture, Symonds’s nagging fear that inversion may somehow be atavistic, and 
that he should not have progeny, indicates that he could not transcend his personal shame of 
being an invert in the 19th century. Part of the reason he did not want to have descendants is “I 
carry an ugly surname” (153), a refrain occurring frequently in his memoirs. The worry of 
passing down his surname represents the psychological burden of shame he carried, as he did 
not disapprove of his sister and daughters having children.  
In her reading of Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler notes that the social function of naming 
“is always to some extent an effort to stabilize a set of multiple and transient imaginary 
identifications” (152). She further argues that “the name, as part of a social pact and, indeed, a 
social system of signs, overrides the tenuousness of imaginary identification and confers on it 
a social durability and legitimacy. The instability of the ego is thus subsumed or stabilized by 
a symbolic function, designated through the name” (152-3). A patronym, in other words, 
facilitates the stabilizing of Imaginary gaps and lapses between genders, legitimizing the 
superiority of men over women, affirming the bonds of heterosexuality, and concretizing the 
formation of heteronormativity. While Symonds did not have the theories of Lacan and Butler 
as tools to examine his shame in his patronym, his instinctual shame does not originate from a 
subversive or rebellious nature against the status quo of Victorian society, as several critics 
have convincingly documented that Symonds’s sexuality did not exclude him from the 
privileges of patriarchy, which he revelled in. His shame arose from his betrayal of the social 
contract between men, or what Gayle Rubin in her seminal essay “The Traffic in Women” calls, 




shame, unable to imagine a life with a long-term same-sex engagement, and worried that his 
inverted gene would be propagated in society, harming it. Clearly, Symonds was very much a 
man of his times; it wasn’t that he was not introspective or intelligent, but he did, in 
Foucauldian terms, exist within structures of power. 
Foucault argues that it is impossible to transcend power, that even reverse discourses 
against prevalent doxa partake in superstructures of power, but Symonds presents a conundrum 
to the Foucauldian theory.  As a thinker who indulged and enjoyed the dominant patriarchal 
power, Symonds’s shame emanated from his betrayal of the power, but even as his shame 
existed within the superstructure, the shame allowed him to escape into a space outside of 
power. Grosskurth reports that H. F. Brown entrusted Symonds’s biography, locked in a green 
cardboard box, to Edmund Gosse, who was the Chairperson of the Committee of the London 
Library in 1925. But before the green cardboard box, there was a black tin box. In 1869, Henry 
Sidgwick advised Symonds to lock his poems in a black tin box. “Having done this, Henry 
threw the key into the river Avon on the 23rd” (Memoirs 195). Like Forster who famously kept 
the manuscript of Maurice under lock and key (“Publishable but worth it?”), there was shame 
in writing about same-sex relationships for Symonds. Yet, the fates of the black tin box and 
the green cardboard box differed. The whereabouts of the black box remain unknown, but 
Symonds, according to Brown, was anxious to preserve the green box containing the 
autobiography (Memoirs 10). The shame Symonds felt throughout his life evolved through 
time. In the earlier incident, he sought the advice of Sidgwick, who could be seen as an Oedipal 
castrating father, just as Wayne Koestenbaum has argued of what Ellis did to Symonds when 
editing Sexual Inversion. Symonds himself admitted that, when his father died, lifting the 
Oedipal repression, he entered an “energetic phase” of creativity and writing (235). In the latter 
incident of the green box, even though he was still fettered by societal conventions, the shame, 




though his memoirs were “useless… for I shall not publish them,” he still desired to publish 
them (29); someone else would publish them. Symonds represents both the perfect embodiment 
of and anomaly in the Foucauldian theory in that the sexologist was not able to rise above the 
strictures of power, indulging in reverse discourse, and unable to eclipse the nagging shame at 
the back of his head, imposed by society that there was something wrong with homosexuality, 
and, at the same time, he refused to destroy his memoirs, “useless” as they are.    
If we can never transcend the prevailing power, how will things ever change? In The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault wrote: 
What seems in fact to have formed the object of moral reflection for the Greeks in 
matters of sexual conduct was not exactly the act itself (considered in its different 
modalities), or desire (viewed from the standpoint of its origin or its aim), or even 
pleasure (evaluated according to the different objects or practices that can cause it); it 
was more the dynamics that joined all three in a circular fashion (the desire that leads 
to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire). The 
ethical question that was raised was not: which desires? which acts? which pleasures? 
But rather: with what force is one transported “by the pleasures and desires”? The 
ontology to which this ethics of sexual behavior referred was not, at least not in its 
general form, an ontology of deficiency and desire; it was not that of a nature setting 
the standards for acts; it was an ontology of a force that linked together acts, pleasures, 
and desires.” (43) 
Like Symonds, Foucault studied Greek culture to demonstrate his own point, and here, he 
hinted at how change can occur within power. There is “an ontology of a force” which holds 
the superstructure of powers together—in this particular example, he pointed out desires, 
sexual acts, and pleasures as the triumvirate of superstructures—but since in a chain, lapses 




even if the transformation still takes place in a realm of power. What is the “force” that causes 
this change? Foucault did not answer, but for Symonds, his motivation originated from a sense 
of shame, and from a need to be free from shame; Shame has been prohibitory and incendiary. 
Through shame and the writing of his memoirs, Symonds created a subjectivity that is both 
within and outside the power of societal doxa. 
 For Symonds, writing had always been associated with shame and the body. “My 
literary achievement,” Symonds confessed, “is no doubt due in part at least to a high degree of 
nervous sensibility” (64). This association of writing with shame may have started with the 
formative years of schooling. The “moral state of the school” had “filled me with disgust and 
loathing” (94). Pretty boys were nicknamed with female names, and known as “a public 
prostitute or as some bigger fellow’s ‘bitch’” (94). Here, “the talk in the dormitories and the 
studies was incredibly obscene” and mutual masturbation was not uncommon (94). To seal the 
link of writing, shame, and body, Symonds connected the headmaster Charles Vaughan’s 
scandal, his own bodily shame, and his studies. The order of the narrative is important: after 
Symonds revealed the affair between Vaughan and Pretor, he recalled an incident where he sat 
with the headmaster to read Greek iambics and Vaughan caressed his leg. Though the caress 
seemed insignificant to Symonds at the moment, he thought “it poisoned and paralysed my 
moral nature” when he learnt from Pretor about the affair and retroactively remembered the 
caress (98). At this time, Symonds also had crushes on his schoolmates, and “a very depraved” 
schoolmate threw “his arms around me, kissed me, and thrust his hand into my trousers” (98).  
As a result, his health and work suffered. Even as he “felt a terrible new sense of power… [he] 
grew unhealthily and perversely” (98). The shame that manifested itself as physical ill health 
emerged from his judgment that “my own sort of love [is] sin” (176). To be fair, Symonds had 




The complexity of shame, desire, sin, and the educational institution of power are embodied 
for Symonds.  
  Symonds himself was not unaware of the concatenation of these factors in his works: 
“My powers of expression were considerable, yet not of first-rate quality. Vaughan at Harrow 
told me the truth when he said that my besetting sin was ‘fatal facility.’ I struggled long to 
conquer fluency. Still I have not succeeded… I strove, however, to control the qualities I knew 
myself to have, to train and curb them, to improve them by attention to the details of style… 
Passion and imagination, in the true sense of these words, were denied me. I was not born 
without capacity for passion. But I had to tame it down and subdivide it” (218). Symonds’s 
review of his own prowess is not dissimilar to Forster, who famously proclaimed that he would 
be able to write better books were it not for societal prejudice. But unlike Forster, Symonds 
looked inward and blamed himself. He was unable to differentiate his headmaster’s assessment 
and his own. Did Vaughan know that his young student Symonds was homosexual? It is 
unlikely, but whatever the case, Symonds had introjected his “sin” of desire for men and was 
ashamed because of it. He struggled with writing as he struggled with his shame. As long as 
he could “control,” “train,” “curb,” and “tame” his passion for men, he believed that his writing 
would shine.  
However, the repression of his desire to avoid shame is not as straightforward as it 
seems. It could be assumed that Symonds’s desire to strive for literary excellence implies that 
literature is healthy. But for Symonds, perusal of literature is not “wholesome for a man of my 
peculiar temperament” (239). Over his lifetime, he doubted the panacea of literature. Unlike 
the reading scene between Hareton and Catherine in Wuthering Heights, signalling 
reconciliation, Symonds recollected that his reading scene with Vaughan had “poisoned” his 
moral fiber (98). Apart from his personal experience in school, Symonds’s mistrust of 




schools at around the same time he was schooling. According to James Eli Adams, muscular 
Christianity expounded the virtues of outdoor exercise, promoting strength and courage, to 
safeguard against the evils of masturbation and same-sex sexual acts prevalent in schools; such 
acts, Adams demonstrated, were thought by the Victorians to be found in books (101-2). Books, 
which could be used to teach morals, could also instigate “bad” behaviors. Symonds had a 
sexual awakening when he read Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium but he wondered throughout 
his life if the reading of classics had led to the “unnatural vice” in schools (286; 295). Oscar 
Wilde’s Dorian’s descent into depravity is aided by “a poisonous book” (110).  In Forster’s 
Maurice, Durham’s declaration of love to Maurice is prefaced with “I knew you read the 
Symposium in the vac…Then you understand—without me saying more… I love you” (56). 
Maurice replies in consternation that their illicit relationship is a “rotten notion,” a rotten notion 
taken from the Greek classic (56). Even a simple signifier such as a graffito of a penis jolted 
Symonds out of his marital bliss, arousing in him an inexplicable and irrepressible desire (188). 
There is a history of suspicion of associating deviant sexuality with literature, a suspicion not 
unknown to Symonds. Even as Symonds was ashamed that he could be a better writer if he 
could only curb his same-sex passions, he knew the ontological nature of literature could also 
transmit affects and emotions. For him, producing and perusing literature engender deleterious, 
shameful effects in the imagination. Symonds had layers of imbricated shame: the shame of 
not writing to his potential because of his same-sex passions even as he acknowledged that 
people knew him as one of the premier men of letters in his generation, which perhaps might 
give rise to the shame of not living up to his reputation; the shame of producing literature that 
might affect and encourage the homosexual, lurid behavior of schoolboys in public schools, a 
behavior that Symonds censured.  





Often I have felt myself as tired and worn with writing “as the tanned galley-slave is 
with his oar.” Reaction follows; and the fatigue of labour craves the distraction of 
amusement. Trying to evade the congenital disease of my moral nature in work, work 
has drained my nerves and driven me to find relief in passion. The subjects with which 
I have been occupied—Greek poetry, Italian culture in one of the most lawless periods 
of modern history, beauty in nature and the body of man—stimulate and irritate the 
imagination. They excite cravings which cannot be satisfied by simple pleasures. (239)  
Symonds was not unaware that the burden of shame in his writing (“trying to evade the 
congenital disease of my moral nature in work”) took a toll on his body. Like Darwin, whose 
shame manifested itself psychosomatically, shame was written on Symonds’s body as he was 
“worn and tired,” conflating the imperfect pathological body with the diseased mind. What is 
surprising is that although the shame of same-sex passions had, in his own eyes, prevented him 
from being a first-rate writer and caused his fatigue, the same-sex desires also urged him on 
and soothed him; he sought relief in passions. To Symonds, while books may “stimulate” his 
mind, the imagination could not be satisfied without bodily release. “I judged my own sort of 
love to be sin,” wrote Symonds, “But when, in the stage of difference, I became careless about 
sinning, then, and not until then, I discovered love, the keystone of all the rest of my less 
tortured life” (176). When his reading and writing could not satisfy and repress his desire, he 
wallowed in the sinful, and hence, shameful acts of satisfying his desire, and at his extreme 
shame, in his extreme shame, he discovered transcendence and beauty out of his shame. The 
circularity of shame of same-sex desires had in Symonds’s case impeded him as a writer, 
causing his health to deteriorate, and, at the same time, appeasing his psyche as he indulged 
physically in his passions even as books ignited ideas of prurience among schoolboys, a dire 
state of which Symonds disapproved. In Symonds’s subjectivity, shame had coalesced in a 




from same-sex passions, and as he was ashamed of his bodily transgressions and his body of 
works, he also attained satisfaction and pride from them.    
 The incessant struggle with shame, between what others expected of him and what he 
wanted for himself, was reflected in his meandering, indirect style of writing, which has come 
to be known as “queer,” and which led some contemporaries like Arthur Symons to question 
the sexologist’s sanity. Shame necessarily encompasses an anxiety about seeing the self from 
the other’s perspective, regardless of whether the anxiety is real or imaginary, regardless of 
whether the perspectives are accurate, and as a result, we are cautioned against making any 
faux pas in case we lose face in front of others. This characteristic of shame compels the subject 
to occupy introspective spaces of the self and others, splitting one’s subjectivity to 
accommodate others, giving rise to a multiplicity of selves; in shame, as there is an awareness 
of the self, there is also a breaking down of the self and others. This multiplicity is often seen 
in Symonds’s writing:  
This is the way with all of us who, like the caddis worm, build houses around them. 
Men of a different stamp follow the ways of the hermit crab, and creep into solid shells 
which shelter them against the sea and assaults of neighbours. It comes to the same 
thing in the end; only the caddis worm is the pupa of that winged ephemeron the Mayfly, 
born to be eaten up by trout; while the shell into which the hermit crab has crept may 
last long after its tenant’s lonely death, until at last it perishes beneath the stress of 
elemental forces, pounding waves and churning sands. But these things are metaphors; 
and there is a want of taste and sense in straining metaphors too far. (247) 
While critics often point out Symonds’s reluctance to give up his patriarchal privileges, 
Symonds saw himself differently as vulnerable and short-lived and brave. But the jarring 
contradistinction goes beyond perceptions. Stylistically, Symonds compared his openness as a 




sense.” For whom? To him, the metaphors are clearly elegant; otherwise he wouldn’t have 
extended them. His proclamation followed by a retraction of the metaphors demonstrates the 
struggle of pleasing his self and the society. The self-referentiality of examining his own words 
compounds the cacophonies in the passage in spite of the melodious prose. His conflicted 
writing reflects the shame he faced, at once enunciating what he desired to say and policing his 
words for the sake of others.  
 While Symonds warned us/himself of “straining metaphors too far,” he was also 
alerting readers to pay attention to his metaphors. Although Angelo Fusato the gondolier had 
no voice in the memoirs, Symonds imagined what he would think: “A just instinct led [Angelo] 
to calculate that our friendship, originating in my illicit appetite and his compliance, could not 
be expected to develop a sound and vigorous growth. The time must come, he reasoned, when 
this sickly plant would die and be forgotten. And then there was always between us the liaison 
of shame” (275). Two pages later, Symonds wrote, “An element of intimacy [of sex between 
men] is demanded, out of which the sexual indulgence springs like a peculiar plant, which has 
its root in something real” (277). There was no doubt in Symonds’ mind that sex between men 
was illicit and shameful in the two passages. However, while the same-sex act remains constant, 
the extended metaphor of the plant, which springs from shame, differs; in one a moribund plant, 
in another a sturdy one that appears nourishing and stable. The healthy plant is rooted in 
“something real,” indicating vitality and longevity. Meanings of morbidity and wellness elide 
in a metaphor. The instability of the metaphor stems from a sense of shame for Symonds; what 
doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.  
  The struggle between shame and expression of the self is manifested in the precarious 
metaphors as well as in the repetitive narrative; the same story is told twice or more. The pretext 
of separation from his wife—she did not want to have more children—is, for instance, oft 




story of Norman. Phyllis Grosskurth in the introduction to the memoirs implied that since 
Symonds used Norman’s real name, even though he wrote (and lied?) that “Norman” was a 
pseudonym, there was something unconscionable and disingenuous in Symonds’s character, 
which in turn impugned the trustworthiness of the memoirs (28). It is without a doubt inimical 
on Symonds’s part, a reprehensible and deplorable behavior akin to the despicable journalist 
Nico Hines outing young athletes whose lives may be endangered in their own conservative 
countries in the 2016 Olympics, but inexcusable as the behavior might be, Symonds’s shame 
had caused him to collapse and elide meanings in his metaphors. Norman, the only one who 
retained his real name, represented an anomaly to the list of liaisons Symonds provided in the 
memoirs because he was the first and only boy to be of the same social class as Symonds; 
Symonds, like Carpenter and Forster, usually preferred working-class men. Furthermore, his 
teacher-student entanglement with Norman recalled to his mind his exposé of the affair 
between his headmaster Vaughan and classmate Pretor, blighting and terminating Vaughan’s 
otherwise brilliant career. Eve Sedgwick’s influential theory in Between Men states that the 
social contract between men in a patriarchy is such that although homosocial bonding is highly 
encouraged, it is done at the expense of male homosexuality, and Sedgwick goes on to 
exemplify the theory with Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend and The Mystery of Edwin 
Drood where male intimacy is punished with violent attacks. Symonds was the policing 
enforcer of the homosocial continuum when he reported Vaughan, but he was also the 
malfeasant, violating the social contract with his same-sex affairs. The two-fold shame from 
Symonds arose from his failure to abide by the homosocial contract, seducing someone from 
his own social class; not only did he betray his sex, he betrayed his own social class. Norman 





 The shame manifested in the double telling of the same period of his life. In the 
autobiography, instead of chronicling his life in the order of occurrence, he wrote two chapters 
which tell a similar story. In the first telling, an entire chapter is devoted to Norman with ribald 
details of their relationship. In the second, in a separate chapter, he merely repeated that he 
accepted a lectureship for sixth form at Clifton College: “This brought me into close relations 
with the boys. The interest I took in them made me work with energy and enthusiasm” (234). 
Norman is notably absent and expunged from the second account. It is as if there are two 
versions of narratives that Symonds wanted to tell: the first, an explicit risqué one where 
Symonds contravened the homosocial contract, and the second, a cleaned-up version, adhering 
to social decorum, demonstrating that the homosocial connection had given him strength and 
vigor, and perhaps justifying the proscription of male intimacy in society. If the Norman 
chapter were taken out of the memoirs, which could easily be done, Symonds would appear to 
be another Victorian man who paid money to working-class men for sex. Shame obviously 
played a role in the two retellings: to avoid shame, the expunged report that Symonds wrote 
cohered to the societal standards of masculinity.          
 Shame dominated Symonds’s writing and revealed itself in his narrative style in the 
memoirs. Using shame to analyze Symonds’s life and works where meanings are repeated, 
obfuscated, and elided can explicate why his contemporaries doubted his sanity. The binary 
argument that Ed Cohen, Oliver Buckton, and Jonathan Kemp champion to resolve 
contradictions in Symonds’s works lacks the subtlety that a reading of shame can do. A close 
exegesis of shame in Symonds’s works also avoids the need to resolve his work neatly, as Ian 
Venable did. Venable treats shame negatively, and argues that as Symonds’s poetry matured, 
he gained a sense of pride. But shame as an affect is free from value. Although Symonds was 
ashamed of himself, he channelled the affect into his writing and life, enriching his works with 




“For the Perfect Man There Could Be No Shame”: Havelock Ellis’s Latent Shame and 
Style in My Life 
The shame in Ellis’s writing is not as patently obvious as his co-writer Symonds’s partly 
because Ellis projected himself as a heterosexual man in adherence to the norms of Victorian 
society, and partly because he himself was proud to be a leading sexologist of his time. Most 
critics discuss the production of value and the effects of Ellis’s science but do not examine the 
shame in his writing. For example, like many early critics of Symonds, Paul Robinson and 
Sheila Rowbotham explicate Ellis’s texts, tracing the beginning of Modernism from sexology, 
and contrasting Freud and Ellis. Margaret Jackson discusses the tension of Ellis’s views in 
which he advocates that women should control their sexuality and that they should exercise 
their reproduction function. Carolyn Burdett writes on his discourses on eugenics, while Lucy 
Bland and Chris Nottingham, following Rowbotham, situate Ellis’s scientific work in political 
and cultural context. Two critics, Ruth Yeazell and Heike Bauer, notably depart from the 
scientific engagements and repercussions of Ellis’s works, and argue for the literary influences 
behind the sexologist.  
Yeazell, in particular, positions Ellis’s notion of modesty as part of a narrative of 
courtship among the English middle-class. Unlike Darwin’s notion of modesty, in which the 
modest female possesses weaker passions than the male counterpart, modesty for Ellis is “the 
sign of sexual emotion…[and] an expression of feminine erotic impulse” (Studies 1: 46).  A 
blush is an expression of modesty and sexual desires because it is similar to an erection: an 
erection “is a blushing of the penis,” Ellis quotes from an anonymous source (Studies 1: 73).3 
Although Ellis based female signs of sexual desires on the penis, privileging the phallus, his 
interpretation of modesty provides a subversive and powerful reading for seemingly passive 
                                                
3 Ellis might be quoting from Darwin who describes blushing as “blood to surface exposes, 




heroines like Fanny Price, Molly Gibson, and even Esther Summerson. “Such heroines may 
long remain modestly unconscious of their desires,” Yeazell writes, “but the very structure of 
wish fulfillment on which their stories depend must first presume the reader’s knowledge of 
their wishes. If it is the fiction of the heroine’s modesty that enables the novelist to make her 
the subjective center of the narrative, to represent her as a subject is also to represent, however 
obliquely, her choosing and her desire” (48). Using Ellis’s worldview, what appears to be a 
passive subject signals her sexual desires by her modesty and her blushing, and in so doing, 
she eventually obtains the object of her affection.   
Yeazell’s concern with Ellis is to explicate his notion of modesty in narratology, 
relating modesty to Victorian novels; she does not delve into the raison d’être of his text. Why 
did Ellis whose interest revolved about deviant sexual behaviors philosophize about the idea 
of modesty? Is modesty a deviant sexual behavior? The infamy of Sexual Inversion and its trial 
for obscenity prompted Ellis to tactically rearrange the chronology of his oeuvre by placing 
The Evolution of Modesty as the first volume of Studies in the Psychology of Sex and Sexual 
Inversion as the second volume, even thought the latter research was published first. Clearly, 
Ellis hoped that The Evolution of Modesty would chip away the prejudice of readers and prepare 
the readers to accept Sexual Inversion. How can the first volume achieve this?  
     Ellis defined modesty as “an almost instinctive fear prompting to concealment and 
usually centering around the sexual processes” (Studies 1:1), which is similar to Darwin’s 
description of shame in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals: “Under a keen 
sense of shame there is a strong desire for concealment” (295). Ellis further quoted others to 
exemplify what modesty is: a modest woman’s “slightest infractions… are punished with 
atrocious shame… The mind is absorbed in shame instead of being occupied with desire” 
(Stendhal, qtd. in Ellis, Studies 1:2); “Modesty is masculine shame attributed to women… They 




Renooz, qtd. in Ellis, Studies 1: 3). Hohenemser found that modesty is accompanied by shame, 
regarding shame as a psycho-physical phenomenon as “the state of shame consists in a certain 
psychic lameness or inhibition” such as the lowering of the head and the averting of looking 
into the other party’s eyes, actions similar to a display of modesty (qtd. in Ellis, Studies 1:7). 
By associating modesty with shame, Ellis implied that modesty is the avoidance of shame and 
at the same time shame engenders modesty. Modesty is the expression of shame. 
Sometimes Ellis could not differentiate the behavioral trait modesty from the affect 
shame. Although Ellis was quick to point out that modesty arises not entirely from a purely 
sexual phenomenon, modesty “is the timidity of the body” and appears when sexual desire 
appears (Studies 1: 36-7). Sexual desire is often seen as shameful, Ellis explained, because sex 
acts are committed furtively, secretly behind closed doors. A modest lady’s “feeling of shame 
is made to be overcome,” Ellis quoted from Colin Scott (Studies 1: 39). Ellis elaborated that 
the overcoming of shame “correlated with its physical representative, the hymen, in the rupture 
of which there is, in some degree, a disruption of modesty” (Studies 1:39). He further cited 
Montaigne that the “virginal shame” increases “the desire to conquer and curb” in men (Studies 
1:42). On the one hand, Margaret Jackson in “Eroticizing Women’s Oppression” accurately 
points out that Ellis’s notion of prevailing over women’s shame/modesty bears “an uncanny 
resemblance to the familiar patriarchal justification of rape” (4). On the other hand, Ellis’s 
series of Studies in the Psychology of Sex examine aberrant nonheteronormative sexual 
behaviors, and not Victorian middle-class “normal” male sexuality, as Phyllis Grosskurth 
shrewdly notes (Memoirs 22). That is, shame/modesty of sex is abnormal because “for the 
perfect man there could be no shame, because shame rests on an inner conflict in one’s own 
personality” (Studies 1:83). In other words, Ellis implicitly argued that all sexual acts should 




on women when the “conception of women as property” arose in society is inequitable and 
should be abolished.  
Ellis rearranged the chronology of Studies by placing The Evolution of Modesty as the 
first volume to draw a parallel between his body of works and his life’s aspiration to be a 
“perfect man” without shame. The objective of the book placement is first to chip away at the 
prejudice that sex, or the study of sex, is illicit and shameless; what is abnormal about 
discourses on sex is the societal shame/modesty surrounding them. His decision to make 
Modesty the first book in the series is indicative of Ellis who worked hard to disassociate 
himself from any disrepute that adhered to the sexologists. As Chris Nottingham notes in his 
book-length study, Ellis gradually distanced himself from his formative mentor, James Hinton, 
an advocate for polygamy, who paid for part of Ellis’s medical education, when there were 
increasing allegations of sexual misconduct that Hinton abused his social status for sexual 
favors among his female admirers. Similarly for the infamous trial against Bedborough for 
selling “a certain lewd wicked bawdy scandalous and obscene libel in the form of a book 
entitled Studies in the Psychology of Sex: Sexual Inversion,” Ellis himself was not prepared to 
be a witness even as his book was at the heart of the suit (My Life 363). Placing Modesty as the 
first book in the series, distancing himself from his mentor, and displaying an aversion to being 
subpoenaed as a witness in a trial on his book are Ellis’s strategies for appearing reputable and 
avoiding shame. 
Even as Ellis expressed that sexual acts and sexuality should not be shameful, and even 
as he bravely wrote about his sexual fetishes in his autography, he could not escape the sense 
that there was something shameful about sex. He claimed, in the preface of his autobiography, 
to counter the “timidity in self-expression [which is] the outward sign of an increased literary 
emasculation;” he sought to risk telling the truth, “however shameful it might seem to some” 




Western discourses. Foucault argues against the common belief that we are free through 
confessions because the confession is a resource for authority to access and diagnose the sins 
and crimes of the subject which is to be dealt with accordingly. Through confession, subjects 
partake in their own surveillance, deciding what is morally right and wrong. Although both 
Symonds and Ellis repeatedly proclaimed the veracity of their autobiographies, their motives, 
and eventually, their results differ. Symonds aimed to record his life as a case study for future 
sexologists, and delayed the publication of the memoirs out of shame; his shame reconfigured 
and placed him outside the superstructures of powers; his confession is, at the same time, a 
non-confession, as the public did not have access to the autobiography. Ellis, on the other hand, 
fits nicely into Foucault’s thesis that made Ellis believe he freed himself from the shackles of 
societal doxa but was in fact trapped in the system of power; even when he professed over and 
over again that he was not ashamed of his works and his life, the autography belied his 
declaration, shown in his narrative strategy. In the preface, he proclaimed that he would write 
the truth unabashedly, and yet at the same time, he cautioned his “intelligent readers [to read] 
between the lines” (vii-viii). While Ellis modelled himself to be the “perfect man” with no 
shame, he actively avoided shame, trapped in the panopticon of his own surveillance.   
This strategy of avoidance of shame percolated into the writing of his autobiography. 
He wrote honestly about his fetish for “urolagnia” although he justified that it “never developed 
into a real perversity,” that is, he did not act on his sexual arousal from seeing people urinate 
(84). The “trait,” he claimed, was “inherited” from his mother when she urinated on a solitary 
path at the London Zoological Gardens as they were walking side by side (85). Ellis lapsed 
into a critical scientific third-person narrative when analyzing the experience. In the mother, 
there is an “impulse to heighten a pleasurable experience by blending it with the excitement of 
sharing with her son. There was evidently a touch of exhibitionism, the added pleasure of 




for a woman is always a little in love with her first born and only son” (86). He termed such a 
familial intimacy “undinism.” His writing strategy allows him to scrutinize his sexuality 
scientifically, creating a distance between himself and his autobiographical self and inviting 
the reader to view him as a specimen, instead of a deviant. As a specimen, there is no shame 
and stigma attached in the interest of science.  
When he does not dissect his sexuality scientifically, he aestheticizes it. The strategy 
may seem contradictory to us but as many scholars have noted, science and art were not as 
distinct as they are today. In a description of his body, he wrote, “I am not excessively slight 
or at all emaciated. Olive Schreiner said once of my nude form that it was like that of Christ in 
the carpenter’s shop in Holman Hunt’s ‘Shadow of the Cross.’ I am fairly well formed and 
proportioned” (102). In the offhand sentence without a prelude before it or an elaboration after, 
he disclosed that an unmarried woman had seen him naked as if there was no breach in 
Victorian propriety. His writing strategy to avoid shame involves Schreiner appraising and 
evaluating his nude body as art. Just as science turns his urolagniac fetish into a medical 
condition, the aestheticizing of his nudity works to objectify and desexualize his body, 
removing the sexual intimacy between Schreiner and him and, by extension, the shame 
involved in premarital relationships.  
Besides his undinism and exhibitionism, Ellis also confessed his incestuous desire for 
his sister (178). His strategic writing has a two-fold purpose: firstly, the honesty disarms the 
reader, leading the reader to believe in the veracity of his autobiography. What is more 
important in his confession is that he had never acted on his illicit desires—like Christ even as 
Ellis had renounced his Christianity. His comparison of himself with Christ occurs no less than 
four times in his autobiography,4 because like Jesus, Ellis lived in a world of temptations and 
yet he had done nothing shameful; there can be purity among sinners. In his memoir and in his 
                                                




life, Ellis implied that a non-heteronormative, non-productive, and hence shameful desire 
should be curbed, contrary to many critics who note that Ellis wrote to normalize sexual 
deviancy.   
However, his adumbration of his sexual deviancy and his self-control mask Ellis’s 
deeper subjectivity, which he might not even be aware. In Nottingham’s study, he suspects that 
Ellis was homosexual, given that, when Olive Schreiner paraded naked in front of the 
sexologist, offering herself to him, he did not act on the situation. But there is no evidence in 
his autobiography or in others’ to suggest that Ellis desired men. Ellis’s close friendship with 
Edward Carpenter secured a certainty that if Ellis was homosexual or even remotely curious 
about being homosexual, they would have had a chance to sleep together since the promiscuous 
Carpenter believed that male comradeship involves intimacy,5 or there would be a note by Ellis 
like that of E. M. Forster documenting George Merrill touching his backside, which Forster 
links with “a creative spring,” or at the very least, Ellis would have consulted Carpenter. A lack 
of desire for women does not imply that Ellis liked men. 
While no substantiation could be derived from Nottingham’s claim, Ellis did record his 
troubled relationships with women. Onboard a ship in Australia, a female acquaintance, whom 
a reader may assume was sexually available, and he walked up and down the deck, and she 
broke the silence and said, “Ain’t the moon lovely?” (140). He was immediately repulsed by 
her: “Such a feeling of loathing rose up within me that, in a few moments, after briefly 
responding, I said it was time to go below, and wished her good night” (140). The sexologist, 
who wrote and spoke publicly about sex, was put off by a forward female passenger, but it is 
not the quality of forwardness that repelled him. A short while later, he met Miss Papillon who 
                                                
5 Even at 78 years old, Carpenter was still sexually active. Chester Arthur recorded his sexual 
encounter with the 78 year-old Carpenter, and gave the manuscript to Allen Ginsberg. Ginsberg 
published it in Gay Sunshine magazine in 1991. A detailed account can be found in 




possessed “all the vivacity and intelligence and high spirits of her race [French Canadian], 
together with a complete freedom from sex consciousness” (146). Unlike the immodest 
passenger, Miss Papillon was innocent about sex, or modest enough to conceal what she did 
know, and at the same time, she somehow managed to express her interest in Ellis, but he 
“never put out my hand in response” (146). It is easy to understand why Nottingham thought 
the tenuous attraction to women meant that Ellis was homosexual, but Ellis was simply not 
sexually attracted to either men or women.  
This non-attraction for men and limited attraction for women, which we would now 
term asexuality, continued for the rest of his life. Ellis married Edith even though there was no 
sexual attraction between them. On their wedding day, they returned to their respective 
“bachelor homes” and did not consummate their marriage (294). Eventually, like Symonds and 
his wife, Ellis and Edith agreed mutually to stop all marital relationships because Edith disliked 
“the mechanical contraceptive preliminaries of intercourse” and Ellis felt that “relations were 
incomplete and unsatisfactory, too liable to jar on one or other of the partners” (342). When 
later on Edith proposed to recommence sexual relations, he rejected the offer because he found 
no satisfaction in sex. In fact, even when he had a relationship with Amy with Edith’s tacit 
acknowledgement, and while it is clear in Ellis’s autobiography that Edith’s female partners 
fulfilled her sexual needs (310), there is no indication that he had intercourse with Amy, as 
Nottingham notes; Amy acts as a companion for Ellis during Edith’s long and frequent 
absences (305, 308). The death and dearth of sex between Ellis and his spouse did not cause a 
rift between the couple; on the contrary, it fortified their ties, creating a passionless, spiritual, 
Platonic love that allowed the free exchange of ideas as Ellis repeated throughout the rest of 
the autobiography.6 His attraction to Edith, who was to his knowledge an invert, and to Miss 
Papillon is based on the idea of comradeship: what he wrote of Miss Papillon appertains to the 
                                                




women in his life in general, “She treated me with all the frankness and trust of a comrade and 
friend; it was precisely such a comrade and friend, making no appeal to sexual emotion, that I 
then needed” (146). Even as a young boy, regarding a girl he wanted to marry he “had no 
physical desires and no voluptuous emotions; I never pictured to myself any joy of bodily 
contact with her or cherished any sensuous dreams” (89). Instead of his mentor James Hinton’s 
brand of physical polyamory, Ellis’s relationship with women was characterized by spiritual 
comradeship, tying into his political inclination towards socialism where he first met Carpenter 
in a meeting at The Fellowship of the New Life.   
If it seems incongruous that Ellis should not have mentioned his open marriage in his 
autobiography to be above blame, to be free from shame, it is because he, like Christ, is the 
observer and not the participant, as he duly notes: “If I had written my own ‘history,’ it would 
doubtless have been a surprise, to whose who could have recognised it, to find how small my 
experience was and how temperate my estimate of the sexual act. I am regarded as an authority 
on sex, a fact which has sometimes amused one or two (though not all) of my more intimate 
women friends. But after all, it is the spectator who sees most of the game” (224). His lack of 
sexual desire assisted his work, helping him to avoid the shame of being associated with sex.  
One of his writing strategies to avoid shame is to reinforce the narrative of his non-
desire by referencing his partner’s work. Edith’s novel, Kit’s Woman, tells a story of a married 
couple, Janet and Kit, who run into marital woes when Kit becomes impotent in a mining 
accident. He urges Janet to have an affair with an older man, and she bears his child to 
everyone’s satisfaction. Ellis called the novel “genuinely personal” as “the story was 
consciously or unconsciously inspired by her own relations with me” (348). While Ellis uses 
the novel to underline that an open marriage can achieve the triumph of a nonsexual love over 
physical attraction, it should be noted that he did not defend his manhood even as he claimed 




the reader’s perception of his virility or lack thereof especially in light of his want of sexual 
desire to evade the shame of his sexual deviancy of undinism, exhibitionism, incest, and open 
marriage. On the surface, it appears subversive that Ellis emasculated himself in patriarchal 
Victorian society but the notion that he would rather be known to be effete than to be ashamed 
of his fetishes, fantasies, and behavior demonstrates the length he went to avoid ill repute.  
The mention of Kit’s Woman functions as a foil to Edith and Ellis’s relationship because, 
as opposed to the novel, it was Edith who initiated the idea of an open marriage: “Even my 
strong sense of justice could scarcely have long tolerated so one-sided a sexual freedom in 
marriage. It might be true that I was exclusively heterosexual and she was not, and that 
therefore there was no demand on me to go outside marriage for love. But it is also true that 
the very qualities in her nature which made her largely homosexual were qualities which, 
fortifying as they might be to our comradeship, were inimical to the purely feminine qualities 
of sweetness and repose a man seeks in a woman” (310). Here, Ellis adopted another writing 
strategy to elude shame, a strategy to scapegoat Edith. Her scandalous novel proved that any 
twisted ideas originated from her. Just as it was his mother who urinated in front of him, 
arousing in him his undinism, it was Edith who instigated that their sexual relations should 
come to an end (342), it was Edith whose masculine same-sex desires were uncontrollable and 
who fomented the idea of an open marriage, it was Edith whose hysteria was unchecked, 
provoking Ellis into a divorce. Because Edith predeceased him and the publication of his 
autobiography, and because Ellis was the literary custodian of Edith’s works and letters, he 
quoted selectively from her letters and burned others.  The unconscious scapegoating of Edith 
should not be read to impugn Ellis’s earnestness and character because, after all, he confessed 
his sexual peccadilloes and, besides, he appeared to genuinely care for her. The scapegoating 




unconsciously creating an antagonist in the person closest to him, the person he loved the most, 
and inculpating her in the sexual decisions he partook. 
  Incriminating Edith to the readers of his autobiography depends on the readers’ trust 
of Ellis’s veracity. It is not enough for him to maintain that he was merely following Edith’s 
judgment; he needed to craft a convincing narrative to present his case, and a specific example 
of his modus operandi will explain how readers are swayed to his perspective. Consider the 
way he told readers about their decision to have an open marriage. He began with an anecdote 
of a letter Edith wrote to him, recounting her “emotional outflow” towards Claire (309). The 
letter pained him as he had all “the weaknesses of a human husband,” but he “conquered [his] 
pain and gave no sign that [he] had even felt any” although he was only “a human” with a 
“suffering heart” (309). Even though he had a “purely intellectual interest in Hinton’s doctrines” 
of polyamory, and even though he was conscious of “a flaw in the ideal of married love [he] 
had so far cherished,” a small part of him still believed in the sanctity of marriage until “a secret 
wound of the heart, ‘not so deep as a well nor so wide as a church door’” killed the “conception 
of mutual devotion in marriage” (310). He continued to quote several letters between Edith and 
him relating to Claire and he concluded that “Edith’s love for Claire involved a diminished 
tenderness for [him]” (316). After Claire, “there was a succession of them” (316). Eight pages 
after examining their open relationship and Edith’s infidelity, he finally introduced Amy, his 
paramour. The narrative structure makes him impeccable. Edith fell in love with someone else 
without first discussing it with him, although they had hitherto been faithful to each other. 
However, because he wanted her to be happy, he suppressed his suffering and pain. The word 
“human” appears thrice in two pages, reminding readers of his humanity, and the intensity of 
his agony and heartache. Any idealistic notions he had regarding the mutual fidelity of marriage 
were now killed by “a secret wound of the heart,” not by philosophical meditation or personal 




should deduce it was caused by Edith’s liaison. To describe his wound, he quoted from Romeo 
and Juliet, a play about a love so intense that the lovers would rather die than live without each 
other, implying that he was capable of such dedication till death. Although he was an atheist, 
the Shakespearean quote connects the church, the sanctity of marriage vows, and him, recalling 
to readers the comparison Ellis made between Jesus and himself.  At once, Ellis was both 
“human” and consecrated. Furthermore, when Edith had a series of inamoratas who robbed her 
love for him, was it not equitable that he received one lover whom he did not seek but met 
through happenstance? He was, after all, just human.  
Ellis’s careful construction in scapegoating Edith to avoid the shame of his own 
unfaithfulness is effective because he displays great love for her throughout the autobiography. 
Even though they are “not a union of unrestrainable passion” but “a union of affectionate 
comradeship,” and even though their marriage is “an experiment which might, or might not, 
turn out well” (270), he has shown immense concern for Edith. In fact, the autobiography might 
be mistaken for Edith’s biography because from the point that he meets Edith, the book details 
Edith’s life and features her letters (from his point of view) as much as it does his. As the 
honesty displayed in his confession over his sexual fetishes compels readers to believe that he 
did not commit any deviant and shameful sex acts, his love for Edith endears him to readers 
and, hence, blinds readers to the scapegoating. A man who loves his deceased spouse so much 
could not possibly cast aspersions on her, and therefore what he said that Edith did must be 
true.    
 
Conclusion: Shame and Writing About Sex 
As Ellis found out in the Bedborough Trial, writing about sex in the Victorian age invites shame 
and ignominy even under the aegis of medical discourses. Sexual Inversion is not a book a 




entails the author’s knowledge on sex, be it first-hand experience or listening to others’ sordid 
details or reading “poisonous” books; any way of knowing about sex was deplorable and not 
what a respectable Victorian gentleman would do. The Victorians placed great value on 
respectability, as is evident in the many Victorian novels about fallen women, from Gaskell’s 
Ruth to Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss. Even men were required to stick to decorum to a lesser 
extent. Both Frank Fowke and Will Holland, men who returned from India, could not find 
suitable wives because of their illegitimate half-caste children (Family Secrets 13-46). Under 
this repressive milieu, sexologists were under great scrutiny and a sex scandal could ruin them.  
 Ellis and Symonds experienced shame and dealt with it in different manners. In life, 
Ellis suffered less agony than Symonds, reflected in the straightforward, open, and frank 
manner of his autobiography. His confession in his memoirs meant to him that he had lived 
without shame, but his writing strategy suggests that he had much shame, because he pushed 
the blame onto the women in his life. In the end, while he worked in a transgressive field, he 
could not transcend the shame. On the other hand, Symonds had lived with shame and pain for 
a great part of his life because of his homosexuality, a nagging feeling that he did not fit in, 
and his sensitive and uptight nature. He could not indulge in sexual horseplay with his 
classmates and could not engage in overt sexual behavior like his contemporaries, Marzials 
and Gower. The conflict between the puritanical society, and his internal shame in being 
homosexual, and his desire to “out” himself via his memoirs distilled into his style of circular 
and meandering writing. His shame drove him to write and to confess. The process of 
struggling with his shame creates a gap in the Foucauldian superstructures of power, allowing 
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